A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF VALUE

BY

MARY EVELYN CLARKE, PH.D.

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, SMITH COLLEGE, NORTHAMPTON, MASS.

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS, LTD.
10 & 11 WARWICK LANE, E.C.4
1929

Digitized by Google

BF778
C6
EDUC. PSYCH. LIBRARY

Printed in Great Britain for the UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS, LTD.,
by HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LTD., London and Aylesbury.

Digitized by Google

PREFACE

It is my aim in this essay to illustrate the change of attitude towards the problem of value which has resulted from its inclusion in the domain to which modern psychology has applied the genetic methods of biological science. In particular I wish to draw attention to some of the consequences of the very common preoccupation with its origin and variations in the experience of the individual to the neglect of its other aspects, notably its relation to knowledge, which is the real criterion of its validity.

I cannot, indeed, claim to be criticizing a current tendency in philosophy, for there is evidence that the trend of thought has already turned against the *Psychologismus* I am describing, so that I may be rather voicing the feeling of the present generation of thinkers than opposing it. Nevertheless, I am afraid that Professor Urban's treatment of this type of criticism as a matter of common agreement among philosophers [1] must be regarded rather as a hope for the future of a nascent movement than as an accurate account of the present outlook in philosophy. It is true that in England, where the

[1] See his Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association: *Progress in Philosophy in the Last Quarter Century*, published in the Philosophical Review, March, 1926.

734152

Digitized by Google

dominant influence upon the thought of the age has been mathematical physics, this psychologistic tendency is scarcely traceable in the works of philosophers, though its effect upon popular thought has been considerable. In France and Germany, and in America, on the other hand, it is only in the last few years that the tide seems to have set in the opposite direction, and the later writings of Meinong and of Urban himself must be regarded as pioneer work towards the formation of a new tradition in the theory of value.

This brief indication of my intention will explain my failure to refer to the theories of some of the most widely recognized authorities in this field, even in a classification which claims to be as nearly as possible exhaustive. As I consider the question of most interest in this connection at the present time to be that of the validity of value judgments, it is my desire to pave the way for a more adequate treatment of this by pointing out some of the omissions and ambiguities in the recent discussions both of it and of the closely related epistemological problems. I have therefore endeavoured to avoid as far as possible the metaphysical issues raised by Münsterberg, Sorley, and, among the Germans, by Rickert and Windelband, contenting myself with a brief indication in my concluding chapter of my reasons for rejecting the presuppositions upon which such metaphysical theories of value are based.

Digitized by Google

A fuller discussion of the metaphysic of value would have carried me beyond the scope of my subject.

My indebtedness to the writings of Professor G. E. Moore is too obvious to demand acknowledgment here. Professor Laird's *Study in Moral Theory* was published after the first draft of this essay was written, but it will be clear that I am in close agreement with him, and have found his suggestive illustrations very helpful.

In addition to my quotations from his *New Rationalism* I am indebted to Professor E. G. Spaulding, of Princeton University, for some suggestions made to me verbally which I have not acknowledged in the text.

Parts of my third, fourth, and fifth chapters embody the major portion of an article on *Valuing and the Quality of Value* which appeared in the Journal of Philosophy, January 31, 1925.

My thanks are due to the Publication Fund of the University of London for a grant in aid of the publication of this book, the substance of which was originally presented to the University as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

LOGIC VERSUS "PSYCHOLOGISMUS" . . 1

CHAPTER II

AFFECTIVE THEORIES OF VALUE . . . 41

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

SOME QUASI-AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCES . . 90

CHAPTER III

THE THEORY OF VALUE AS INTEREST . . 102

CHAPTER IV

VALUE AS A SUBJECT-OBJECT DETERMINATION . 148

Digitized by Google

CHAPTER V

PAGE

OBJECTIVE THEORIES OF VALUE AND SOME CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS OF THESE . . 192

CHAPTER VI

SOME METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY DEFENDED 253

INDEX 323

Digitized by Google

A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF VALUE

CHAPTER I

LOGIC VERSUS "PSYCHOLOGISMUS"

1. *Introductory.*—The evolution of the problem of value.

2. *The rise of "Psychologismus."*—Psychology's usurpation of the foundations of moral philosophy—Neglect of the problem of validity by the earlier value psychologists—Its diverse treatment by more recent investigators—Psychology's claim to the whole domain of the "normative sciences"—Some examples from modern logic—Parallel tendencies in the treatment of value—The genetic derivation of standards.

3. *Baldwin's Genetic Logic.*—His account of logical universality criticized.

4. *Baldwin's logic of affection.*—His genetic theory of moral obligation a *petitio principii*—His affective generalization criticized.

5. *Summary.*

1. It is the orthodox biological view that the later phases of an evolutionary process are normally characterized by greater complexity than the earlier phases. The permanent interest of this, as of any scientific truism, lies less in its original significance than in the possibility of extending it to departments with which it was not at first associated. True, the researches of Comparative Psy-

Digitized by Google

chology have already made its application to mental life as familiar as its reference to physical development. It is in respect of their greater simplicity and lack of clear-cut distinctions that we contrast the thought of the savage with that of the civilized adult. What these early stages of mental development lack is the conceptual power of holding together in thought what is common to many different experiences, of perceiving identity in any degree of diversity. The doctrine has not, however, been so commonly applied to the *product* of thought as to its *process*; hence it is to the philosopher's account of knowledge as no mere summation of facts, but a gradual unfolding of a complex and minutely differentiated structure, that attention has lately been directed. It is still of interest to point out that, in the relative homogeneity of early thought, philosophy was not distinguished from natural science, much less was there any distinction between the physical and biological sciences or between the various sciences in each of these groups. The line of advance has been consistently in the direction of a more delicate discrimination, until we reach the present situation, where every aspect of every subject is handed over to a specialist for a treatment so detailed that a lifetime is often too short for its accomplishment.

It is generally admitted, of course, that the development is not a product of analysis alone. By

Digitized by Google

characterizing the evolutionary process as a change in the direction of *coherent* heterogeneity, Spencer himself implied that the differentiation is always accompanied by reintegration, though it is important to notice that, in the evolution of thought at least, there is seldom complete equilibrium between the two. In any department at any one time one tendency is likely to predominate.

It is a popular view of philosophy that its task is specifically the task of integration, of harmonizing and unifying the results of the various sciences. Knowledge, we are told, is organic, and it is the philosopher's part to rescue its members from the dissecting knife of the laboratory worker and to restore them to their places in the system of thought. The sciences isolate their particular subject-matters from the unity of experience, and their treatment of them is in this sense abstract. It is for philosophy to overcome this abstraction, and exhibit knowledge as a concrete structure. It is important here to avoid the elementary blunder of believing that the function of philosophy is *altogether* synthetic, the analysis having always been previously performed by the special sciences. Obviously scientific imagination is constantly performing syntheses, even between elements apparently remote, and there are plenty of analytic philosophers; thus, if we are to distinguish between the two departments at all, it cannot be in this

Digitized by Google

superficial manner. As, moreover, the one characteristic which the many new tendencies appearing in philosophy at the present time have in common seems to be their opposition to Objective Idealism, a predominantly synthetic philosophy, we may even perhaps claim that this is an age of analysis in this as in other departments—thus an age which is effecting the alliance of science and philosophy, not their divorce—and that we shall therefore discover the most interesting recent developments of thought if we direct our attention to its increasing heterogeneity rather than to its growth in coherence, and consider some of the principal *distinctions* which modern writers have emphasized.

2. I am aware that it may appear paradoxical to introduce a dissertation on value in these terms in view of the fact that, so far from being a problem distinguished by recent analysis, the nature of the good has been a central topic of discussion from the dawn of philosophy. A little reflection upon its treatment by earlier thinkers as contrasted with the methods of the present day will, however, show the relevance of these opening remarks. It is only in comparatively recent discussions, where the demand for a more and more searching analysis has led to a great increase in specialization, that it has come to be recognized as a separate field of investigation. Until recently it was held that the problem was sufficiently met by the statement of a metaphysical

Digitized by Google

position—*vide* its treatment by Spinoza and Kant —and any important modification in a theory of value was regarded as evidence of a fundamental change of belief. In other words, the so-called "normative sciences,"[1] being rooted in metaphysics, derived the solution of their more far-reaching problems from this source. Hedonism, for example, implied a naturalistic philosophy, whilst a doctrine of self-realization like Green's derived its whole meaning from his idealistic presuppositions as to the nature of the self. In each case the validity of the moral criterion depended upon a metaphysical proposition.

As a result, however, of the rapid advance made in the last half century by the science of psychology, and the consequent application of the genetic method to matters formerly considered to be quite beyond its scope, a number of questions have presented themselves to which a general philosophical theory does not seem to afford a satisfactory answer. How, it is asked, can we claim universality for standards which are seen to have evolved in the course of social development? And how is *the process of apprehending* good and evil, beauty and ugliness, related to these qualities themselves? Is valuing simply the discernment of a property of

[1] i.e. logic and ethics, for æsthetics was as yet in its infancy, and it is here, perhaps, that the new tendency reveals itself most clearly.

Digitized by Google

the object, or is it in some sense constitutive of what we call the value? Or, as the question is popularly worded, are values subjective or objective?

I do not mean, of course, that all these problems are new in the history of the subject, that none of them were envisaged as aspects of the broader question at first under consideration. The relation of value to consciousness, for example, was usually determined by the supposed relation of reality itself to this. Thus, to quote a familiar instance, Hume "denominates objects Good" because they "produce immediately an agreeable sensation, . . . as others from their immediate disagreeable sensation acquire the appellation of Evil. . . . Some objects again, by being naturally conformable or contrary to passion, excite an agreeable or painful sensation; and are thus called Good or Evil."[1] But as, with him, objects are themselves psychical in character, and are only related through an accidental association of ideas, this view of the nature of good and evil was always met by a criticism of his sensationalist theory of knowledge. It called forth no special defence of the objectivity of *value*. It was the claim made by one of the empirical sciences that value lay within its special field, and must be treated by its method, and the resulting problem of

[1] David Hume: A Dissertation on the Passions, Section I, *Essays Moral, Political and Literary*, Vol. II, London, 1875 edition.

Digitized by Google

harmonizing the conclusions thus reached with the principles forming the supposed metaphysical basis of the normative sciences (notably of ethics), that revealed the necessity of treating the notion of value as an independent subject of research. The crucial issue in this conflict has always been the first of the questions just enumerated: Can the validity of the value judgment (e.g. the judgment of moral goodness) be determined, as psychologists claim, by a study of the genesis and history of value, or does this present a separate problem to be investigated after the genetic account is completed?

It is true that this issue has not always been recognized by the protagonists of the psychological method—indeed, most of the earlier investigators in this department accept the former alternative so unquestioningly that, if we were to confine ourselves to this phase of the enquiry, we might be tempted to think that such a question should be dismissed as meaningless, and that the whole subject of the nature and implications of value could be exhausted by a complete psychological analysis. The most noteworthy example of this attitude is Ehrenfels' *System der Werttheorie*, probably the most systematic treatise on the psychology of value that has appeared. Ehrenfels clearly assumes that the values he describes find their justification in the social function they perform. Thus, at the close of the ethical enquiry to which his second

Digitized by Google

volume is devoted, he explicitly identifies General Ethical Theory with the Psychology of Moral Values, as outlined in this volume, whilst he declares the more specific theoretical interests of ethical science to be: (1) descriptive—the tracing of the history of moral values; (2) genetic—an explanation of these in terms of the laws and tendencies which the preceding historical account shall have revealed.[1] The possibility of pressing the question of validity further does not occur to him.

The ground of these writers' preoccupation with origins is undoubtedly in most cases the fact that their philosophical background is a naturalism for which the discoveries of biological science are final; hence the norms and imperatives of a metaphysic of morals seem to them like echoes of a bygone age, which are quite irrelevant to the subject as they envisage it. That the question of norms may not be a metaphysical question in the strict sense of the term at all, the nature of ethical and æsthetic standards being a problem which falls outside the domains of both metaphysics and psychology, is a possibility which philosophers have only lately begun to entertain,[2] and which the

[1] C. von Ehrenfels: *System der Werttheorie*, Vol. II, Leipzig, 1898, pp. 257–8.

[2] G. E. Moore and Meinong (in his later works) are the writers who have defended this hypothesis most successfully. (See especially Meinong: *Für die Psychologie und gegen den Psychologismus*, Logos, Vol. III, 1912.)

Digitized by Google

naturalists among them are, of course, reluctant to admit. "The analysis . . . and classification of values," says Professor Perry in his original statement of the naturalistic position,[1] "will be based upon a study of varieties of interest. Interests may be dispositional or actual, momentary or permanent, personal, subpersonal or super-personal, individual or collective, mutually consistent or inconsistent, original or acquired. The words good and evil now become blanket names for a thousand different attitudes of liking and disliking. The importance of the school of Meinong[2] lies in exploitation of this rich empirical field, in its substitution of this systematic but elastic polytheism for the conventional trinitarianism of the worshippers of the true, the beautiful, and the good." And, as the empirical method has been substituted for the method of deduction from metaphysical principles, it is naturally assumed that the *products* of this new method will replace those of the old one—that is to say, that the values shown to emerge in the course of social evolution will automatically assume the rôle of those once deduced from a now discarded metaphysic. It is only when it is recognized that this rôle was the rôle of authority, in the sense of

[1] Ralph Barton Perry: *The Definition of Value*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XI, pp. 153–4.

[2] i.e. in his earlier work, in which he associates himself with Ehrenfels.

Digitized by Google

being the accepted criterion of *what ought to be*, that a suspicion arises that these newly enthroned deities (who are after all of very humble origin !) may not prove adequate to all the functions of godhead.

As stated, the more recent writers on this subject are for the most part aware of this rather obvious difficulty. The interesting fact is not that they have dealt with it, but that they have suggested so many different answers to it, some of which enable their authors to retain their radically empirical standpoint, whilst others reveal the necessity of supplementing the psychological enquiry by one which employs a different method. What these various answers are, we shall presently have to enquire.

For the moment it is sufficient to note that there seems to be only one point upon which all these writers are agreed, viz. the impossibility of returning to a view which derives its value distinctions from metaphysics alone. Upon this, however, even writers much addicted to metaphysical speculation are emphatic. Dr. A. E. Taylor, for example, declares that a Metaphysic of Ethics is the goal and not the starting-point of an examination of morals, the one necessary and sufficient basis for which is psychology, " the word being understood in that comprehensive sense in which it includes the psychological side of anthro-

Digitized by Google

pology and natural history."[1] It would be easy to find parallel statements in other recent writers.[2] Hence, in place of the rival claims of empiricists and apriorists to have furnished a complete account of value, a somewhat different issue has lately emerged, which has been more squarely faced by both parties—I mean the question how far an enquiry which remains at the standpoint of the individual experient can determine the validity of the standards and imperatives it discovers in his experience, how far these have, if not metaphysical, at least *logical* and *epistemological* implications to which the subjective reference is irrelevant. A final answer to this question can only be given at the close of this essay, but the general direction in which that answer is to be sought will become apparent if we consider for a moment how modern psychology has usually interpreted the general logical problem of validity.

It would be generally admitted to be an understatement of the case were I to represent the

[1] A. E. Taylor: *The Problem of Conduct*, London, 1901, p. 88.

[2] e.g. B. Bosanquet: *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, London, 1912, p. 296: "Before arguing upon questions of value, we must have immediate experience of what is meant by caring for something. We must have the judgment that something can be cared for, before we can develop it by considering what must be cared for more or less." True, these "necessary minima of experience" are not ultimate or fundamental, but they are "the starting-points from which experience develops."

Digitized by Google

psychologist's usurpation of the ancient claim of metaphysics to form the basis of moral philosophy as the only shifting of boundaries which has resulted from the very rapid development of his science. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that most of the ground formerly covered by the mental, or philosophical, sciences has now come to be disputed territory. It is true that philosophers have not as a rule taken these other demands so seriously. Few logicians, for instance, have troubled to dispute the claim made by some psychologists to the whole domain of logic, only a strictly subordinate function being left to this science, which has even been renamed *Psychologic*,[1] on the ground that, as thus reconstituted, it has too little kinship with the older logic for the same name to be applicable to both without ambiguity. For, where this claim has been made explicit, as in the case just cited, it has usually appeared too paradoxical to be taken seriously. In many instances, however, the encroachment has been much more gradual, and a careful study of some of these has convinced me that in such cases its consequences have not always been clearly recognized. It is notably the confusion of logical with psychological issues which seems to be the principal source of confusion in the theory of value to-day, hence no work upon the subject can afford to neglect this psychologistic

[1] By F. C. S. Schiller: *Formal Logic*, London, 1912, p. 393.

Digitized by Google

tendency. For this reason I have chosen to develop the main argument of this essay against the background of the broader conflict of these two sciences. If any metaphysical issue is involved, I believe, as Dr. Taylor does, that this is only revealed at a relatively late stage of the enquiry.

We have seen that it is characteristic of the "psychologistic" tendency which I am describing to deny the normative character of any of the philosophical sciences (with the possible exception of ethics in its practical aspect). There seems to be some confusion of motives here. The original reason for questioning the appropriateness of the name was undoubtedly the recognition that it is not the primary task of a science to lay down practical rules, and that the aim of logic, for example, should be rather to study the forms of thought than to give directions for correct thinking. So far the reaction is one with which any theorist must be in complete sympathy. Once deny a practical interest in enforcing standards, however, and it is easy to overlook the theoretical interest of relating and systematizing the principles which may serve as standards.[1] Hence the polemic

[1] It is not always recognized that logical principles are not themselves rules. The principle of syllogistic reasoning, for example, simply defines the relation between certain logical forms. A rule of correct reasoning may be stated as a corollary of it, but it is not itself a statement of such a rule. This distinction

Digitized by Google

against formal or normative logic, like that against normative ethics, tends more and more to represent the scientific task as that of tracing the *origin* and *growth* of the principles of reasoning. And, as it is not difficult for psychology to establish a claim to this historical enquiry, a rearrangement of boundaries ensues, and psychology, as the general science of mental development, is represented as assigning the department of reasoning to the ancillary study of logic as its particular sphere.

This psychological trend is traceable in many logicians in whom its full import has not always been recognized. The classical instance is Mill's belief that all reasoning is from particular to particular, which may be a perfectly correct description of the village matron's mental process, but which does not enable us to determine its validity. It is possible to trace a number of Mill's other logical errors to the same confusion, e.g. his claim that the Law of Causation is established by induction, or his attributive view of propositions. It is obvious that the Law of Causation is suggested by induction, but it is not validated by that method. Similarly, we become acquainted with objects (and so are able to make judgments concerning them) only through awareness of some of their qualities, but an account

between the theoretical and practical aspects of logical principles is discussed in detail by Husserl: *Logische Untersuchungen*, Halle-a.d.S., 1913. See especially Vol. I, pp. 154 ff.

Digitized by Google

of the process whereby we reach judgment does not tell us what we *mean* when we judge. The attributive view is not a view of the import of propositions at all. As, however, Mill distinguished psychology and logic only as science and art, holding that the theoretical grounds of logic are "wholly borrowed from psychology, and include as much of that science as is required to justify the rules of the art,"[1] it is not surprising that he should revert to the psychological standpoint whenever he abandons for a moment the practical attitude. It would be easy to cite other examples of this oscillation in the writings of orthodox logicians.[2] It is

[1] J. S. Mill: *An Examination of the Philosophy of Sir W. Hamilton*, 2nd edition, London, 1865, pp. 388–9, quoted by Husserl, op. cit., p. 51.

[2] We even find something of this obscuring of boundaries in a writer whose logical bias is too apparent (in spite of the statements quoted above, p. 11, note) to allow of his being charged with psychologism. What he means by characterizing logic as "the morphology of knowledge," Bosanquet tells us, is that "the form of thought is a living function, and the phases and moments of this function are varieties and elements of the form. Therefore the Morphology of Knowledge must be construed as not excluding the Physiology of Thought" (B. Bosanquet: *Logic*, 2nd edition, Oxford, 1911, Vol. I, p. 2). His account of judgment is thus a purely genetic one, tracing its evolution from the simple impersonal judgment, whose subject is some undefined portion of reality, up to the abstract universal judgment of science, in which a concept has replaced the demonstrative of perception, the purpose of this scheme being "to master *the nature of a process, the scientific*

Digitized by Google

more important for my present purpose, however, to call attention to the more uncompromising adoption of the psychological position by some of Mill's modern descendants in the empirical tradition—men like F. C. S. Schiller and J. M. Baldwin—who begin by furnishing an exhaustive account of the psychology of reasoning, and proceed to argue, precisely in the manner just described, that, since the genetic method is the only fruitful method for a non-mechanical science, any science which is concerned with thought must proceed historically; thus logic can be nothing more than a department of psychology, the whole subject-matter of which they have already treated under that head.

As, moreover, it is possible to trace a certain parallel between cognition and other psychical processes, notably feeling, it is sometimes added that there is a logic of affection analogous to the logic of cognition, the characteristic processes of which are generalization, subsumption, and, where feeling and conation are organized as interest, a claim to universal assent. It is here that some of the consequences for a theory of value become most apparent, for the experience we call valuing is usually held by psychologists to consist in

history of a function" (p. 97, italics mine). It is true that, for Bosanquet, it is in the last resort logic which furnishes the clue to the nature of reality; hence with him it is logic which finally absorbs psychology, and not *vice versa*, but the significant fact remains that here too we find the old lines of demarcation effaced.

Digitized by Google

feeling, a view which renders its logical aspect—the question of the validity of the value—a very difficult problem. If, however, feeling can be shown to exhibit a logical development similar to that of cognition, an easy transition is effected from the immediate experience of valuing as feeling pleasure (or taking an interest) in an object to the recognition of standards or norms having apodeictic force.

This is, of course, an extreme instance of *Psychologismus*, and few of the defenders of the psychological line of approach would probably care to press this analogy between thought and feeling. Even where no such argument is adduced, however, it is commonly held by writers who are influenced by this line of thought that the standard by which an experienced value is tested is itself a product of the experience of the race, if not of the individual—hence the widespread belief in the subjectivity of all values. The hypothesis thus suggests itself that whether value is regarded as epistemologically subjective or objective depends upon whether the logical question of validity is or is not distinguished from the psychological question of genesis. Where the two are identified, or where the latter is still held to furnish an answer to the former, the value is traced to the psychical activity of valuing. Where, on the other hand, it is argued that the fact that an experience occurs does not enable us to judge whether it is *good* that it should occur, or

Digitized by Google

(more accurately) that the fact that a thing is "a felt good" does not mean that it is necessarily a genuine good, the value is treated as a factor entirely distinct from any subject's experience of it to be sought in the objects, or relations of objects, which have given rise to the experience. Thus the logical and epistemological issues, though distinct, are very closely related, and any confusion in the one involves the distortion of the other. As the epistemological issue is the more familiar and obvious, I shall choose this as my usual point of attack in the chapters that follow, though my principal object is to find a solution of the logical problem which underlies it. In order, however, to exhibit this problem of the logic of value as but one aspect of the broader conflict of logical and psychological claims, I propose to devote some space in this introductory chapter to a discussion of the extreme case of psychologism just referred to, in which the parallel between genetic logic and the genetic theory of value is most clearly revealed. As the very wholesale claims made on behalf of this method have not found very wide acceptance, an examination of them may prepare the reader to extend his criticisms to some of the more plausible epistemological arguments in which the same bias is apparent, and which lead, if pressed, to very similar results.

3. The writer who has drawn out this genetic

Digitized by Google

parallel in most detail is Mr. J. M. Baldwin, the first two volumes of whose *Thought and Things* are devoted to the exposition of his new method in logic, whilst his third volume attempts to trace an analogous development of feeling, in the course of which moral imperatives and æsthetic standards emerge. Thus, although this work is by no means one of the most recent contributions to the subject, it will be convenient to take it as representative of the more extreme tendency to be illustrated here. I should, however, be in danger of obscuring rather than shedding light upon the central problem of this essay were I to enter into the amazing intricacies of Mr. Baldwin's first two volumes, any adequate discussion of which would necessarily be a very long one, and I must therefore assume that the general features of his genetic view of logic are familiar to my readers,[1] and confine myself to enumerating without elaboration or comment the one or two points which are of special significance for my own argument.

The uncompromising language in which Baldwin introduces his subject already gives a clue to his position. Both the traditional Aristotelian logic

[1] For a very searching criticism of this see Bosanquet's articles in the Psychological Review, quoted below; also an article by J. E. Creighton: *The Notion of the Implicit in Logic*, Philosophical Review, Vol. XIX.

Digitized by Google

and the metaphysical logic of Absolute Idealism having, as he thinks, broken down through their failure to apply to our concrete mental life, he declares it to be the task of the new logic he defends to answer, first, the questions *how do we think* and *how is knowledge made*, which belong to the peculiar domain of psychology, and, second, the question *why do we think*, which carries us into the objective sciences of life and mind, viz. biology and sociology. If anyone wishes to call such an enquiry psychology, or epistemology, or *Gegenstandstheorie* with Meinong, or *Bewusstsein und Gegenstände* with Lipps, he is at liberty to do so without fear of misrepresenting it. He has chosen the name Genetic Logic simply because his results cut across several fields, and seem thus to render these recognized terms inapplicable, but "as to names, chacun à son goût."[1] As, however, no one would presumably allow this latitude in the choice of a name, unless he considered the various alternatives to be largely synonymous, we must conclude that Baldwin really does not wish to bring within the scope of this enquiry any topic which falls outside the domain of psychology or the biological and social sciences which belong to the same group, and, indeed, it is difficult to see how he could have done so whilst he confined himself, as he professes to do

[1] J. M. Baldwin: *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, *Functional Logic*, London, 1906, pp. 10–18.

Digitized by Google

throughout, to the rules of observation and hypothesis observed in the empirical sciences.[1]

The chief interest which this whole enquiry has for us centres, however, round his account of the genesis of logical universality. As we should expect, he finds the origin of the universal judgment in empirical generalization, out of which it is developed through *the systematization of judgments*. His long account of this systematization is very difficult to follow. Apparently it is accomplished by means of the Methods of Induction, notably Agreement and Difference, though he admits, of course, that the mere discovery that A is constantly accompanied by B, and that B is not found where A is absent, does not warrant the necessary, unquantified judgment, *A is B*. This involves the factor of limitation, or exhaustion of the sphere of reference, which makes it possible to treat it in abstraction as an independent whole. He does not mean by this that certainty is only reached by complete enumeration—it is not a return to the old criterion of "perfect induction"—for it is not by an examination of all the members of the A class but by the establishment of a non-B class, B and non-B being mutually exclusive concepts, that the limitation is imposed. To be able to affirm unconditionally that *man is vocal*, we must know that non-vocal beings have characters incompatible with man-

[1] Op. cit., p. 9.

Digitized by Google

hood ; hence man is not non-vocal—A is not non-B, and is therefore necessarily B—the power of speech is an essential property of the human species.[1] To the objection that this assumes the non-B class to have been determined in such a manner as to exclude A (a matter on which it would seem to be just as difficult to reach a conclusion as on the constitution of the A class), he replies that the two cases are not parallel, that it is often possible to discover incompatibility, or final *exclusion* of a property from a class, when finality in the mode of *inclusion* would require an indefinite extension of experience.[2] But he explains this merely by pointing to the development of meanings through opposition ; e.g. the child reaches the notion of *spoon* as a vessel for carrying milk by contrast with other instruments, such as forks, which allow the liquid to run through.

It seems clear, however, that a universal judgment results only where *one or other* of the opposed classes is already partially determined. It is easier to determine A negatively through the exclusion of non-B than positively through the qualification of B only if we happen to be acquainted with the relevant properties of the non-B class. *Other things being equal*, it is no easier to determine that non-B involves non-A, and therefore excludes A, than

[1] Op. cit., Vol. II, *Genetic Logic*, London, 1908, pp. 302–6.

[2] Op. cit., p. 321.

Digitized by Google

directly that A involves B. The proof that inarticulateness is correlated with certain anatomical characters incompatible with some of the essential marks of man must have proceeded by the same steps as the proof that man is vocal, for it is not a purely negative argument. Some positive correlation must be established in order that incompatibility may be exhibited. If *A is B* is established by the determination of a non-B class, *non-B is non-A* requires the determination of an A class—in this case the knowledge of what the essentials of manhood actually are—and we thus become involved in a circle.

Obviously these difficulties could have been avoided by the admission of inductive postulates, i.e. of an *a priori* element in knowledge, but this is exactly what the argument was designed to avoid, for Baldwin had already attempted to derive the traditional Laws of Thought from our experience of constancy of meaning and the correlative exclusion of incompatible features,[1] and he would undoubtedly attribute all postulates to a similar origin. He cannot, however, altogether ignore the common objections to this procedure, and it is interesting to find him admitting, when faced with these in another connection, that we do employ certain presuppositions in all cognitive construction; hence these must be "constitutive" in the thought

[1] Op. cit., pp. 273–83.

Digitized by Google

of the individual, though they are probably the product of earlier selective processes traceable in the course of racial development.[1] Finding, moreover, that the argument can be pressed even farther back, he finally closes the discussion by declaring that questions of racial endowment are answered for the evolutionist by the selection theory of current biology and involve no appeal to philosophy, though he makes a last attempt to bridge the gulf between the two by suggesting that the category of unity, which thought employs as a principle of organization, is probably " the mental reflection of motor synergy—the unity of more partial and partially adapted motor processes in a larger whole of adjustment or accommodation. This reflects itself in consciousness as what we call the form of 'unity in variety,' or . . . 'sameness in difference.' "[2]

That he is never quite satisfied with the cogency of these arguments is suggested by his frequent appeal to another criterion of universality, viz. community in judgment. Having, that is to say, established the universality of a judgment in respect to content, he still finds it necessary to enquire whether it is " universal in the sense of legislating its results for other intelligences," though he recognizes that this introduces " an experimental

[1] Op. cit., p. 158.

[2] *Dr. Bosanquet on Imitation and Selective Thinking*, Psychological Review, Vol. X, p. 59.

Digitized by Google

strain, a problematic force, into all implication whatever," making *even the universal of the essential relational type* "experimental and instrumental, both in its origin and in its employment in predication."[1] This, however, enables his critics to bring a new charge against him, viz. that he has transferred "the ideal postulate of reason that all valid judgment is valid for all intelligence" to "the *de facto* social consciousness to which it applies only in grades so contingent and varying as to be of no selective value whatever,"[2] and to this he has no answer at all to make except his usual *argumentum ad hominem*, which dismisses the appeal to a postulate as "logical formalism which smacks of mysticism."[3] That any philosophy must consent to be "mystical" to the extent of admitting as *a priori*, or postulating, those principles which are assumed in all attempts to prove them, is an objection which, perhaps by reason of its very triteness, he is content to ignore.

In spite of the cursoriness of this criticism, it will be easy to see its bearing upon the subject of this chapter. It has always struck me as an anomaly of recent philosophy that the critics of this view should have been so quick to perceive that a genetic

[1] *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, pp. 293–5.

[2] B. Bosanquet: *Discussion—Imitation and Selective Thinking*, Psychological Review, Vol. X, p. 408.

[3] J. M. Baldwin, op. cit., p. 414.

Digitized by Google

account of thinking never really explains "by what character judgments are true," but only "under what influence we have come in fact to hold certain judgments to be true,"[1] thus begging the whole question of logical validity, yet that, when the criterion sought was not that of truth but that of value, the two questions should so commonly have been treated as synonymous, and the psychologist's failure to do more than show us how we come, rightly or wrongly, to *consider* certain objects good should so rarely have been seen to leave his theory incomplete. Whilst the subjective origin of truth is almost always disputed, the subjective source of value is usually admitted without question. As already stated, it is my desire to exhibit the parallelism of the claims made in these two cases by proceeding to examine Baldwin's treatment of the problem of value, since he is one of the few writers who accept both questions upon the same terms and treat them consistently as two aspects of the same problem. Just as, with him, truth originates in subjective belief, but is standardized when viewed in retrospect and found to be appropriate within a given sphere and acceptable to all, so value has its source in subjective affection, which comes, however, to be organized, or systematized, and is then experienced as common to different subjects, and so assumes the form of standards or

[1] B. Bosanquet, op. cit., p. 406.

Digitized by Google

ideals exercising imperative force upon the individual will.

As this second argument, at least in the form which Baldwin gives it, is less familiar than that of genetic logic and has a more immediate bearing upon the subject of this essay, I will try to indicate briefly its main contentions.

4. The good, Baldwin holds in common with most psychologists, "is that aspect of the actual whereby it fulfils or terminates a personal interest,"[1] i.e. it is a relation between subject and object involving feeling and will. He believes that these affective experiences can be genetically described, just as logical activities can, and that the two processes of standardization exhibit a broad similarity, though we shall see that the differences between this "affective logic" and the logic of cognition are often more striking than the resemblances.

On the authority of Ribot and other French psychologists he makes the rather precarious assumption that there can be affective revival *which is independent of the cognitive image*[2]; (hence where the two occur together, the latter may be the effect and not the cause of the former). It is this self-repeating character of feeling which furnishes the basis for affective generalization.

[1] *Thought and Things*, Vol. III, *Real Logic*, London, 1911, p. 63.

[2] Op. cit., pp. 83 ff.

Digitized by Google

Nevertheless, he is obliged to admit that there is no real *community* of immediate affective experience. My feelings of appreciation or distaste seem to be entirely private. They may recur indefinitely in my own experience, but I cannot assume similar experiences in others. As, however, cognitive generalization was found, when traced far enough back, to be motor in origin, being accomplished through " the union or synergy of motor processes which serve to receive and classify the data of sensations," [1] it is not difficult for him to exhibit an analogy between it and the organization of affective-volitional processes into permanent dispositions, tendencies, and interests. Detached and isolated impulses, he says, are subsumed under these interests or dispositions, and they assume the general function of the universal in relation to particulars, i.e. they exhibit identity in diversity, and, just as the cognitive categories of sameness and difference resulting from the organization of motor processes " can be read as constituent parts of the objective content," so, too, do our *appreciations* of an object tend to be transferred to it " as very unstable objective predicates." [2] It is true that they still have not the community of cognitive universals, since the particulars cannot be shared, but they attain this, we are told, by a process of " ejection." We do not find our *particular* affective

[1] Op. cit., p. 95. [2] Op. cit., pp. 96–7.

Digitized by Google

experiences repeated in the experience of others, but we do assume that our more permanent demands and purposes are common to ourselves and our fellows. We read into them our sentiments and interests, and, if we find that our assumptions are not borne out by the facts, we conclude that there is some abnormality either in the person or in the circumstances.

Baldwin sees, indeed, that what this ejection gives us is simply a community of feeling corresponding to the community of assent in judgment. Similarity of biological structure and function leads to similarity of ends. There is a broad conformity to type. This gives us the *is* of practical life. It explains the rise of social custom and the impulsion to social conformity, which is even stronger in animals and savages than in civilized men. It no more explains the *ought* of the moral consciousness than mere catholicity of judgment explained the necessity of logical determination. One who has attempted a genetic derivation of the latter, however, is not likely to be deterred by the difficulties of explaining the former, which is a far more widely recognized subject of psychological analysis, and has been treated with much more appearance of success.

Just as the universals of knowledge are inductively established, so, he argues, are the values of practical life arrived at by the method of postulation and

Digitized by Google

verification (through satisfaction, or attainment), in the process of which an ideal is gradually developed, which transcends the possibility of achievement as the "essential universal" of logic transcends experience, but towards which there may be indefinite approximation. As value is a relation of the object to the self, this ideal is always an ideal of *personal* fulfilment in the light of which each new impulse to action is read, and approved or found wanting. Affective development is always in the direction of an organization of interests, and this is imaginatively carried forward to completion "in a system of appreciations, satisfactions, realizations," constituting the ideal unity of a self. This is what universality means in the sphere of practice. It is in this way that the promotion of permanent and comprehensive ends becomes an imperative of moral conduct. Thus in contrast to the static relation of logical particular to universal, the relation of the affective particular to its universal is prospective, dynamic. The *universality* of moral obligation is of the Hegelians' concrete type; it is not the abstract universality of formal logic, for the moral act is always singular, being the result of a unique organization of impulses in a single self whose character is further determined by it and so becomes more complex and more clearly defined. It is only when viewed retrospectively that moral acts can be *classified* and *types* of virtue recognized,

Digitized by Google

or moral *rules* formulated. Similarly the *necessity* of a moral act consists in the recognition that only one type of action is at any given moment appropriate to the goal in view, that this alone has a place in the imaginatively constructed system and so contributes to the realization of the ideal, and that every alternative must be rejected as inconsistent with the end to be accomplished.[1]

This affective logic is not, of course, confined to the practical sphere. A similar movement, we are told, may be traced in æsthetic experience. As, however, the purpose of the present account is rather to illustrate a tendency than to give a complete exposition of a theory, I need not pursue it further. Its bearing upon my argument will already have been sufficiently indicated.

The weakness of the position will be apparent from our examination of the corresponding logic of cognition. It was agreed that the logical characters of universality and necessity could not be accounted for by an *a posteriori* theory. The *a posteriori* account is simply a description of the psychology of reasoning, which always presupposes the logical elements it seeks to construct, for the postulates involved in all thinking cannot be empirically derived. It is therefore difficult to see how the process traceable in feeling can be accurately described as even "quasi-logical," and

[1] Op. cit., pp. 129–48.

Digitized by Google

there is no reason to expect that the genetic account of ethical obligation and æsthetic appreciation will prove any more adequate to account for all the facts of moral and æsthetic experience than the genetic account of thinking was to account for those of knowledge.

Moreover, it is obvious that Baldwin's account of the imperative of the moral ideal begs the question in just the same way as his account of logical necessity did, and as all naturalistic theories of the good are bound to do.[1] With the growth of a social consciousness there does arise, as he shows, a feeling of compulsion to social conformity, a subjective necessity (due to the gregarious instinct and to the fear of punishment) to obey the rules and respect the traditions and conventions of the particular environment in which the subject finds himself, but this, he admits, is not *moral* necessity. The imperative is still hypothetical, obedience being the condition of social esteem or even toleration. He finds the transition to a specifically ethical demand where the ideal emerges of an organized personality with which each particular

[1] I am using the word "naturalistic" in accordance with Professor G. E. Moore's definition of Naturalism as a method which substitutes for "good" "some one property of a natural object or of a collection of natural objects, . . . thus replacing ethics by some one of the natural sciences." (See *Principia Ethica*, 2nd edition, Cambridge, 1922, p. 40.)

Digitized by Google

act must be in harmony. He does not seem to see that the ordinary objection to the naturalistic derivation of value, which he apparently believes himself to have avoided by this account, applies equally to it. For, when we enquire wherein the attraction exercised by this ideal differs from the compulsion of social custom, and whence it derives its categorical force, the only reply is that the subject perceives it to be *good*. The ordered conduct of a harmonious personality is seen to be *better than* a yielding at every point to undisciplined impulse. Nor is it really possible to press the question further, and ask why a coherent system *should* be considered better than a chaos of unordered impulses, for that order is better than chaos is self-evident. It is thus once more through the medium of a non-empirical factor that the transition from subjective psychological necessity to objective moral necessity is effected. Unless the ideal of an organized, ordered self were immediately perceived or assumed to be *good*, it would have no higher claim to authority than social convention—indeed, it would carry considerably less weight, for it would make no appeal to the motives of expediency which give the latter so much of its force. There is no natural development of social expediency into moral obligation.[1]

[1] The logical objections to Naturalism will be more fully discussed in the chapters that follow.

Digitized by Google

Similarly the moral act is described as universal, in the sense of individual or singular, yet as possessing "synnomic" force, i.e. it is the act that *must* be performed by any moral agent in the subject's particular circumstances and with his particular background and constitution. But again it is only inasmuch as the act in question is the only act which conforms to an ideal, and is therefore envisaged as *good*, that it can claim this universal appropriateness. We do not infer it to be good because we see it to be appropriate; we infer it to be appropriate because we see it to be good. Affective logic is just as prone to circular arguments as the parallel "logic" of cognition.

The fact that the characters of logical validity and moral obligation are not empirically derived does not, of course, preclude the possibility that processes like generalization and implication may occur in the affective sphere, as these writers maintain, for the latter claim might conceivably be upheld without the former. Although this question has no direct bearing on our argument, it is of sufficient logical importance to justify us in pausing for a moment to consider the answer to it.

We saw that the genetic view of cognitive universality traced it to "the union or synergy of motor processes receiving and classifying sense data." If this be a correct psychological account, —and it is not my task to examine its accuracy,—

Digitized by Google

it would seem probable that the affective process would exhibit an analogous development. When, however, we compare the cognitive processes of generalization and subsumption of particulars with the organization of affective-volitional processes into permanent interests or dispositions, we can hardly fail to perceive that the affective generals thus constituted have very little in common with the abstract universals to which they are compared. It is pressing the analogy rather far to speak of the particular impulse as "subsumed" under the permanent disposition as the cognitive particular is subsumed under its class. Again the resemblance to the concrete universal is much closer, for an interest is a *system* of feelings and impulses in which each particular tendency has a place. The terminology chosen to describe the process of "subsumption" makes this clear. "The interest," we are told, "is the outcome of partial tendencies *which enter into its organization.* The growth of habit proceeds by the constant inclusion of detached and isolated motor tendencies; and the simpler tendencies are, *in this sense*, subsumed under the larger habit or interest *into whose composition* they enter."[1] The reader will hardly claim that "this sense" is the same as that in which we speak of logical subsumption of particular under universal.

Furthermore, community of feeling, correspond-

[1] *Thought and Things*, Vol. III, p. 99 (italics mine).

Digitized by Google

ing to the community postulated in the claim of judgments to be true, which of course means true for all, was reached, it will be remembered, by the "ejection" of the interest or disposition into other selves. This theory of ejection presents considerable difficulties, a discussion of which would involve the whole question of *Einfühlung* and its treatment in current æsthetics, which is quite beyond the scope of this essay. I would merely draw attention to one very significant statement which Baldwin makes in this connection. "The machinery of thought," he says, "is available also for affective contents, *so far as these can be thrown into cognitive form.* This takes place in the logical mode when the generalized dispositions, moods, sentiments, etc., take on the forms of intercourse. A system of symbolic renderings, linguistic and other, springs up . . . . by which *general meanings* of all sorts are made available in the social life."[1] Baldwin believes, it is true, that there is more real community of affective experience than this. As, however, individual feeling is always private, it is clear that only generalized interests can be ejected, and though, as I have just tried to show, the so-called "universality" of feeling is not reached by the same process as cognitive generalization, it is difficult to understand what is meant by a "general" which can be read into the experience of others as

[1] Op. cit., p. 108 (italics mine).

Digitized by Google

the particular cannot be, unless it be just this "general meaning," or conceptual aspect of the interest, from which the affective element is lacking. This should not be interpreted as an argument that we know other selves only by inference. But if we ask why it is that the generalized interest can be ejected, when the particular feeling is by its very nature private, the answer is clearly that an interest is a complex of many experiential factors, some affective-volitional, and therefore private, others conceptual, i.e. communicable and interchangeable, and that it is the latter alone that are read into the experience of others. The affective elements are so entirely individual that, if they play any part in our interpretation of the experience of others at all, it is as taking place in ourselves, not in them. We are able to enter intellectually into the emotional experience of another, for the intellectual factors in an emotional situation are common to different subjects, but the actual emotions which we ascribe to them are always felt as our own. We simply infer that they *should* be experiencing feelings similar to those which the reading into them of the cognitive aspect of the experience has roused in us.

This very brief account has, I hope, been sufficient to show that the theory that feeling exhibits a development in the direction of generality and community similar to that of judgment rests upon

Digitized by Google

two confusions: (1) the failure to recognize certain non-empirical elements in logical thought which cannot be genetically described; and (2) the failure to distinguish the affective elements in a psychical complex, such as an interest or disposition, from its cognitive elements, which leads to the ascription of an affective character to purely cognitive factors. The first of these confusions results in the treatment of logical questions by psychological methods; the second involves the opposite error of attempting to treat logically a psychological subject-matter which defies this method. Thus distinctions essential to clear thinking between both the matter and the methods of the two sciences are obscured.

5. It has been my aim in this introductory chapter to illustrate the growing influence of psychology, particularly in respect to method, upon the sciences most closely related to it, and to make clear the importance of recognizing this in constructing a theory of value. I have shown how it has laid claim to the treatment of one after another of the problems formerly regarded as falling within the spheres of metaphysics, epistemology, or logic, amongst them the problem of value, which has come as a result to be regarded as a special field of investigation. It is true that the rival claims of these other departments were to a great extent ignored by the earlier value psychologists, but I have drawn

Digitized by Google

attention to the attempts made by some more recent writers to reconcile them. The net result of these seems to be the general recognition that a fruitful theory of value must find its starting-point in psychology rather than in metaphysics, but that the problem has logical and epistemological aspects which no psychologist can afford to neglect. This, however, is not always held to imply that it presents any problems which fall outside the domain of psychology, for the recent extension of the scope of this science has sometimes led it to lay claim to the whole of these related spheres, and not simply to the treatment of this one problem. One of the commonest marks of this usurpation is the denial of the normative function of any philosophical science. For it is a common error to suppose that, apart from the task of enforcing it, the only interest which can attach to a norm lies in the question how it arises in human experience; hence logic, the science of the norms of thought, comes to be the study of the history of these norms, and this is, of course, a department of the science which traces the history of experience as such.

It is true that psychologists have usually discovered the essence of value not in thought, nor in the objects apprehended by thought, but in feeling; hence the norms with which they are here concerned are norms or standards of feeling, but this does not apparently make any difference to the way

Digitized by Google

in which their validity is determined. Feeling, it is sometimes argued, exhibits a logical development closely resembling that of thought, and the standards discovered in the two spheres have an exactly parallel history and significance. This, it is true, is an extreme example of *Psychologismus*, and the origin of moral and æsthetic standards is not ordinarily traced to this bastard logic. I have suggested, however, that, even where the analogy between cognition and affection is not pressed, it is usually concluded that the history of these standards will *somehow* furnish a clue to their validity, and that we shall be able to determine what things have value, and how they come to possess it, through an analysis of the activity of valuing, or, more accurately, of the *feeling* of value which we call appreciation, or interest,—an enquiry that again falls entirely within the domain of psychology.

It must thus be my next task to examine a number of other theories in which the psychological bias is less obvious, but which still discover the essence of value in some relation of the object to a subject. I shall then compare these with other possible views of the nature of value and its standards.

Digitized by Google

CHAPTER II

AFFECTIVE THEORIES OF VALUE

1. *Introductory.*—Unsatisfactoriness of the present situation.—Complete demonstration the goal.

2. *Classification of theories of value.*—Demonstration by a process of elimination attempted.

3. *Plausibility of the subjective view.*—Meinong's definition in terms of feeling—Ehrenfels' alternative definition in terms of desire—Priority of feeling over desire—Other affective and affective-volitional theories.

4. *Urban's theory of value as a third dimension of feeling.*—The theory criticized: In its qualitative aspect—In its quantitative aspect—Meinong's theory of quantitative differences in feeling criticized.

5. *Meinong's theory of value as a feeling presupposing an existential judgment.*—His answers to criticisms—His distinction between *Aktgefühle* and *Inhaltsgefühle*—Presentation the presupposition of other feelings.

6. *The dilemma in Urban's criticism.*—Urban's definition of value feeling too broad.

7. Meinong's definition a *petitio principii*—The fallacy traced to a confusion of means with ends.

8. *Summary.*—Transition to the affective-volitional theory.

1. It seems to be widely recognized that there is a great deal of confusion in the writings of contemporary philosophers as to the nature of good and its relation to living subjects.[1] Nevertheless, most of

[1] Cf. W. M. Urban: *Value and Existence*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIII, pp. 449–50: "The philosophical triangle, existence—

Digitized by Google

the writers who have dealt with this question have contented themselves with offering considerations in favour of some one theory without attempting to show that this is the only consistent view. If they have engaged in destructive criticism at all, it has not as a rule been very conclusive, nor has it covered all the current theories.[1] In a subject of this kind

truth—value, has shown itself susceptible of almost endless manipulation, with resulting endless confusion. One hears of 'values' as existing and of existence as a value, and again both propositions are denied as palpable absurdities. It is said that 'there is not a further something called value over and above the thing; the value is part of the complex set of experiences that make up the thing'; but it is affirmed with equal conviction that 'value is never part of the nature of anything.' In one breath we speak of truth as a value belonging to judgments as such, and in the next we talk of the beautiful and the good, and other forms of value, as being special types of truth. There is scarcely one of the possible permutations and commutations of these three terms that has not had a serious representation in philosophy. In consequence 'value' has, in the last decade, been a word to conjure with, and, as everyone knows, sleight-of-hand performances have not been lacking. The ideas, existence and reality, have always been equivocal, but, with the prominence which the value notion has achieved in modern philosophy, their inherent ambiguity has lent itself to all sorts of legerdemain." For a very similar statement see W. H. Sheldon: *An Empirical Definition of Value*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XI, p. 113.

[1] Professor R. B. Perry's latest book, *General Theory of Value*, New York, 1926, is a notable exception, for he attempts here a destructive criticism of all the alternatives to the "interest theory" which he defends. I shall refer in the next chapter to

Digitized by Google

complete proof is, of course, an ideal, and I am far from claiming that I am able fully to demonstrate the position I wish to defend. As, however, I should consider it entirely valueless in the present situation either to propose a new theory which I could not effectively support, or merely to undertake another piece of discursive writing in defence of one of the current views, it will be my aim in the chapters which follow to develop a consistent line of argument which shall exhibit the superiority of one of these theories over all others with which I am acquainted.

An argument which has this aim must be of one of two kinds. It must either be a *reductio ad absurdum*, showing that the denial of the theory defended involves a contradiction, or it must attempt an exhaustive enumeration of the possible views, and then proceed to show, by a process of elimination, that only one of these alternatives is satisfactory. The first method is seldom applicable to a philosophical subject-matter, where the data are not quantitative, and where exact definition is

his arguments in favour of this. Mr. Urban has criticized the relational view and the view of value as a quality (*Value and Existence*, pp. 452–60), and Mr. Dewey and Mr. D. W. Prall have engaged in a brief controversy on the subject (Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XX, pp. 128 ff., and Vol. XXI, pp. 117 ff.), but none of these last three writers would claim, I think, that he had dealt with all the possible alternatives to the view he was defending.

Digitized by Google

usually the goal rather than the starting-point of enquiry. I shall therefore employ the second method, having resort to the first, however, at the point where it becomes possible to show that most of the other views proposed involve the same fallacy, and are therefore untenable for precisely the same reasons.

2. Now it is obviously no easy task to make a complete enumeration of theories of value, even if one limits oneself to the comparatively recent doctrines which are in harmony with modern science and are thus "live options." Sufficient instances have already been given to show the great diversity of these; hence I am aware that the scheme I am about to propose may be an incomplete induction. Yet it seems reasonable to believe that the number of alternatives is limited, and that these *could* therefore be exhausted by a classification based upon a sufficiently fundamental and inclusive principle. It will be worth while, then, to consider for a moment what principles of classification are suggested by the theories with which the reader is most familiar.

The commonest source of dispute among recent writers on this subject is the question of "objectivity" referred to in the previous chapter, and this is therefore the *fundamentum divisionis* that first suggests itself. It is true that the antithesis of "subjective" and "objective" is by no means unambiguous. I am perfectly willing, for example,

Digitized by Google

to admit Professor G. E. Moore's contention that most of those who defend the objectivity of value really wish to establish more than this (viz. its *intrinsic* character), as they would object equally strongly to some objective views, e.g. the view that "better" meant "better fitted to survive."[1] This does not seem to me to prove, however, that the *fundamentum divisionis* is unsatisfactory, but simply that the division is incomplete, as there are several objective theories; hence those who wish to defend any one will reject the others just as strenuously as they reject any subjective view. And as neither "intrinsic and instrumental" nor any other pair of terms refer to the antithesis I have in mind, and it is this antithesis which best illustrates the effects of a psychological bias on the theory of value, I shall retain these, using "subjective" in the popular sense of having its source in some attitude of a subject to an object, "objective" as referring to a property which objects have, or a relation of these to each other, which is not affected by their relation to any subject.[2]

A division into subjective and objective theories

[1] G. E. Moore: *The Conception of Intrinsic Value*, Philosophical Studies (American Edition), New York, 1922, pp. 255–6.

[2] Meinong's "personal" and "impersonal" seem to be synonymous with "subjective" and "objective" in this sense. (See below, p. 195.) The word "personal" might, however, suggest too narrow an interpretation to be applicable to some of the theories it would be required to cover.

Digitized by Google

is, however, only the first step. Differences of opinion arise among those who define value as a subjective relation as to the particular attitude in which it is discovered, which may be feeling (the pleasure it arouses), or conation (the subject's desire for it), or some more complex affective-volitional state such as "interest." A far more convincing view than any of these has, moreover, been proposed by Professor Alexander, who objects that value does not *consist in* any subjective attitude, but is rather a determination of the whole situation: object-related-to-subject,[1] a position which is closely allied to Professor Dewey's recent theory that value is an intrinsic quality of things as related to living subjects, which, if these subjects are of adult intelligence, is always partly conditioned by judgment.[2] The possibilities of the objective class seem at first sight to be more limited. Clearly the object itself is not value, and there thus appear to be only two alternatives on this side: it must either be a property of objects or a relation between them. Here again, however, a dispute arises as to the manner in which it is discriminated. Is it cognitively apprehended, like other properties and relations, or does emotion acquire a "presentational" function here, making appreciation an

[1] S. Alexander: *Space, Time and Deity*, London, 1920, Vol. II, Bk. III, Ch. IX.

[2] John Dewey: *Experience and Nature*, Chicago, 1925, Ch. X.

Digitized by Google

affective but objectively determined experience? Lastly, it has been suggested recently[1] that value may be not an object but an "objective," i.e. an independent category distinct from being and existence, and therefore neither a property nor a relation of existing things. We have thus to add a third division to this group, and our classification then falls into the following scheme:

A. SUBJECTIVE THEORIES:
   (1) *Affective:* Value consists in feeling aroused by an object.
   (2) *Volitional:* Value consists in desire for an object.
   (3) *Affective-volitional:* Value consists in interest in an object.

B. NEUTRAL THEORIES:
   (1) Value is a quality of objects as related to subjects, conditioned by judgment. (Dewey.)
   (2) Value is a determination of the subject-object situation. (Alexander.)

C. OBJECTIVE THEORIES:
   (1) Value is an indefinable predicate, apprehended:
      (*a*) by feeling (having a presentational function).
      (*b*) by judgment.

[1] By W. M. Urban in three articles in the Journal of Philosophy. See pp. 243–52 below.

Digitized by Google

(2) Value is a relation among objects.
(3) Value is an "objective."

As this or some closely related principle of classification seems to be implied in most of the works to which I shall have occasion to refer, I shall use it as the basis of the discussion which follows. It will be obvious that the scheme is an epistemological one. My treatment of the subject will thus inevitably leave many metaphysical questions unanswered. These, however, are too far-reaching in their implications to be adequately discussed within the limits of a short essay, and I can only attempt to indicate in closing what I believe to be the most important metaphysical results of the conclusions reached in the main argument.

In view of the number and variety of the alternatives even the task which I have undertaken might threaten to be a somewhat laborious one, in the complexities of which it would be difficult to develop a coherent argument. It will be found, however, that very similar objections apply to several of them, whilst others will be seen to rest upon a rather superficial analysis and to have found few supporters, so that it will be possible to dismiss them quite briefly. I hope thus to be able to simplify my scheme sufficiently to make my general purpose clear. After this negative defence of the alternative which I believe to be the true

Digitized by Google

one, I shall try to answer some of the most important criticisms which have been made of it by the defenders of other views. Lastly, I shall attempt in the concluding chapter to develop a more positive argument in its defence by exhibiting what I believe to be its metaphysical implications, as opposed to those of another view to which epistemologically it bears some resemblance.

My first task, then, must be to examine those theories which I have classed as "subjective," to all of which, as I have already hinted, the same criticism applies, viz. that they beg the logical and epistemological questions through a too exclusive prepossession with the psychological analysis of an individual's experience. The peculiarity of the situation is that their authors often admit this general line of criticism, but claim that their particular formulations avoid the fallacy, whereas they are actually continuing to commit it in subtler forms. It will therefore be necessary for me to examine most of them separately, in order to show how it is committed in each case.

3. However repugnant it may seem to common sense to say that the value which the ordinary man attributes to objects is not a property of these at all, but is due to the relations in which they stand to sentient subjects, a little reflection

Digitized by Google

will reveal the plausibility of this theory, for the considerations which have led psychologists to reject the naïve view are very simple and obvious.

In the first place it is found that there is apparently no object to which value may not under certain circumstances attach. It seems to be predicable of an indefinite variety of things which have nothing else in common except the fact that value is imputed to them. Now this fact alone would not prove that the value was not attributable to the objects themselves but was due to the relations into which they entered. It might simply indicate that value was a unique and therefore indefinable predicate which could not be identified with, nor analysed into, any of the other properties of the object, and this, I believe, is the correct deduction from it. The alternative view is, however, tempting, as it makes it possible to submit the concept to further analysis, and so to reach a great many more conclusions concerning the nature of good. Moreover, it is supported by the further discovery that the value of any one object varies with varying conditions, specifically with its varying relations to a subject. It is particularly difficult to avoid it if we adopt the psychological line of approach, for clearly it is only through the activity of valuing that value plays any part in the experience of an individual. It would be meaningless from the

Digitized by Google

point of view of an individual agent to speak of the value of an object which was not valued. Yet if objects have value only if valued, the value is evidently due to the valuing. It cannot attach to the object in itself, but must be constituted by the subject's relation to it. It is then easy to show that this relation is an affective one, for what distinguishes the attitude of valuing from other attitudes seems to be its non-intellectual character. The things we value are the things that arouse in us an emotional response. We may contemplate objects and make all kinds of judgments about them without being in the least emotionally affected by them, but in that case we do not as a rule say that we value them. We only speak of valuing them when we do not merely view them intellectually but when they make some appeal to the other side of our nature, when we no longer *describe* but *appreciate* them.

It would be easy to illustrate this view by quotations from present-day writers. I will content myself with a very concise statement of it by Meinong in one of his early works, which none of his later modifications of his theory ever led him to retract, though he evidently came to regard it as only half the truth of the matter. "Value," he says, ". . . . is dependent on valuing, i.e. on the *feeling* connected with our knowledge (actual or assumed) of the existence or non-existence of

Digitized by Google

what we call the value-object. . . . Moreover, when we enquire what determines the *amount* of the value, we can find no other explanation of this than *the strength of the feeling* aroused in subjects of normal intellectual and emotional capacity." [1]

It will be remembered here that a school to which Meinong himself is much indebted has agreed with him in tracing value to a subjective relation, but that these writers have discovered it not in the relation of feeling, but in that of desire. It is by *the strength of the desire* aroused in subjects of normal capacity that they estimate the amount of the value. As I have included this view among the alternatives to be examined, I will take the opportunity of saying what little I have to say about it, before proceeding to a more detailed discussion of the affective view.

That an object of value means simply an object of desire is a view which has not often been maintained since his critics exposed the fallacies in Mill's exposition of it. The school to which I refer is, of course, that of Ehrenfels, with whose name it is chiefly associated at the present time,[2]

[1] A. Meinong: *Über Werthaltung und Wert*, Archiv. für systematische Philosophie, Vol. I, p. 328 (italics mine).

[2] It is, of course, the view of Freud and his disciples that the objects to which we ascribe value, e.g. æsthetic and religious objects, are objects of unconscious desire. It would, however,

Digitized by Google

and a very cursory study of his *System der Werttheorie* will be sufficient to show that his divergence from the affective view is more apparent than real, for he first admits, as an alternative to his own, a slightly modified version of Meinong's definition in terms of feeling (which he believes to be always the *condition* of desire),[1] and later declares that no analysis of experience reveals any primary psychical factor corresponding to what we call desire (i.e. wishing, striving, or willing). In the experience of what is called intense desire he is aware, he says, of various intense experiences, viz. feelings, presentations, and especially motor sensations and sensations of effort, but seldom of any further factor (and certainly never of one of much intensity) which could not be included in one or other of these categories, but must be recognized as an additional psychical element. What we call desire, then, is " simply a presentation (yielding an increase of pleasure) of the inclusion of an object in, or its exclusion from, the causal system built up around the immediate, concrete presentation of the self," [2] —in short, it is a complex of other intellectual and

lead me too far afield to enter into a discussion of psycho-analytic doctrines here. I must leave the reader to apply my criticisms of other subjective theories *mutatis mutandis* to this view.

[1] C. von Ehrenfels: *System der Werttheorie*, Leipzig, 1897, Vol. I, pp. 54–7.

[2] Op. cit., pp. 248–9.

Digitized by Google

emotional factors, not a distinct element in mental life.

These conclusions seem sufficient to justify us in including Ehrenfels' view among those which discover value in the affective relation, and I need not therefore devote any space to a separate examination of it. It would not even be particularly relevant to question this analysis of desire, for, even if it be regarded as a primary element in conscious life, there are sufficiently forcible arguments in favour of giving the priority to feeling as the source of value, if the choice lay simply between these two. We value many things which we already possess and do not therefore desire, or which have ceased to exist and so cannot be desired, even things which could not from their very natures enter into this relation, such as our nation's glorious past, or the misdeeds of which we repent, which latter are certainly objects of negative value.[1] The most important question which arises here is not, however, whether feeling or desire is the correct definition of the valuing attitude, but whether it can be as simple a relation as either of these. Even Meinong, who pronounces most clearly in favour of the affective view, admits that desire may play a secondary rôle in the experience of value : there may be

[1] Cf. Meinong: *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie*, Graz, 1923, pp. 37–45, where these arguments are set forth in detail.

Digitized by Google

value feeling without desire, whilst desire itself cannot arise except as a result of *some* feeling—hence it alone cannot condition value—but value is enhanced where feeling is reinforced by desire, and we often measure it by the *motive force* of the feeling, which means its influence on desire.

Nearly all the more recent writers who have adopted the subjective view agree that the attitude whence the imputation of value arises is a more complex one, involving both feeling and various volitional and motor elements; moreover, in the few cases where the affective definition is adhered to, it will usually be found that the term *feeling* is made to cover much more than the simple hedonic tone of experience, viz. motor sensations and their organic accompaniments. We speak in this sense of feelings of gladness, familiarity, fatigue, excitement, depression, hesitation, assurance, and so forth. Obviously it is plausible enough to include the feeling of value in such a list, but an exact psychological analysis must go farther and determine the elementary constituents of such an attitude, and whether all of them are essential to the experience of value so that the name must be reserved for the total resultant state, or whether it is more accurately identified, as Meinong and Ehrenfels believed, with *one* of its affective or motor elements.

In spite of the great similarity between them, then, there are sufficiently important differences

Digitized by Google

between the position of Meinong, who traces value to the simple pleasure-pain element in consciousness, the view of Urban and others who ascribe it to *a total attitude* predominantly affective in character,[1] and that of the more recent American writers who discover it in the affecto-motor attitude called *interest*, to necessitate my treating each of them separately.

It may be objected that the two former, and notably the first, have fallen a good deal into the background in recent speculation, and would not be defended by any contemporary writer. It is true that the abstractness of the first theory makes it less acceptable to contemporary psychologists, who insist on a more concrete view of conscious life, whilst both savour a little of the old mechanical view of consciousness as a compound of separable elements rather than a product of organic growth. Nevertheless, Meinong's careful analysis of the value situation has proved too influential a contribution to the psychology of the subject for a discussion of this to be complete without a brief examination of it, whilst, so far as I know, the second position would still be defended by Urban as a correct account of *valuation*, though he has since developed an independent theory of *value*. I shall therefore devote the remainder of this chapter to an analysis of these

[1] See his early work: *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*, Chapters II–III, London, 1909.

Digitized by Google

two versions of the affective theory, reserving the more modern definition in terms of "interest" for discussion in the one which follows. As it will be my aim to show that the broader interpretation of "value feeling" really resolves itself upon examination into the narrower, I will begin with a discussion of the theory that value has its source in "a total affective state."

4. It is easy to see the difficulty which those who defend this definition are attempting to resolve. If the phrase "value feeling" is to have any meaning at all, feeling must be a generic term of which this variety is a species; hence the traditional definition of it as "a certain subjective state, varying continuously in intensity, and passing from time to time from its positive phase (pleasure) to its negative or opposite phase (pain) or *vice versa*,"[1] must be amended, for, according to this, it is an elementary psychical state which cannot be further analysed, and must combine with some extraneous factor to form a more complex structure, if different elements are to be discovered in its constitution. This definition, Urban argues, applies only to "sensation feelings." It is inadequate as an account of appreciation, which, though still a predominantly affective attitude, includes more than the simple two-dimensional pleasure-pain series. Value feeling can only be fully described in terms of a three-dimen-

[1] James Ward: *Psychological Principles*, Cambridge, 1920, p. 45.

Digitized by Google

sional theory such as Wundt applies to feeling in general.

He distinguishes in such feeling not only its *direction* (positive or negative — pleasantness-unpleasantness) but also the aspects of tension-relaxation and restlessness-quiescence, which arise through the connection of feeling with conation. Tension and restlessness characterize what he calls "the transgredient reference," where the control is subjective and the attitude prospective, dynamic, i.e. the ethical attitude of obligation; relaxation and quiescence are features of the "immanental reference," where the control is objective, making possible repose in the object, the æsthetic attitude of contemplation. It may be remembered that one of the main objections urged by Wundt against the simpler view of feeling was its helplessness when confronted with the problems that arise in regard to the complex emotions associated with ethical and æsthetic experiences.[1] Thus, even if the numerous criticisms brought against this theory as applied to "sensation feelings" appear conclusive, it is still possible to defend it as an account of the total attitude involved in valuing, including reference to an object and a relation to conation. Urban has to admit that the experimental investigations of Störring, Titchener, and others have re-

[1] W. Wundt: *Outline of Psychology*, Second Revised English Edition (translated by C. H. Judd), Leipzig, 1902, p. 94.

Digitized by Google

solved the opposition of restlessness-quiescence into that of simple pleasantness-unpleasantness, and that of tension-relaxation into kinæsthetic and organic sensations, and have further shown that both pairs of terms really refer to affirmation and arrest of tendency, i.e. to conation, rather than to feeling. Nevertheless, he insists, in the appreciatively described total meaning of the attitude these qualifications of feeling appear as primary qualities of experience.[1]

Nor is this the only application of the three-dimensional theory. It has a quantitative as well as a qualitative reference to value feeling. It may be possible to describe the degree of pleasantness or unpleasantness of a feeling in terms of duration and intensity, but we cannot properly apply this terminology to the feelings of relaxation or repose, for example, in which æsthetic value consists. To indicate the degree of such feelings and their comparative stability, as contrasted with the dulling of intensity with repetition, Urban refers to the "depth and breadth of feeling in the personality," a phrase borrowed from Krüger who attributes it to a relatively constant conative disposition, with the formation of which the sense of value becomes differentiated from the mere tendency to move in the direction of the greatest anticipated pleasure.

Urban goes on to show that both the degree of

[1] W. M. Urban: *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*, pp. 62–3.

Digitized by Google

depth and breadth and the qualitative aspects mentioned vary quite independently of the quality of pleasantness-unpleasantness and its intensity. A feeling of positive value may attach to an unpleasant experience or a feeling of negative value to a pleasant experience, e.g. we may enjoy the relief of an outburst of anger after long-continued inhibition, even though we know it to be an emotion of negative worth. And, similarly, there may be increase in depth of value feeling with decrease in hedonic intensity, a very common experience in the sphere of morals, where a quiet sense of obligation, not accompanied by any intensity of feeling, often reveals a deeper sense of the worth of an ideal object than the intensest emotion. These additional qualitative and quantitative aspects of value feeling are simply not reducible to differences of hedonic tone, and are therefore sufficient, he thinks, to place it in a different category from mere "sensation feelings."[1]

Now I am not quite sure that I understand all that Mr. Urban means by the distinction between scientific and appreciative description, upon which his psychology of value is based. So far as I can discover, however, the contrast is simply that between the abstractness of the experimental psychologist's external, analytic treatment of the phenomena of mental life and the concreteness of presentation which is attained when these pheno-

[1] Op. cit., pp. 72–6.

Digitized by Google

mena are viewed introspectively as moments in the living whole of a personal experience. If this account is correct, it can hardly have failed to suggest itself to some of his readers that the difference between feeling as scientifically investigated and feeling as experienced in appreciation is simply that the latter includes several non-affective factors, such as reference to an object and a basic conative disposition. If, then, in the cases where the simple element of feeling is considered in abstraction from its psychical accompaniments (as in the case of the so-called sensation feelings, which are the most easily isolated, and have therefore received most attention from experimental psychologists), the third dimension resolves itself into some other element in the total experience, it seems at least probable that qualities such as "depth and breadth," which are associated with value feeling as "appreciated," represent the permanence and stability of the conative basis and cognitive presuppositions of the feeling as it appears in the total attitude rather than any quality which this feeling itself derives from them. It is true that Urban explicitly denies this, but it is very difficult to understand what he means by the suggestion that what is non-affective for scientific analysis may become in concrete experience an actual quality of feeling itself, which "as a term of appreciative introspection" is irreducible.

Digitized by Google

The same remarks apply to his other aspects of tension-relaxation and restlessness-quiescence, which are no more themselves feelings when they contribute to a predominantly affective attitude than when viewed in isolation.[1] If this is the case, however, the factor we call *value* is not discovered in feeling at all, but belongs to some other aspect of experience, for the third dimension of feeling, to which it was traced, has disappeared. Urban's reason for seeking it in some quality of the feeling itself will become clearer as we proceed.[2]

Now I do not wish to quarrel with current psychological terminology, which explicitly uses "feeling" in a narrower and a broader sense, so long as it is not claimed that all the factors which are included in the latter must therefore belong to the affective side of consciousness. Urban, however, is by no means the only writer who seems to have interpreted this terminology too literally. Even Meinong himself has included in his last book a section on qualitative differences in feeling (i.e. differences within the spheres of pleasure and pain respectively),[3] to which very similar remarks

[1] I am in complete agreement here with some criticisms suggested by Mr. F. C. Bartlett in a paper on *Valuation and Existence*, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1916–17, p. 119.

[2] See below, pp. 77–80.

[3] *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie*, pp. 79–82.

Digitized by Google

apply, but which raises a number of minor issues of sufficient importance to merit a separate examination.

Feelings, Meinong declares, have *content*, and we should naturally expect their content to differ in quality and not merely in quantity in different instances. The denial of such differences is usually defended on the ground that the variations we experience can always be reduced to changes in the cognitive grounds of the feeling, a simplification which the principle of economy would warrant. Two considerations, however, seem to justify an opposite conclusion.

(*a*) The same object may arouse two distinct feelings, viz. a pleasure of sense—or possibly an æsthetic pleasure—and a feeling of value, *excited*, it may be, by the æsthetic qualities of the object, e.g. of a picture. Again, intellectual pleasure, which he defines as pleasure in the cognitive activity itself, is obviously distinct from the feeling of value, which is directed towards the content cognized. As, however, this distinction of act and content is not apparent in the immediate experience, but is only revealed by analysis, the difference we trace in the two experiences must be a difference in the *quality* of the emotional accompaniments. Value feeling must be different in kind from the mere sensation feeling we call pleasure in the ordinary sense.

Digitized by Google

Now this argument would be plausible enough were there not a simpler explanation of these facts, which Meinong seems to have overlooked. In each of the instances he cites there is clearly *a second cognitive act*, to which a distinct feeling attaches, and these secondary feelings are thus numerically different from the primary feelings of enjoyment, even though they may be qualitatively exactly like them. If I engage in fruitful intellectual activity, or become absorbed in the contemplation of a work of art, my mental process will be qualified by a certain feeling-tone. Subsequently I shall probably adopt an attitude of appreciation, which Meinong defines as a feeling of value attaching to an object as judged to exist,[1] e.g. to the truth revealed by my intellectual labour. The two experiences will be distinguishable because they are not strictly contemporaneous. Two successive mental acts are involved, and these are often separated by a sufficient time interval to be apprehended as distinct. The two feelings are thus distinguished, not through their qualitative differences, but simply through the fact that they are *two*. If the value feeling always arose contemporaneously with the primary emotion, it is doubtful whether they *could* be distinguished at all. The only qualitative difference between the two experiences

[1] Whether or not this is a correct definition is for the moment irrelevant.

Digitized by Google

seems to be a difference in the cognitive acts to which the feelings attach, the real significance of which will appear when we discuss the alternative view of value feeling.

(*b*) Secondly, Meinong holds, feelings group themselves into classes in virtue of a certain community of character, which is traceable amidst the greatest diversity in their objects and therefore in their cognitive grounds. The emotional reaction to a work of art is entirely different from the pleasure afforded by a tasty dish, and this difference cannot be attributed wholly to the sources of the feeling in what is presented to cognition. Feelings have their own objects, over and above the objects of the perceptual or other activities to which they attach. The beautiful, which is the object of one type of feeling, is quite different in character from the agreeable, which is the object of another type; hence it lends a different character to the feeling it arouses. Now what is common to value feelings (whether they are associated with economic or with ethical values), and what distinguishes them as a type from æsthetic or from sensation feelings, seems to be a certain faintness or lack of intensity, as a result of which they may attract little attention even when they exercise a determining influence upon the will. Value has a spiritual (*geistig*) character, as a result of which value feeling lacks the force that characterizes

Digitized by Google

bodily feeling.[1] On the other hand, it is more uniform in strength than feelings which exhibit greater quantitative variations, though it must evidently vary in some degree, as its effect upon the will is greater in some cases than in others.

Once more this analysis appears more ingenious than convincing. Even were we prepared to endorse the curious theory that feeling has an object distinct from that of cognition, it is surely obvious that this object must derive its character entirely from the object of cognition. We distinguish the beautiful from the agreeable as specific properties of a work of art and a favourite dish respectively. Now these differences in the objects involve differences in the conative response (in the one case inhibition of conation, in the other, usually, immediate conative activity), and, as a result, considerable differences also in the physiological aspect of the experience. The total emotional states will thus be entirely different in character (the subject will be *ganz anders zu Mute*), but there seems to be no evidence of any qualitative difference in the affective factors. Differences in the intensity of the feeling and in its non-affective accompaniments seem sufficient to account for the total difference. Moreover, the specific difference in quality discovered in *value* feeling, viz. its relative faintness or lack of force, is clearly simply

[1] See appendix to this chapter.

Digitized by Google

a difference in intensity, i.e. in quantity. If we consider what gives it this "spiritual quality," we perceive that the emotional reaction is less intense in such cases, hence more "spiritual," because the intellectual aspect is more prominent in valuation than in sensation or æsthetic enjoyment. If our appreciation of an act of self-sacrifice seems cool and passionless in comparison with other emotional experiences, it is not because value feeling is different in kind from, say, sensation feeling, not because the feeling of a human being is of a different quality from that of a pig, but because the primary factor in the former is not feeling at all but judgment. However essential the emotional ingredients may be, it is really its intellectual aspect which gives value experience its specific character and not any qualitative difference in the feeling itself, a conclusion which leads us from this to the alternative solution of the problem how a simple psychical element like feeling can contain the differentia of value.[1]

[1] It would be easy to cite other examples of the view of value as a qualitative variation in feeling, but, as most of these agree in essentials with those I have examined, it would prolong this discussion unnecessarily to undertake a separate examination of each of them. The most interesting variation on this theme is Lipps's definition of value feeling as *a feeling of the value of personality*. "The values of personality," he says, "are the natural, and thus necessarily the ethical, basis of the determining force of pleasure" (Theodor Lipps: *Die Ethischen Grundfragen*, Hamburg, 1905,

Digitized by Google

5. It will be found, that is to say, that most of the writers who define value in terms of feeling, yet who do not admit the possibility of qualitative variations in feeling itself, agree in seeking the differentia of "value feeling" not in the emotional factor but in its presuppositions, which, however,

p. 59). Further, "the feelings of sympathy in which all æsthetic feeling consists are . . . pre-eminently and in their very essence sympathetic feelings of personal worth." Hence his well-known analogy: "The force and the free co-operation of forces, the ease and power, the assurance and calm, that we admire in a work of architecture, are apprehended as the force, ease, assurance, of a quasi-personal being, comparable to ourselves" (p. 55). He recognizes only one exception to this rule. The value of those external objects our pleasure in which is *not* æsthetic is often, he thinks, co-ordinated with, not subordinated to, the value of the self or personality (p. 45), though it would have been easy for him to show that such objects are always instrumental, and their value therefore derivative (see pp. 83–86 below); hence it was scarcely necessary to make an exception of this group. The belief that one pleasure differs from another pleasure, one pain from another pain, only in degree of intensity rests, he believes, upon prejudice, and is not supported by the facts. There is as much difference between our pleasure in a humorous situation and our pleasure in a noble act as there is between the blast of a trumpet and the notes of a flute. To say that a thing is valuable is thus to say that it is pleasurable, but not everything that yields pleasure is therefore of value. "The feeling of pleasure by reason of which we attribute value to an object is not simply a pleasure of a certain intensity, it is a pleasure of a peculiar quality" (*Æsthetik*, Hamburg, 1903, pp. 7–8.)

When, however, we come to analyse this specific feeling associ-

Digitized by Google

they believe to be indissolubly united with it in a total mental state which they too call "feeling" in the broader sense already referred to. "A concrete feeling attitude," says Witasek in an attempt to distinguish this from the three-dimensional theory, "includes various factors, notably

ated with personality, we find it to be once more a complex state, including a simple affective element of greater or less intensity accompanying a judgment of comparison between some presented content and the conceptual construction we call the self. Our attitudes towards a humorous situation and a noble act, such as the sacrifice of life for some worthy cause, are certainly qualitatively different experiences, and the former is devoid of personal reference, whereas it is possible that we *do* value the latter because it harmonizes with an ideal of self which we have formed and thus reveals a certain kinship between the agent's purposes and our own. Moreover, the pleasure in the first case is what Meinong calls an *Aktgefühl*, i.e. it is yielded by *the mental activity itself*. "Chance is playing with our power of apprehension, our expectation, our ordinary way of looking at things." In the second case the pleasure is in the content of the judgment (*Inhaltsgefühl*), which, as stated, is not in this case a simple assertion but a judgment of comparison. The cognitive elements of the two attitudes are thus entirely different. That the affective factors appear different too is probably due to the fact that the pleasure is in both cases so closely associated with the judgment that conditions it that it can hardly be dissociated from it even by a considerable effort of abstraction. If, however, we persist in this effort, we shall find that the emotional element is in both cases simply the hedonic tone of pleasantness-unpleasantness, the personal reference in the second case merely causing this to be somewhat more intense here than in the first case.

Digitized by Google

presentation, frequently also judgment, and, of course, feeling in the narrower sense in which psychologists use the term when they speak of it as a psychical element. If this emotional factor becomes the dominant aspect of the total psychical state, it is described as a feeling, or affective state. The special character of such an emotional state, however, in other words *the kind of feeling* that results, is only determined by the emotional element in so far as the opposition of pleasure and pain and their varying intensities are concerned, for the feeling itself is only variable in these two directions, and no further *qualitative differences* in it are revealed by psychological analysis. None of the innumerable other differences traceable in the various phases of the emotional life are attributable to the genuinely affective factor. They are all due primarily to the intellectual elements associated with it."[1] He afterwards defines the specific attitude called "value feeling" as *a feeling directed towards an object*, and demanding as its presupposition *the judgment that the object exists*.[2]

This view, or one closely akin to it, is defended by a great many value psychologists. As stated, its principal exponent is Meinong, whose theory of qualitative variations in feeling just examined was

[1] Stephan Witasek: *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Æsthetik*, Leipzig, 1904, pp. 68–9 (italics his).

[2] Op cit., pp. 91–2.

Digitized by Google

apparently suggested by a later enquiry,[1] and is only introduced into his last work as an additional consideration in favour of feeling as the locus of value. As a great many of the other writers on this subject, including Witasek himself, have been influenced by his very careful and detailed analyses,[2] it will be convenient to take his account as representative of this position. Its main features are probably familiar to many.

All valuation, Meinong holds, refers to what exists. We value objects only as existing. I can think of a costly object without reference to its existence. I cannot *value* it except as existing.[3] A musician values his instrument so long as it exists. If it is destroyed he may regret it, may dwell lovingly on the thought of it, but he can no longer value it. Once more, then, mere sensation feeling is not value feeling. My sensations of

[1] *Über Emotionale Präsentation*, Sitzungsberichte der kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, phil. hist. Kl., Bd. CLXXXIII, 1917. A number of other modifications are introduced into his later works apparently as an outcome of this investigation, notably an important discussion of "impersonal value." See below, pp. 195 ff.

[2] Notably by his *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie*, Graz, 1894. (See Witasek, op. cit., p. 74, note.) Many of the arguments of this early work are restated in the first part of his last book, *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie*. See especially pp. 49–62.

[3] Or at least as *assumed* to exist. (See appendix to this chapter.)

Digitized by Google

warmth in a well-heated room may be accompanied by pleasure, but I do not value them. If I value anything, it is the stove, i.e. the object which causes the sensations, and this is valued *as existing*, and continues to be valued even when not giving heat. The sensation feelings are merely the conditions of the value feeling. I value the stove because it has the power to arouse in me pleasant sensations of warmth. And the same thing is true of æsthetic feelings, which are therefore excluded by Meinong and Witasek[1] from the value class. The value reaction, they hold, is secondary. It occurs *when the æsthetic object is judged to exist.* Æsthetic experience itself arises without the medium of judgment, the cognitive element in it being simple presentation. Æsthetic feeling is pleasure in the presentation, the object not being as yet related to the other factors in experience. Before we can value it as the source of the æsthetic emotion, we must apprehend it as a factor in experience related in certain definite ways to other factors, in short, the feeling must be directed towards an object judged to exist. If we fail to observe this distinction, our definition of value will be too broad, and will fail to express its distinctive character. Æsthetic, hedonic—indeed, any and every feeling, will be included in value feeling, and there will be nothing specific in the experience. It is true

[1] Op. cit., pp. 73–5.

Digitized by Google

that what we sometimes value is not so much the object itself as one of its qualities—e.g. we have a blunt knife sharpened and value its sharpness—but the principle is the same, though in such cases we speak of the *realization* of the quality rather than of its existence. We value it as having its characteristic mode of being. In the same way we may extend the principle to cover our judgments about immaterial objects, e.g. mathematical concepts, relations, etc., which are *subsistents* rather than *existents*. The connection between object and feeling cannot, then, be interpreted as causal, for these conceptual entities cannot enter into the causal series; moreover, we often ascribe value to non-existence,[1] or to our own future, where causal efficacy is from the nature of the case excluded.[2] It would be more accurate to interpret it after the analogy of perception, which always involves judgment and in which feeling is always mediated by judgment. In a similar way value feeling arises in connection with a judgment of existence (or of reality), and, as the correlation of an intellectual and an emotional state presents no problem, it

[1] i.e. in cases where the object if it existed would be of negative value; e.g. we may value the absence of disease.

[2] We shall see that more must be attributed to causation here than Meinong admits, as many of the things he mentions are really instrumental, but this would not invalidate his explanation as applied to genuine cases of intrinsic value.

Digitized by Google

may be defined as *the feeling attaching to a judgment of existence or subsistence*, often called simply *a judgment feeling*.

As stated, this theory has found very wide acceptance among Meinong's compatriots, who share his epistemology. It has not been quite so readily adopted by English and American writers, whose different line of approach leads them to question some of his presuppositions. The most obvious objections that have been brought against it are really answered by Meinong himself in the passage to which I have just referred, where he is doubtless trying to guard himself against the criticisms to which his earlier formulations of it had been exposed.

It had been objected, for example, that, if this definition was to cover all classes of value, the reference to reality must be interpreted so broadly that it could hardly serve as the distinguishing mark of a specific type of feeling. The kind of reality that could be presupposed in æsthetic feeling, for example, would be, not existence in space and time, but simply æsthetic reality, which would render the judgment tautological.[1] As we have just seen, however, Meinong excludes æsthetic feeling from the class of value feelings as a typical

[1] Cf. Mr. F. C. Bartlett's remarks in his paper on *Valuation and Existence*, referred to above (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1916–17, pp. 126–9).

Digitized by Google

case of a feeling lacking the presupposition of reality, the presentation with which it is associated being pre-judgmental.

Again, it was argued that we do not hesitate to declare such an end as perfect happiness a good, although, so far from judging it to be real (if by real we mean actual), we do not even know whether it is possible.[1] To this he replies that many of the things we value are *not yet real*, notably the objects of desire which he had agreed to include in this category. The inhabitants of a town would not desire a tram-way, for example, if this already existed in the town. But it is to the *prospective existence* of a tram-way that they attach value in such cases. We do not value any object unless we believe it to be *realizable*—unless, that is to say, we can imagine it as existing. We should not value perfect happiness unless we believed it to be possible. We should at most declare that it *would* be good, if it could be realized.[2]

Meinong perceives, moreover, that his definition of value feeling as *a feeling associated with judgment* raises certain further questions. Are all "judgment feelings" value feelings? And if not, by what marks is the value species distinguished from other

[1] Cf. W. M. Urban: *Value and Existence*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIII, p. 464.

[2] Meinong: *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie*, pp. 49–56.

Digitized by Google

species? Or, if the two are equivalent, what are the cognitive presuppositions of those feelings which we do not describe as value feelings, e.g. sensation feelings, or æsthetic feelings? His answers to these questions are quite simple and unequivocal.

The answer to the first question is in the negative. Not all judgment feelings are value feelings. Those feelings already referred to which attach to the act of judging rather than to the content of judgment may be distinguished from value feelings by the fact that the quality of the judgment is almost indifferent in such cases. We may pass from a judgment of existence to a judgment of non-existence without any corresponding transition from positive to negative feeling, and *vice versa*. In other words, it is the *fact of knowing* not the content known which excites the pleasure in these cases, as witness the fact that a change in feeling does occur when there is a change in the character of the cognitive act from judgment to assumption, i.e. when we become doubtful of the knowledge we believed ourselves to possess. No change of this kind is traceable in the case of value feeling, which attaches rather to the content of the judgment, or assumption, of existence, and thus exhibits a change in quality only when the existence of the object is questioned.

His reply to the second question has already been

Digitized by Google

indicated. These feelings differ from all others, specifically from æsthetic feeling and sensation feeling, in their cognitive presuppositions, the presuppositions of these latter being simple presentation (*Vorstellung*).

6. It is here that the most serious divergence between Meinong and his associates and their English-speaking contemporaries becomes apparent. The question whether this absolute distinction between presentation and judgment, so familiar in modern German philosophy, can be maintained, has been so exhaustively treated by contemporary writers that it is unnecessary for me to discuss it here. I need only point out that the rejection of this epistemological distinction has prevented many who desire to defend the affective view of value from accepting Meinong's account of it. Even Urban, whose early work has probably more in common with Meinong's position than that of any other English or American writer, rejects the merely presentational consciousness as an abstraction.[1] The " pure contemplation " of the simplest perceptual forms, he points out, is the product of a conative process involving spontaneous acceptance or rejection, i.e. " presumption of reality," a cognitive attitude directed towards the presented object, apart from which there can be no presentation. This " primitive presumption " cannot stand

[1] *Valuation : its Nature and Laws*, pp. 45–6.

Digitized by Google

in the relation to feeling which Meinong's presentation has, for it is "implicit judgment," and the feeling associated with it will therefore already be value feeling. Valuation, in other words, does not always involve explicit existential judgment; it may occur at a stage where the question of the existence or non-existence of the object has not yet arisen. Reality-feeling attaches to whatever has "recognitive meaning" for the subject, and the presumption of reality persists until an illusion-disturbing moment causes it to pass over into a judgment of existence or non-existence, or into an explicit assumption.[1]

It does not seem to occur to Urban to doubt that this implicit or explicit reference to reality belongs specifically to value feeling, which, as we have seen, he describes as a total feeling attitude or emotion including this presupposition, as opposed to the mere hedonic-tone of sensation. We must conclude, then, that the simple feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness have no cognitive correlates at all, as all the forms of cognition that he recognizes, viz. presumption, judgment, and assumption, give rise to value feeling. Apparently these other feelings depend upon bare passive sensation involving no cognitive process.

This really does seem to be what he means if we

[1] See appendix to this chapter.

Digitized by Google

may judge by some later passages: "Joy and sorrow," he says, "the two typical and fundamental emotional attitudes which have these worth suggestions or meanings, become meaningless when conceived apart from these presuppositions. They are usually judgment feelings, although not always such, . . . for they may follow upon simple presumption or assumption of reality. The joy in the presumed, assumed, or asserted reality of an object is *toto genere different from the pleasantness of a sensation.*"[1] Or again: "Undoubtedly when attention is held by a sensation of sound or colour, or by an organic sensation, its feeling-tone tends to dominate consciousness. . . . But it is not until there is *explicit reference of the sensation*, as object, to a conative disposition *through judgment or assumption* that the totalization of attitude takes place which gives rise to the worth suggestions of feeling. In such a totalization *the feeling tone of the sensations, as such, becomes irrelevant* and subordinate to the worth feelings of the attitude as a whole."[2] How this attention to a colour or a sound differs from the "pure contemplation of perceptual forms," which, we were told, involved at least a presumption of reality, he does not explain, nor does he appear to realize that pure sensation, divorced from any such external reference, is just as much a limiting concept as Meinong's presentation. He seems to

[1] Op. cit., pp. 64–5. [2] p. 65, note (italics all mine).

Digitized by Google

hold that some experiences really are "abstract," in the sense that a single element dominates consciousness to the exclusion of all others instead of being synthetized with these in a concrete mental attitude. This, however, is not reconcilable with his insistence that every actual experience presupposes the acceptance or rejection of a content, and involves him in just what he had before criticized in Meinong as the serious fallacy of taking an abstraction made for purposes of analysis as a picture of reality.[1] Thus, where he is consistent, he can assign no distinctive pre-supposition of value feeling, for all feeling is equally reality feeling, whilst, where this claim is abandoned, as in the passages just quoted, he is still unable to find any more substantial basis of distinction than a psychological abstraction never realized in experience. It is evidently to escape from this dilemma that he resorts to the three-dimensional view, but this does not really avail him, for we have seen that the third dimension which he discovers in the "total feeling attitude" resolves itself into these non-affective presuppositions; it is not a specific quality of the feeling itself."[2]

[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

[2] It is true that such qualities as "tension-relaxation," "restlessness-quiescence," or "depth and breadth" of feeling, also imply a reference to conation, dispositional or actual, but this cannot be the differentia of value feeling, for Urban describes *all*

Digitized by Google

7. It seems clear, then, that if we deny any primary cognition which is not implicit or rudimentary judgment, we must admit that all feeling, including sensation feeling, is in some sense judgment feeling. If, that is to say, we reject Meinong's purely presentational consciousness, and maintain that all experience involves at least a presumption of reality, we must challenge his identification of value with pleasure in the content of an existential judgment as too broad a definition.

If, however, we study the situation a little more closely in order to assure ourselves exactly what the affective factor in appreciation presupposes, a brief introspection will reveal that our emotional reaction does indeed include a judgment—neither mere feeling, if this could occur, nor the attitude of liking, an outward directed motor-affective attitude, constitutes what these writers call "value feeling." We like many things which we do not value. Many people like sugar-plums, but they are not usually said to

concrete emotion as affective-volitional. In the experience of value, he thinks, feeling rather than conation is the "worth fundamental," for we do not actively desire all the objects of whose value we are conscious; we merely have a disposition to desire them. Both factors are, however, implied in every feeling attitude. It is the presupposition of reality that determines it as a feeling *of value*.

Digitized by Google

value them.[1] But this judgment is not the mere judgment that the object exists (or is at least realizable), which is explicit or implicit in all pleasure or pain excited by objects. I know that sugar-plums exist, and jazz-bands, and merry-go-rounds, and there are times when the existence of all these gives me genuine pleasure, yet I do not regard them as valuable. But there are other objects—the Dialogues of Plato, a Wagner opera, or the affection of a friend—whose existence also gives me pleasure, and to which I do attribute great value. The judgment of existence and the pleasure associated with it occur in both cases, nor does there seem to be any qualitative difference between the two pleasures. What is present in the latter instances and not in the former is *a second cognitive presupposition*, viz. the judgment that these objects not only exist but their existence is a good—philosophy, music, love are things which are worthy to be—and it is this second presupposition which distinguishes the experience of value from other complex emotional states. What this means, however, is that the specific presupposition of value feeling is *the value judgment*; in other words, that the attempt

[1] I must in fairness admit that there seems to be some difference between English and American usage here. It is not uncommon to find American writers using the term in just this sense, which sounds almost incongruous to an English ear. For a fuller discussion of the ambiguity in the value terms, see Chapter III, pp. 102 ff. below.

Digitized by Google

to discover the essence of value in the affective aspect of the experience involves a *petitio principii*.

It thus becomes apparent that the view of Meinong and his disciples involves a rather subtle form of that very question begging that our analysis of Baldwin's argument led us to suspect was involved in every attempt to account for value in psychological, or naturalistic, terms. Our pleasure in an object is not itself value experience. If we call this feeling value feeling, we are tacitly assuming that the object is worthy to excite pleasure, i.e. a judgment of value is presupposed. The question of the validity of this judgment, which is the ultimate value problem, is one which no analysis of the subject's affective reactions will enable us to answer. The logic of value is a subject which falls entirely outside the domain of psychology.

The plausibility of Meinong's argument is, I believe, due to the very common failure to distinguish means from ends, which leads him to confuse the exchange value of economic goods with the intrinsic worth to which all valuing points. Another reference to the passage already quoted will make my meaning clear. He says that we feel pleasure in warmth, but that this is merely a sensation feeling, and we do not value the sensation. What we value is the stove which gives the warmth, and here we feel pleasure in an object judged to exist. A moment's reflection should, however, convince us

Digitized by Google

that we value the stove as a means to warmth, which is in turn a means to the production of an agreeable psycho-physical state, and it is because this instrumental efficacy implies existence that the value in these cases appears to have this implication. If there is anything in the whole state of affairs which is valued for its own sake, it is this condition of the organism, though, in cases like this, where the means are external objects which can be used as media of exchange, our outward directed awareness tends to fasten upon them, and we pay less attention to the more intangible ends from which their real worth is derived. These material things, which are sought after in common by all who have similar needs, thus become familiar symbols for the ends they promote, and the value often comes to be associated exclusively with them, whilst the true ends, being individual and private, are overlooked. Accordingly psychological analysis, which is an analysis of the contents of experience, reveals only the explicit aim, it requires a different type of enquiry to determine in what respects the object aimed at is good.[1]

[1] Professor Dewey's objection to the abstractness of the Utilitarian end is a case in point (John Dewey: *Human Nature and Conduct*, New York, 1922, pp. 199–209). It is not denied that our concrete aims and purposes involve much more than this. But there are many situations in which it is difficult to assign any further ground for *the ascription of worth* than that the pleasure of those concerned is enhanced.

Digitized by Google

This question of the intrinsic value of psychical or psycho-physical states is, I believe, of great importance for the theory of value, as much of the disagreement among writers upon this subject at the present time seems to be traceable to the failure to recognize them as the true ends to which the material goods with which we are so much occupied are contributory.[1] This confusion will be more clearly illustrated if we press the same example a little further. In winter we enjoy the warmth of our stoves, in summer the coolness of the breeze. The two cases are parallel save for the fact that the stove, as a possible object of exchange, possesses economic worth, whilst the breeze does not. The breeze also exists, and we enjoy it for the sake of its coolness, yet we should not call it an object of value. The end in both cases is the same, viz. the resulting conscious state. We attach value to the means that promote such states largely in proportion to our ability to put ourselves in possession of them at will. As we have not this control over the winds of heaven, we pay less attention to them, and so do not come by association to regard them as symbols of the good they promote. Being merely instrumental to this, they are frequently ignored, though, where its causal efficacy is very obvious, we may sometimes exclaim that a cooling breeze is good. A very brief examination will always reveal the real

[1] For a further discussion of this see the next chapter.

Digitized by Google

end for the sake of which such things are valued. The valuing, however, is not simply pleasure in an object judged to exist. It is again pleasure in an object judged (or tacitly assumed) to be good, i.e. the essential factor so far as the *value* is concerned is not the feeling but the judgment, what psychologists have called "value feeling" being simply a reaction of pleasure (or of pain if the judgment is a judgment of negative value), which is not directly excited by the object at all, but accompanies the judgment that it is good (or bad). Whether this affective element is essential to the experience, or whether valuing can take place without it, is another question, which we shall be in a better position to answer after we have examined the affective-volitional theories to be discussed in the next chapter.

8. What this investigation has so far shown has been, firstly, that the two theories, which seek to derive the value of an object from our desire for it and from our pleasure in it respectively, are not mutually exclusive, for most of the modern versions either resolve the first into the second or arrive at a compromise between them. The belief in the relational character of value is a natural inference from the discovery that it may apparently attach to any object whatsoever, and, moreover, that the value of any one object varies with its varying relation

Digitized by Google

to a subject, which appears to be always an emotional one. The chief difficulty which this view presents is that of distinguishing value feeling from other affective experiences. Two solutions of this problem have been proposed: (1) That value feeling includes a third dimension not resolvable into the mere opposition of pleasantness-unpleasantness, which vary only in intensity. This third dimension, however, is only discovered in a total feeling state, never in a simple feeling examined apart from its cognitive and conative accompaniments; hence it is easy to trace it to these other elements in the feeling attitude, specifically to the accompanying judgment. (2) That the distinguishing mark of value feeling is this accompanying judgment, which is interpreted as a judgment of existence (or reality in a wider sense). This, however, gives rise to a dilemma, for there must either be prejudgmental cognitions which constitute the presuppositions of non-value feelings, since bare feeling is a psychological abstraction, or, if all cognition is implicit judgment and so includes a reference to reality, which seems to be the accepted epistemological view, all feelings (with the exception perhaps of pleasure in the cognitive activity itself) must be value feelings, and this is, of course, too broad a definition. A closer analysis, moreover, reveals that a more specific judgment is presupposed in what we call a feeling of value, but this is found to be the

Digitized by Google

judgment of value; hence the only distinguishing feature of value feeling is its association with the value judgment. The feeling itself is simply the hedonic-tone of pleasantness (or unpleasantness), of a certain duration and intensity, which constitutes the affective factor in any experience. To treat it as the essence of value is to assume that to be capable of exciting pleasure is *ipso facto* to be good, whereas we are only justified in calling a thing good if it not only does excite such feeling but is found worthy to do so. The confusion seems to be largely due to the failure to observe that the object on which judgment has thus to be passed is often itself a feeling. Any "value feeling" (in the sense in which these writers use the term) that occurs in such cases is, however, merely a secondary accompaniment of the judgment; it is not the feeling that occasions it.

As already mentioned, these arguments do not exhaust the possibilities of the affective view. All that we have so far determined is that the general cognitive presuppositions of feeling, being always the same in kind and differing only in degree of explicitness, are not sufficient to distinguish the various affective attitudes. Now, it is frequently argued that its cognitive reference is not the only presupposition of feeling, and that an even more significant aspect of the total mental state is its conative basis. It is true that all emotional experiences are alike in

Digitized by Google

including a reference to reality. What really distinguishes the experience of value from the simple pleasures of sense—warmth, colour, sound, etc.—(and, it is sometimes added, from æsthetic experience) is its volitional aspect. Where the attitude is relatively passive, the subject being as it were arrested by the object, as he frequently is upon its first appearance, even if it be a source of pain rather than pleasure, the feeling is not yet value feeling.[1] So soon as the conative response is aroused, however, so soon, that is to say, as the experience ceases to be mere inward, passive pleasure (or pain) and becomes the outward directed attitude of liking or interest, which includes desire, we have a genuine experience of value, which should therefore be defined as an affective-*volitional* relation between subject and object.

We must next enquire, then, what arguments are adduced in favour of this relation as the source of value, and whether these are more successful in avoiding the assumptions involved in the older theories.

[1] This is probably what Urban really means by his distinction between "sensation feeling" and "value feeling."

Digitized by Google

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

SOME QUASI-AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCES

1. *Urban's "modes of feeling."*—Predominantly intellectual character of the later modes.

2. *Meinong's "Phantasiegefühle."*—Ambiguities in his account—Intellectual character of the imaginatively presented content.

3. *Witasek's account of "Phantasiegefühle" accepted.*—Inconsistency in his deductions.

4. *Conclusion.*—The value traced to a non-affective aspect of consciousness.

1. THE attempt to account for value in terms of feeling has led some of the writers referred to in the previous chapter into curiously far-fetched explanations of what are normally regarded as intellectual processes. I have already referred to Meinong's account of the "spiritual," and therefore intensityless, character of value feeling. There are several parallels to this which may add weight to the argument against the affective view. An interesting example is Urban's careful investigation of the "modes of feeling," which he calls passion or emotion, sentiment or mood, and "affective sign." [1]

An affective attitude, Urban thinks, presupposes arrest of some conation. In the early stages, where this is a new occurrence and there has been no time for adaptation, the feeling is relatively intense and therefore prominent in con-

[1] The terminology is borrowed from Paulhan (*Les phenomènes affectifs et les lois de leur apparition*, Paris, 1901), whose theory forms the basis of Urban's discussion. (See *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*, pp. 104–10).

Digitized by Google

sciousness, and is correlated with explicit judgment. This is the stage of emotion or passion. Where readjustment is in process, the feeling becomes less intense, and passion or emotion passes into the stabler condition of sentiment or mood, representing habituation, and finally into "affective sign," a term invented by Paulhan to represent the limit of the affective series, where the accommodation approaches completion, conation has become dispositional, and the feeling is relatively intensityless. These affective states correspond to the transition on the cognitive side from judgment to assumption, explicit or implicit.

The paradox of this situation is that the decrease in intensity does not imply any corresponding decrease in worth suggestiveness, whereas, if value be wholly or primarily affective, we should expect to find it at its maximum in passion or emotion, and becoming gradually dulled with habit till it reached its vanishing point in the relatively intensityless "affective sign." Actually, on the other hand, degree of worth and intensity of hedonic-tone vary independently of each other, even where the latter is the feeling-tone of the value experience itself. This experience may exhibit an increasing positive or negative worth significance at the same time that the intensity of the pleasure or pain which it at first aroused is becoming dulled by habituation. The worth significance may even be at its height where feeling is reduced to the abstract "affective sign." Urban gives no illustrations, but the situation he describes is a familiar one. The ability or integrity of a colleague may excite my enthusiastic appreciation as I first become aware of it. As I come in course of time to expect and depend upon it, it will cease to arouse any emotional

Digitized by Google

response, yet my sense of its value will have increased rather than diminished.

Urban attempts as usual to resolve the contradiction by means of the distinction between scientific and appreciative description. Non-appreciative description (i.e. scientific analysis), he says, involves a process of abstraction which makes one aspect of the situation do duty for the whole.[1] In appreciative description, on the other hand, we find that these different aspects of the total attitude may vary independently—that the sense of value may increase as emotional intensity wanes.

It might have been thought that this, together with the fact that the later modes can be *presented* and *described*, would have suggested to him that they could not be accurately represented as affective at all, but he draws the opposite conclusion, viz. that "feeling must in some way be the object of recognition, presentation, and judgment, and thus approach the cognitive side of experience,"[2] and he suggests (like Baldwin who was similarly influenced by French psychology) that sentiment, mood, and affective sign, being relatively permanent and abstract, may perform a function analogous to that of the image or concept in cognition. Though less intense than passion and emotion, they can fill their rôle and so represent the increase in worth suggestion which accompanies habituation. "The affective sign has a functional meaning which does not lie in its intensity." He never questions the legitimacy of retaining in the affective series a factor which performs this purely intellectual function, and whose only claim to be called feeling seems to be that it gives the state of consciousness a peculiar "tone." It

[1] Op. cit., p. 96. [2] p. 106.

Digitized by Google

is to be remembered, however, that the purpose of the whole analysis was to exhibit the rôle of feeling in value experience, hence doubtless this *tour de force* of ignoring the real identity between two intellectual processes whilst maintaining a forced analogy between feeling and intellection.[1] Apart from such a motive he would surely have found it simpler to treat the "affective sign" as merely the weakened hedonic accompaniment of the image which succeeds the sensation on the cognitive side when judgment gives place to the permanent, implicit assumption of reality. If the arguments of the last chapter are valid, the whole development from emotion or passion to affective sign might have been described as the transition from a phase of experience in which, feeling being relatively intense and pervading consciousness, the intellectual process of valuation had scarcely begun, to the stage where feeling has been dulled by repetition and the correlated desire has become dispositional, whereas the simple awareness of an object has given place to an explicit judgment or assumption of value, which now occupies the forefront of consciousness, only a faint resonance of the former emotional experience remaining. The artificiality of the opposite mode of treatment is thus additional evidence against the view that value is discovered in the affective relation.

2. The description given by Meinong and his associates of a specific "feeling of imagination" is another interesting corollary of their theory of value. The relation between the two will be apparent when it is remembered that they discover value in the feeling roused by an object judged to exist, *except in cases where judgment has given place to*

[1] See James Ward: *Psychological Principles*, p. 458.

Digitized by Google

assumption, or supposal. In such cases the "judgment feeling" is said to be replaced by a "feeling of imagination" (*Phantasiegefühl*), i.e. a feeling associated with an imaginary object. These feelings, Meinong says, are still value feelings, the difference between them and judgment feelings being simply their association with supposal rather than with belief. They stand midway between presentation (in this case an image) and actual feeling, just as supposal stands midway between presentation and existential judgment, and thus represent the emotional correlate of assumption.[1]

The difficulties of this view are obvious. Presentation (whatever we may allow that term to stand for) belongs, like fully developed judgment, to cognition, and there can thus be no question as to the nature of a mental state standing midway between these two. Feeling is a different aspect of consciousness; hence to define a mental state which is neither presentation nor feeling but something between the two is not such an easy task. Is it an intellectual or an affective experience? Certainly most recent writers on æsthetics have been in no doubt as to its affective character. Though it is clear that actual pain can never be a source of actual pleasure, they find all the characters of genuine emotion, affective as well as presentational, reproduced in what they call "imaginary pain." To employ such ambiguous phrases is, however, simply to state the dilemma, not to solve it. Nor, so far as I am aware, has any writer except Witasek offered a real solution. Meinong admits that the description of these mental states as "something that resembles feeling but is strictly speaking not feeling"

[1] A. Meinong: *Über Annahmen*, Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie, 1902, Ergänzungsband II, p. 233.

Digitized by Google

does not fulfil the requirements of a scientific terminology, but he does not seem to see that his term, *Phantasiegefühle*, is a cloak for the same ambiguity, and he continues to use the phrase "a mental state resembling feeling" (*gefühlsartiger Zustand*) without offering the more exact definition he had demanded. He insists, it is true, that in all such experience there is an element that is too vivid to be defined as presentation or assumption and can only be classed as emotion,[1] but, as the real difficulty is that the content of imagination is always *presented*, whereas genuine feeling, the most subjective element in experience, is *unpresentable*, this still leaves obscure the point that required clarification.

These *Phantasiegefühle* evidently correspond very closely to Urban's affective sign, which he himself calls "assumption feeling"; hence a comparison with this may help us to discover their real character.

Urban admits that it is only the "form qualities" of the feeling that can be thus "assumed," or presented, in imagination, and these "form qualities" do not contain "the individual, unpresentable aspect." By the "form quality" (*Gestalt der Gefühle*), a term which Witasek also uses, is meant "the structural relations between the temporal and intensity aspects of the feeling." Our feelings exhibit great differences in these form qualities. In anger the painful feeling is continuous, but the increase and decrease in its intensity are spasmodic, rendering the disturbance very violent. In the dull ache of remorse the feeling, though less acute, is more uniform.[2]

Now it is true that differences of this kind, though

[1] Op. cit., p. 236. [2] S. Witasek: *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Æsthetik*, pp. 139–40; see also W. M. Urban, op. cit., p. 101.

Digitized by Google

originally modifications of subjective experience, can be reproduced in an objective form. Just as we can transpose a melody into another key, so that the same form is retained though not a single note of the original recurs, so we can reproduce the temporal and intensity relations of feeling and contemplate them as imaginary experiences, even as the experiences of another person, or of a thing personified. The only objection we need raise to this is our usual objection to a terminology which includes the form quality thus presented in imagination under affectivity. If, as Urban tells us, "the movement form . . . may be abstracted from the organic and muscular sensations on which it was primarily founded, and transposed to another series or group of sensations," [1] and if, as a result of this abstraction, it assumes "a schematic character" and "may acquire recognitive and generic meanings," it cannot be, as he holds, "*the essential element* of the emotional attitude," for it is not an emotional element at all. The individual, unpresentable aspect is the only genuine emotional factor. It is true, of course, that pure feeling is a limiting concept, that such a state is seldom or never experienced, every emotional attitude being a complex of many factors, but this does not warrant the inclusion under this head of states in which some of these other factors overshadow the feeling, nor the treatment of the cognitive elements associated with feeling as if they were themselves affective and helped to determine the character of the whole as an affective attitude. It is because he has obscured the distinction between feeling and cognition that Urban is able to represent such presented contents as real feelings. His "affective sign" was so

[1] Op. cit., p. 243.

Digitized by Google

defined that it could do duty for both, and thus provide a cloak for his sudden transitions from one to the other. If, however, our argument against the genuinely affective character of this element had any weight, this apparently simple solution falls to the ground, and how the real emotional factor in experience can be imaginatively presented remains as much a mystery as before.

3. As already stated, these objections do not apply to Witasek's account of *Phantasiegefühle*. Inner experience, Witasek holds, is apprehended by intuition (*anschaulich*), and what we do in the exercise of imagination is to project this experience *as intuited* into external objects. This account is criticized by both Urban [1] and Meinong [2] as over-emphasizing the presentational aspect and doing less than justice to the emotional accompaniments of imagination, which, Meinong insists, are at least "quasi-feelings," whatever these may be! In his *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Æsthetik*, which was written after these criticisms had been brought against his first article,[3] Witasek seems however to have exonerated himself completely from this charge, and I must refer the reader to this for a full account of his later position. Briefly stated, he insists that the feelings associated with imaginative assumption are genuinely emotional, but he believes that the emotional factor in judgment and assumption is the same, i.e. the distinction of real and imaginary does not apply to feelings themselves, but only to their presuppositions—to percepts and images,

[1] W. M. Urban: op. cit., p. 251.

[2] A. Meinong: *Über Annahmen*, p. 235.

[3] *Zur psychologischen Analyse der æsthetischen Einfühlung*, Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie, Vol. XXV, 1901.

Digitized by Google

or judgments and assumptions.[1] It is only if the word *feeling* is used in the broader sense which includes both cognition and affection that there is any distinction between judgment feelings and feelings of imagination. He takes issue with Meinong on this point, insisting that a feeling is called "judgment feeling" if it is associated with judgment, and "assumption feeling," or "feeling of imagination," if it accompanies assumption, but that it itself exhibits no such duality. The proof of this is that the two cognitive activities, being different in kind, may subsist side by side; the accompanying feelings being both real feelings, fuse, or, if opposite in quality (as pleasure and pain) inhibit each other.[2] However convinced a person may be of a given truth, he can always indulge in the opposite assumption, and such indulgence leaves his belief entirely unshaken. On the other hand, it is very difficult for a person in a state of profound misery to imagine himself happy, but, if he is able to do so, his suffering is alleviated; conversely, a person in a state of joyous excitement or mirth finds it difficult to enter into the feelings of one in trouble, but, if he succeeds, his pleasure is at once destroyed. This does not mean, of course, that there is not a fundamental difference in the two total states, but Witasek traces this wholly to their relation

[1] Cf. *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Æsthetik*, p. 114: "Anyone who has sufficient powers of imagery to call up a vivid representation of a pleasing design, a musical composition, or even a simple melody, may experience a pleasure *exactly similar* to that experienced in actually seeing or hearing these things; the purely emotional factor is qualitatively identical in the two cases; it is only in intensity that it falls behind in the case of imagination."

[2] Op. cit., p. 118, note.

Digitized by Google

to reality. "Feelings of imagination are excited by fictitious objects and we know that reality still persists. We are subject to it and cannot alter it. . . . The imaginary is in our power. So long as it pleases us, or is of service to us, we allow it free play, but, as soon as it becomes unpleasant we can demolish it by the sovereign power which we exercise over assumption." [1] The pleasure experienced is real pleasure, the pain real pain, but the absence of a judgment of reality makes these feelings less intense than those which accompany belief, and the knowledge that we can extinguish the whole illusion at will normally prevents them from becoming powerful enough to outweigh our æsthetic pleasure in the whole in which they are an element.

Nevertheless, Witasek declines to draw the conclusion we should have expected, viz. that only so much of our inner experience as is intuited can be reproduced in the objects of imagination, and that feeling (which he believes to vary only in the directions of pleasantness-unpleasantness,[2] and which can thus be nothing more than the simple hedonic-tone of consciousness, belonging wholly to the subject side) is the one factor which cannot be intuited, and so eludes presentation. He seems to hold that there are innumerable examples of imaginative construction which afford evidence of the presence of a genuinely affective factor *in the imaginatively presented object.* This factor must therefore have been presentable to "inner intuition," an argument which he apparently thinks sufficient to silence the objection of several æstheticists [3] that the presentation of a feeling is a

[1] Op. cit., pp. 116–17.
[2] See pp. 69–70 above.
[3] Notably Oswald Külpe and C. Groos.

Digitized by Google

contradiction. It would have been more consistent with his contention that the emotional factor is genuine feeling to have admitted that, though all its accompaniments, including its "form qualities," i.e. its temporal relations and sensory conditions, can be apprehended as *content*, and thus imaginatively projected, the feeling itself remains inner and private. There seems to be no emotional factor, properly so called, associated with assumption as real feeling is associated with the judgment of reality. If, as Witasek insists, a real feeling is present in assumption, it remains a subjective accompaniment of the imaginative activity. So far as it is genuinely affective it is not an element in the imaginative construction, and the designation "feeling of imagination" is therefore a misnomer.[1]

4. The investigation of these feelings thus affords a further confirmation of our analysis of "value feeling." For assumption feeling, being a substitute for judgment feeling, is similarly value feeling (though Meinong points out that, as it is merely representative, the value is in this case derivative).[2] There is, then, at least one type of value which can be traced to a psychical activity containing no genuine affective factor, and describable at best as "quasi-feeling," or as "a mental state resembling feeling," or as the schematic

[1] The possible application of these conclusions to the æsthetic doctrine of "empathy" (*Einfühlung*) will be obvious, but I am not sufficiently confident of my ability to do justice to all the aspects of this very complex theory to care to suggest any further deductions from Witasek's premises which he himself would not endorse. (Contrast his own treatment of *Einfühlung*, op. cit., pp. 131 ff.)

[2] *Über Annahmen*, pp. 253–4.

Digitized by Google

"affective sign," which we were unable to define in terms of feeling at all. The total experience may include feeling, but this is not an element in the imaginative construction. To take a simple example: If I imagine myself the winner of some great honour, the idea will doubtless yield me real pleasure. I shall also picture myself as a person experiencing pleasure, but this simply means that I shall have a mental image of myself experiencing the organic and other sensory accompaniments (i.e. the form qualities) of pleasure, which are all that can be imaginatively presented. No affective factor is traceable in such an image, for affection cannot be "intuited" (*durch innere Wahrnehmung vorgestellt*), and cannot therefore be included in the ejection of "inner intuition" which enters into an imaginative construction. Yet, just as we should call the actual winning of an honour an experience of value, so we should doubtless call the imagined event an imaginary experience of value. The affective element, however, is absent in the latter case; hence the value must depend upon some other factor in the experience, which cannot, therefore, be rightly described as "value feeling."

Digitized by Google

CHAPTER III

THE THEORY OF VALUE AS INTEREST

1. *Some ambiguities resolved.*—Controversy over the correct use of "to value"—The other value terms less equivocal—F. C. Bartlett's explanation rejected—The judgmental interpretation accepted.

2. *The theory of value as interest.*—Its arbitrary use of value terms—Its naturalistic basis—Its advantage over hedonism—R. B. Perry's defence of it—His reply to Moore's criticism of "the naturalistic fallacy"—His distinction between generic and specific value—His repudiation of epistemological subjectivism—The *petitio principii* in his earlier argument—His four criteria of value—Inadequacy of inclusiveness as the sole criterion—Intensity admittedly insufficient—Lack of correlation between correctness and interest—His lapse into epistemological subjectivism—Preference a qualitative criterion not equivalent to interest—The fallacy again due to confusion of means with ends.

3. *Lack of correlation between interest and value.*

4. *The relation of feeling to the judgment of value.*—Maurice Picard's distinction between value and worth—Some non-affective value experiences.

1. BEFORE proceeding further it will be expedient to draw attention to an ambiguity of which some of my readers are doubtless aware, but to which for simplicity's sake I have avoided referring until I had made my own position clear. This was, however, becoming a source of confusion at the end of the last chapter, and may, I think, help to explain the persistent belief of even the most careful in-

Digitized by Google

vestigators that value, whatever its intellectual implications, has an essential relation to feeling. I refer to the ambiguous use of the word *value* itself, to which several recent American writers have drawn attention. I cannot do better than quote once more a much-quoted account of it by Professor Dewey. "Unfortunately for discussion," Dewey says, "'to value' means two radically different things: to prize and to appraise; to esteem and to estimate. I call them radically different because to prize names a practical, non-intellectual attitude, and to appraise names a judgment. That men love and hold things dear, that they cherish and care for some things, and neglect and contemn other things, is an undoubted fact. To call these things values is just to repeat that they are loved and cherished. . . . To call them values and then import into them the traits of objects of valuation, or to import into values, meaning valuated objects, the traits which things possess as held dear is to confuse the theory of judgments of value past all remedy."[1]

Now a writer who recognizes an ambiguity of this kind usually tries to resolve it by an exclusive

[1] John Dewey: *The Logic of Judgments of Practice*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XII, p. 520. Cf. also Maurice Picard: *Value and Worth*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIX, p. 477; S. C. Pepper: *The Equivocation of Value*, University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. IV, 1923, pp. 108 ff.

Digitized by Google

adherence to one or other of the alternative meanings, and this is what most of those who have accepted Dewey's account have done. It must be admitted, however, that the effect has so far been to increase the prevailing confusion rather than to diminish it, for they have failed to agree as to which of the two usages is the correct one. In the course of a series of articles on this subject Dewey seems almost to have persuaded himself that his second set of synonyms give the real connotation of the term. The majority of his American contemporaries,[1] on the other hand, reject this definition and continue to identify valuing with liking or interest.

It is easier to avoid confusion here if we recognize that the verb "to value" and the adjective "valuable," or even the abstract noun "value," are not always used in parallel senses. It is curious that none of these writers should have noticed that, in failing to distinguish between these forms, they are committing the fallacy of which Mill is accused in his identification of "desirable" with "desired."[2] The source of the error in the present case is of course partly the dual use of the verbal form. However useful it might be to restrict the phrase "I value" to one meaning, we have to recognize

[1] e.g. Messrs. Santayana, R. B. Perry, D. W. Prall, S. C. Pepper, and M. Picard.

[2] J. S. Mill: *Utilitarianism*, 10th edition, 1888, p. 53.

Digitized by Google

that it is at present used, as Dewey points out, *sometimes* in the sense of "I like" or "I hold dear," *sometimes* in the sense of "I judge to be good," but most frequently, I would suggest, in the more complex senses of "I like (a thing) judging (it) to be good," or "liking (a thing) I judge (it) to be good." I have failed, however, to trace this ambiguity, as Dewey does, in the other forms of the word. When we call a thing "valuable," we seem never to mean simply that we like it, or value it in the first sense, any more than when we call a thing desirable we mean simply that we desire it. We call a thing valuable when we feel that we *ought* to like it, whether we do so or not (i.e. when we value it in the second sense), just as we call a thing desirable when we know that we *ought* to desire it, or, more accurately, that it is worthy to be desired. We may say, to use an example of Meinong's, that we value the letters of a dead friend, meaning that we cherish them, but we should not call them *valuable*, just because in such a case the appeal to feeling is much more prominent than the acknowledgment of worth, which may even be entirely absent. It is not the mere awkwardness of the periphrasis which makes me refrain from saying that a thing is "valuable *to me*"; it is rather the recognition that, when I pronounce a thing valuable, the term has no personal reference. It means valuable as such, valuable objectively. It does not mean that the

Digitized by Google

thing is *liked* by me or by anyone else, but that it is of such a nature that it *should* arouse the liking of anyone of normal sensibility who has a proper opportunity to appraise it. Moreover, the use of the abstract noun evidently follows that of the adjective rather than that of the verb, for the terms "object of value" and "valuable object" are synonymous.[1]

It will probably be objected here that the use of these adjectival forms differs from the use of the verb primarily through their almost exclusive reference to economic goods, but this does not seem to be accurate. The exchange values we call economic are always instrumental, though the peculiar demands of our material and social environment may compel us to devote a great deal more of our energy and attention to them than to the ends for the sake of which they are pursued; hence our tendency to associate our value terms primarily with them. These terms are, however, applied just as freely to objects of intrinsic worth when our attention is directed to them. The value of means and the value of ends are value in the same sense of *that*

[1] I cannot agree with Mr. Prall that "value is precisely the term applied in common usage to objects which stand at the outer end of the relation called liking, the inner end of which is a human mind that likes" (D. W. Prall: *The Present Status of the Theory of Value*, University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. IV, p. 84).

Digitized by Google

which ought to be, the difference being that the former possess this qualification only by virtue of the ends they serve. There seems to be no *further* ambiguity in the use of the value terms arising out of this distinction.

I believe, moreover, that an intellectual factor is *usually* included in the process we call "valuing." Certainly some of Dewey's synonyms imply this, e.g. "to prize," and still more "to esteem." Thus, even here, the ambiguity consists rather in a shifting of emphasis from the affective to the intellectual aspect than in the use of the same word to represent two wholly different attitudes. To value a picture or a precious stone means more than simply to like them. It involves many judgments concerning their æsthetic and economic worth. And when Mr. Picard tries to illustrate the affective usage by saying that he *values* smoking, or Mr. Prall declares that a pig *values* his swill, it will surely be agreed that the word has been deprived of much of its ordinary significance. That this is Dewey's own feeling is suggested by his increasing reluctance to admit the legitimacy of the first of his two meanings, as witness his practice in all his later articles of qualifying the word "liking," when used as a synonym for valuing, by the adjective "contemplative," which has an indisputably cognitive reference.[1]

[1] See especially his article: *Values, Liking and Thought*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XX, pp. 618 ff.

Digitized by Google

An ingenious attempt has been made by Mr. F. C. Bartlett to show that the two meanings refer to different stages of mental development.[1] The affective use belongs, he suggests, to the very early stage, where no explicit judgment occurs, act, content, and feeling being as yet undifferentiated elements in an experienced whole. The beginnings of valuation can be traced here, inasmuch as the mind is never equally ready to receive all impressions, but possesses an original bias or interest, leading it to apprehend some objects more readily than others, and to feel satisfaction in this ease of assimilation.[2] This is preferential treatment; hence it is rightly to be described as rudimentary valuing, though at the more advanced stages *the judgment* of preference becomes an integral part of valuation. The mere satisfaction derived from the feeling of ease with which those data are assimilated in which we have a native interest develops into the more complex attitude of liking, and this passes over in its turn into the definite judgment form, the different phases marking the gradual distinction of act of apprehension, content apprehended, and accompanying feeling, of which the agent is not at first aware.

It seems to be a fair objection to this argument that Mr. Bartlett is extending the term "value"

[1] In his paper, *Valuation and Existence*, referred to above.

[2] p. 118.

Digitized by Google

even farther beyond its customary application than any of the other writers referred to have done, for the exercise of mere instinctive preference is at first unconscious. We do not explicitly reject the contents which we overlook or only confusedly apprehend, nor do we consciously choose those which we assimilate more readily. The term "preference" seems indeed to be almost equally inapplicable, for the content which is accepted is experienced simply as satisfying, not as *more* satisfying than those which are not assimilated at all. It is not easy to understand what *preference* can mean where no alternatives are recognized, and these do not present themselves until the contents are clearly discriminated. It is probable that Mr. Bartlett does not mean his phrase "preferential treatment" to signify that the agent *explicitly* prefers one content to another, but, if not, there seems no ground for identifying it with valuation. Even if there be a usage of "I value" in which it is equivalent to "I like" or "I hold dear," to equate it to the still more primitive experience described by such terms as "there is satisfaction," "it is agreeable," where the attitude is not even directed towards the object that arouses the feeling, is surely a quite unprecedented extension of its ordinary range. As Mr. Bartlett is willing to admit that, at the more advanced stages, "it . . . becomes true to state that no mere feeling accompaniment of an ex-

Digitized by Google

perience is adequate to give rise to a definite act of valuing," the essential of which is the value judgment,[1] it is curious that he should be so anxious to apply the term to a stage from which this essential is absent. His motive is evidently to exhibit the two as phases in a continuous development, but, as he has to admit that new powers of distinguishing the various factors in experience arise in the successive phases of the development, he might surely have allowed the process of valuing to begin either where feeling and object are distinguished in the attitude of liking, or where feeling, act, and content are finally discriminated in the definite judgment of valuation, and thus have avoided so curious a departure from the common use of terms.

The inference from all this is that, if the verbal forms are really used to describe several different attitudes, it will be difficult to determine the rôle of the value predicate by reference to them. Their various meanings must first be made clear, and we shall be more likely to avoid confusion if we try to discover the nature of *valuing* through an analysis of the concept of *value*, which is apparently unambiguous, than if we try to make the usage of value correspond to that of valuing whilst we are still uncertain which meaning to assign to this. In ordinary speech the adjective "valuable," in the

[1] Op. cit., p. 124.

Digitized by Google

intrinsic sense, means *what ought to be*, an object of value is an object which ought to be for its own sake. Must not the more exact meaning of valuing, then, be Dewey's second meaning, viz. estimating the goodness or worth of a thing? If the verb is applied to situations where this intellectual process is secondary, or altogether absent, it should at least be recognized that in this usage it is not synonymous with the other terms having the same derivation, and it will be remembered that, where its specific cognitive presuppositions were omitted, we found no means of distinguishing "value feeling" from other feelings. Thus those writers who identify value with feeling (or with any other subjective attitude which excludes a cognitive reference) are departing farthest from its original meaning, and seem to be doing most violence to accepted usage, and these are really the only criteria by which we can decide a controversy over the meaning of a word.

2. It is their apparently arbitrary use of the terminology of value which makes it difficult for an English reader to accept some of the arguments used by American protagonists of the "interest theory," a view which has clearly much in common with the older theory of value as desire, and with certain forms of hedonism. Several of these writers have offered detailed analyses of the principal types and phases of interest, human and sub-human, the most

Digitized by Google

valuable of which is certainly Professor R. B. Perry's exhaustive examination of its genesis, mutations, and integrations,[1] with the general conclusions of which any unbiased reader must, I think, be in complete agreement. It is only when he goes on to claim that his investigation has exhibited *the evolution of value*, that the said reader may feel obliged to protest that this is at least not what English usage understands by this term. If it represents the current American use, a linguistic modification must have taken place, which may be of importance to philology, but which can only result in setting philosophers completely at cross purposes.

The only effective way of combating a departure of this kind is to exhibit a lack of correlation between the terms treated as synonymous. If a biologist offers me a detailed scientific account of the descent and characteristics of the chimpanzee, I shall probably be willing to accept this, but, if he calls the species he has described *homo sapiens*, and proceeds to treat it as identical with the human species, I shall certainly try to convince him that he has mistaken the differentia of humanity. The writings of Professor Perry and his associates impel the English reader to a similar task in respect to the identification of interest and value.

Now it is easy to see that this identification is required as a basis for a naturalistic theory. As

[1] Ralph Barton Perry: *General Theory of Value*, New York, 1926.

Digitized by Google

already stated, these writers evidently believe that the application of the psychological method to the problem of value has actually extended the scope of this concept far beyond its traditional limits. The words good and evil have thus acquired an immensely increased denotation, and may now refer to any attitude of liking or disliking, or describe any shade or variety of human interest. The desirable, in the modern sense, means just that which is most fruitful in fulfilling desires; the valuable that which gives the most permanent and widespread satisfaction.[1] The question we have to decide is whether this extension of the value terms to become "blanket names for a thousand different attitudes of liking and disliking" really has placed them beyond the range of the criticisms applied to older formulations of the naturalistic position.

Clearly it avoids some of the more obvious objections to naïve hedonism. It is not, they point out, the mere passive state of pleasure that we call good, for, when we call a thing good, we mean that we like it, and we like many things besides pleasure. Valuing is an active, outward-directed tendency, in which the feeling of pleasure is at most a necessary factor, and the *degree* of the liking is not measured by the pleasure yielded. The most damaging criticism that has been brought against

[1] See Chapter I, p. 9 above, and R. B. Perry: *The Definition of Value*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XI, pp. 153–4.

Digitized by Google

any naturalistic theory of value is, however, undoubtedly Professor Moore's criticism of "the naturalistic fallacy"[1]; hence it behoves Professor Perry to meet this, if he is to have a clear field for the development of his own thesis.

His reply to it is contained in the second chapter of his *General Theory of Value*, but it is exhibited there as part of a much larger task which his scrupulous thoroughness has led him to undertake, viz. the classification of all rival theories on the basis of their degree of relationship to his own view of value as interest, and the separate examination of each type. Many of his criticisms are new, and some of them appear conclusive. His method of refuting the opponents of naturalism is in every case to convict them of an *ignoratio elenchi* by showing that their alternative theories refer exclusively to superlative value, and thus fail to exhaust the value genus, whilst it is value *in the generic sense* that is defined in terms of interest.[2] In their search for the ultimate good, or best, the defenders of these theories have overlooked the humbler claimants to goodness. Their descriptions, however, always cover an implicit assumption of a broader conception than they have formulated. Thus the sword used against natural-

[1] G. E. Moore: *Principia Ethica*, Chapters I and II, *passim*, e.g. pp. 7–15; p. 41.

[2] *General Theory of Value*, Chapters II–IV.

Digitized by Google

ism is double-edged, the critics of its question-begging arguments being themselves guilty of this procedure.

As I have already indicated, I believe that this broadening of the concept can be shown to be an illicit extension made in the interests of a philosophical theory. For if these further goods which are included in the genus are submitted to careful scrutiny, they will be found in every case either to be good merely as means to something else (and thus to derive their worth from their relation to ends already recognized by exponents of the narrower view and not from their relation to an interested subject), or not to be in any intelligible sense *good* at all. On the other hand, some objects will be recognized as good in which no interest is taken, though, as we usually attend more carefully to objects which arouse our interest than to those to which we are indifferent, the value of these indifferent objects is easily overlooked. There are, moreover, few objects which do not arouse the interest of *someone* in *some* connection; hence most value objects will be among the objects of interest, though in some cases the irrelevance of the two circumstances to each other will be apparent.

Let us, then, apply this criticism to Professor Perry's argument.

More than ten years had elapsed between the publication of his first article in defence of a

Digitized by Google

naturalistic definition of value and the later work to which I have just referred, in which most of his earlier arguments are reproduced. It is sometimes claimed, he had said in this first article, that value is indefinable, but, as it is ordinarily assumed that it *can* be defined, the burden of proof rests with those who deny this.[1] Professor Moore and others have called it indefinable on the ground that it is simple, and therefore unanalysable, but they have not demonstrated its simplicity. This could only be done by pointing to "a distinct *quale* which appears in that region which our value terms roughly indicate, and which is different from the object's shape and size, from the interrelation of its parts, from its relation to other objects, or to a subject, and from all other factors belonging to the same context."[2] It seems to have occurred to him since that this is precisely what Moore claims to have done by showing that no attempt that has been made to analyse the concept is really an analysis at all, but always a description in terms of something else that it is not; in every proposed definition the distinct *quale* of goodness is omitted. In any case, whilst still insisting that he himself finds no such residuum, he now demands this as a justification for treating value as a tertiary quality, *not* for treating it as indefinable.

[1] *The Definition of Value*, Journa lof Philosophy, Vol. XI, p. 145.

[2] p. 144.

Digitized by Google

He also makes the reply just indicated to Moore's much-quoted argument (which he had not before attempted to meet) that good cannot in any case be defined in terms of any natural property or complex of properties, or of any temporal existents, since it may always be asked of these, e.g. of the object we desire, or even of the object we desire to desire, whether this *is* really good; hence the two concepts cannot be identical. Value propositions are always synthetic. No analysis, however exhaustive, of the nature of existing things can give us any knowledge of what goodness is. Most of those who have argued in this way, he objects, have had their attention focussed exclusively upon one type of goodness. What this question means for them is: Is the interest in question *morally* good? And the fact that many interests are morally bad, inasmuch as they present obstacles to the realization of broader personal or social ends, is considered sufficient to invalidate the identification of value with interest as such. Moral value, however, is only one species of value. It may be the supreme value, but it is not the whole of value. What is morally bad—war, for example—may thus be good in some other sense, and the question: "Is the interest really good?" is beside the point if pressed against the claim that *qua* interest it must be good in some sense. Value, in other words, is relational; hence a thing may have

Digitized by Google

positive and negative value at the same time, for it may stand in opposite relations to different things or people. Just as an object may be to the right of one person and to the left of another, so it may be good for (or in the interest of) one person and bad for (or contrary to the interest of) another.[1] War may be good in the sense of fulfilling the desire of some men at some time, but it is at the same time bad, inasmuch as it is opposed to the more comprehensive desires felt by all men at all times. These two relations are perfectly compatible. There is a sense of good, then, which varies with the individual. When the question whether a thing is good is put to a subject, M, he will consider whether it is good *for him*, and the same question will have a different significance for each individual to whom it is submitted.[2]

The opposition to this view is due, Perry thinks, to its supposed subjectivism, and he is at much pains to persuade his readers that an interest in a thing is as good an object as any other and can be the subject of ordinary judgments of fact; the value is not relative to anyone's opinion about it. But the realist who seeks to avoid psycho-mania need not become a victim of psycho-phobia. Love,

[1] *General Theory of Value*, pp. 135–6. Cf. G. Santayana: *Winds of Doctrine*, discussed below, pp. 215 ff. These two writers are in very close agreement on this whole subject.

[2] p. 37.

Digitized by Google

hope, fear, are independent of the mental acts whereby they are known, but they are still states of mind. The theory, though epistemologically realistic, is a psycho-centric theory of value, for it represents values as functions of certain acts of living mind.[1]

I do not believe, however, that it is on the ground of its epistemological subjectivism (if by this is meant the view that that is good which a subject judges good) that most of its opponents have rejected this view. It is in the broader sense of "constituted by a subjective attitude," or "personal," to use Meinong's more appropriate word, that this much-abused term has been applied to it. It is perfectly clear that it represents the attitude of valuing as motor-affective and *not* cognitive, and I do not think that many of its critics have been guilty of the misinterpretation with which Professor Perry charges them, though, as interests are frequently conditioned by judgments, it is difficult for either side to keep the two issues entirely apart. It was not epistemological relativism that Moore criticized in his famous Refutation of Egoism, and this criticism holds good against the present theory. M's judgment that *a* is good for him only involves a contradiction inasmuch as there is an inconsistency in a thing's *being* good *for a particular person.* This argument Perry formerly professed

[1] p. 139

Digitized by Google

to endorse,[1] at least so far as he was able to translate it into terms of his own theory. If anything is M's interest it is good, he claimed, *qua* interest, and is therefore not indifferent for N, but is to be respected by him equally with his own interests. A comparison of this statement with some of the remarks just quoted makes it clear, however, that he has been unable to maintain this attitude of impartiality, which would have necessitated a modification of his definition, for, if strict impartiality is to be observed, an interest as such cannot be good. So far it is only a claimant to inclusion in universal good, which, on this view, would be the most inclusive interest—ideally the interest of the whole, in practice probably the interest of the greatest number.

At first he tried to retain both definitions without apparently noticing the discrepancy between them. In making the greatness of the interest fulfilled the criterion of superiority he believed himself to be adhering to his original principle, his basis of comparison being purely quantitative. It is clear, however, that this criterion involves the exclusion of many interests, for there are some interests that can never be fulfilled save at the expense of others. We cannot consistently claim both that the fulfilment of any interest is a positive good and also

[1] Ralph Barton Perry: *The Moral Economy*, New York, 1909, pp. 59 ff.

Digitized by Google

that " the goodness (of a thing) is determined with reference to nothing less than the totality of all affected interests," [1] for, in the latter case, the fulfilment of interests which are by their nature incompatible with wider ends will be positively bad, and will demand repression if these ends are to be achieved. It was of little use for him to emphasize the quantitative character of his standard of comparison, the goods compared being all interest fulfilments, for the fulfilment of an interest is a complex affair, and the *objects* compared are *not* as a rule the same in kind, whilst it is not easy in such cases to estimate the intensity of the feelings they excite. Attitudes of interest cannot be added to or subtracted from each other any more than pleasures can, for even their duration is hard to estimate, nor are human beings sufficiently homogeneous all to adopt similar attitudes towards an object even though they be in other respects similarly related to it. Quantitative estimation thus insensibly gives place to qualitative, which means that the value is determined by the character of the object. It is simply not a fact that we always rank an interest higher because our liking or desire for its object is more intense—on the contrary, our enjoyment of the so-called " higher goods " is normally less intense than our enjoyment of the " lower " ones ; nor where it lasts longer, for some

[1] *The Moral Economy*, p. 67.

Digitized by Google

of those we consider most refined are fleeting and elusive; nor even where it is the interest of the greatest number: we sometimes consider it justifiable, for example, to sacrifice the intellectual interest of a number of people of mediocre endowment for the sake of developing one genius. Professor Perry is thus forced to recognize that the word "greater" is inappropriate in such cases. If, however, he had substituted a word like "higher" or "better," he would have been too easily convicted of the question-begging he claims to avoid. He has therefore found it necessary to revise his whole position very carefully. Evidently he now believes that he can safeguard his main thesis by declaring his original definition to be a definition of the value genus, and representing the process of evaluation as an attempt to arrange the species in an order within the genus and to assign the differentia of superlative value.

There are, he discovers, three or four different senses in which one interest is said to be greater than another.[1] The principle of inclusiveness, by the application of which interests are rendered harmonious, is the principle most applicable to moral problems, but there are other goods than the moral, and in some of these cases another standard of evaluation is employed. Moreover, even the standard of inclusiveness cannot be

[1] *General Theory of Value*, pp. 611 ff.

Digitized by Google

extended beyond the interests of the individual unless each person concerned agrees to will only what is consistent with the wills of all others, the necessary condition of which is universal love—which sounds like an immediate appeal to a different principle. He is only able to avoid this by the rather forced definition of love as "an activity which supports the interested activity of another person," or an interest in another's interest.[1] The inadequacy of this definition could hardly be better illustrated than it is in his own examples of the realization of the ideal in "that moment of melting tenderness felt in the presence of beauty, or of chivalric devotion to a cause, or of compassion for the brave struggle and patient suffering of sentient creatures," or again in "those moments of perfected intercourse in which happiness is founded on generosity, and in which there is a sudden revelation of the meaning of marriage, of friendship, of human fellowship."[2]

Of the other standards which he now recognizes intensity is the most familiar, and this is also clearly a quantitative criterion. Though exact measurement is admitted to be impossible, it can be defined as "a ratio of the elements which are acting under control of the interest to the totality of the elements of the organism," and is therefore

[1] Op. cit., p. 679.

[2] Op. cit., p. 691. See this whole section, p. 669 *ad finem.*

Digitized by Google

sufficiently determinable to allow of a comparison of interests.[1] He infers from this definition that all maximum intensities of interest must be equal, but as it is clear that in that case many interests never reach maximum intensity, this does not seem to be a very important discovery.

Intensity, however, is the standard which, for various sufficiently familiar reasons, must give way in case of conflict to others. Perry still places inclusiveness first in the order of precedence, but he mentions two others, which he has failed to eliminate either as coincident with one of the first two or as open to objection on other grounds.

The first of these, the standard of correctness, does not, indeed, afford a basis for the comparison of values as *better or worse*, which he still insists is always a quantitative comparison; nevertheless, the corrective method is a method of criticism or standardization.[2] As, however, he cannot, consistently with his motor-affective theory, allow that judgment can be a constituent of value, he has to admit that to speak of true and false values is simply an elliptical way of saying that, as our interests are frequently determined by our judgments concerning the character of objects, so they may be strengthened by the assurance of the truth of these judgments or destroyed by the discovery of their falsity.

[1] Op. cit., p. 630. [2] Op. cit., pp. 611 ff.

Digitized by Google

Now, although this is only an indirect criterion of value, it will be of particular interest to Professor Perry's critics, as it brings to light some of the principal paradoxes of his position. And that this is at least not based upon any confusion of thought is evident from his uncompromising acceptance of these implications. If a man courts a woman believing her to be an heiress and becomes indifferent to her when he finds that she has been disinherited, or prizes a picture in the erroneous belief that it is a Titian, these objects, he declares, *lose value* through the correction of the respective judgments. Similarly the value of God arises from the love and admiration that the belief in Him inspires in men; hence it makes no difference to His value if He does not exist![1]

Any opposition to these conclusions will, of course, be construed as evidence of the usual prepossession with certain types of value to the exclusion of others. Some of the objects referred to are, Perry would admit, valuable in other respects than those cited, which means, on his theory, that they are related to other interests than those of the subjects in question. They will thus have lost value only for these subjects. Any more permanent interests which they continue to satisfy are a sufficient guarantee of their abiding value when regarded from these other points of view.

[1] Pp. 613–14.

Digitized by Google

My difficulty with this position is that I can trace no loss of intrinsic value in those cases in which he believes the value to have diminished, but only in the one case cited in which he declares it to persist unchanged. What is revealed in the first two examples is simply that the objects are unfit to serve as instruments for the particular ends which the agent had in view; hence they have lost their value as means. Whether or not they are of value for their own sakes has not been indicated in the statements made about them. Exactly the opposite seems to be true of the value of God. It will hardly be denied that, to represent the value of an object as conditioned so completely by the mere fact of belief in it that the *truth* or *falsity* of this belief (and consequently the existence or non-existence of the object) is irrelevant so long as the belief remains unshaken and the interest in the object is therefore sustained, is to give a very unusual connotation to the term value. It is certainly not the usage of the practical man, unspoiled by metaphysical subtleties, to whom this naturalistic philosophy is expected to make a particular appeal. Would he admit, for example, that it makes no difference to a man's value that he be an unscrupulous liar, provided he be clever enough to deceive his fellow-men into believing in his integrity; that the coward who flees from the battle-field is as good as the brave man who stays to face the

Digitized by Google

foe, provided his desertion be not discovered? On Professor Perry's argument the actual value of both is unaffected so long as the interest felt in them remains undiminished. There is at most a difference in their derivative worth as instruments to more remote ends. But surely common sense takes precisely the opposite view. Both lying and cowardice may occasionally prove useful strategies in the fulfilment of some worthy purpose; and certainly a belief in the existence of divinities has served many important human ends quite irrespective of its validity. It is when we regard the objects of such beliefs as ends in themselves that a scruple arises as to the identity of their value with our interest in them.

There can hardly be need of further evidence that the real locus of value has been mistaken, perhaps through the failure to observe that "specific *quale* different from all other qualities of the object or from its relation to a subject," which may attach to many different objects that appear to have nothing else in common but the indefinable predicate of goodness. This property attaches *inter alia* to knowledge, hence a situation which includes a true belief is *ceteris paribus* better than a situation which includes a false one.[1] Moreover, though it be ad-

[1] Cf. G. E. Moore: *Principia Ethica*, pp. 193 ff. It is evident that Professor Perry has this argument in mind throughout the passage referred to.

Digitized by Google

mitted that no value attaches to existence as such, no one would, I think, deny that the existence of an object of value was better than its mere possibility, whilst clearly an actual intrinsic good is often immensely fruitful in the production of further goods.

It is a corollary of Professor Perry's argument that God will be better or worse than His creatures according as He is the object of greater or less interest. If, then, Western civilization survives and finally dominates the world, He is likely to become an object of less worth than some men of international renown, since the belief in His existence is clearly declining. Whilst defending the relativity of value, Perry was anxious to avoid the charge of epistemological subjectivism. But, if his values appear and disappear, wax and wane, with our beliefs about objects, as interests clearly do, it is not easy for him to do so. There is not in practice very much difference between holding that to be good which is judged good, and holding that men's judgments concerning the existence or properties of an object, in determining the interest which is felt in it, *ipso facto* determine its value. It would still be true, if not in exactly the sense that he had repudiated, that "there is neither good nor bad but thinking makes it so." [1]

[1] See op. cit., p. 129. The standard of correctness is also used by Mr. D. W. Prall whose motor-affective theory of value is in very close agreement with Mr. Perry's. It seems worth while to

Digitized by Google

Perry's fourth criterion for the standardization of values is the criterion of preference. This again is of considerable interest for our enquiry, as it is

draw attention to his article (*In Defense of a "Worthless" Theory of Value*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XX), as his application of the standard is less cautious than Mr. Perry's and has thus exposed him to some damaging criticisms. "Values," he declares, "are satisfactory or unsatisfactory according as the subject's faculties are acute or not and his training thorough or not" (p. 133), which seems to involve (1) that the liking of a person whose faculties were *not* acute would be an unsatisfactory value, and (2) that it is possible to train the activity of liking or preference. When, however, we ask wherein such training consists, we are told that it is not a training in valuation, i.e. in a special kind of judgment, but "in the field of scientific facts and in the principles and peculiarities of the arts." It is difficult, however, to see how a training in the field of scientific facts could be anything but a training in the power of discriminating true from false, which *is* a training in judgment. And by what process again do we learn to understand and to apply the principles of the arts, if not by judgment? Most psychologists would deny that the irrational, in the strict sense of the term, was susceptible of training at all. It is the power of judgment that we train, though new feelings may of course arise as a result of its development. The things that we enjoy as educated adults are not the same things that we enjoyed as children, but it is noteworthy that we ordinarily attribute the change to greater maturity of judgment. As Perry admits, correction of value means correction of judgment.

Now I do not think that Mr. Prall really means to deny this either. Value, he would reply, is a function of affecto-motor process, and this process does not cognize. The value is cognized in later acts of judgment, which, however, in their turn condition further motor-affective acts. It is perfectly true that it is the

Digitized by Google

evidently introduced to cover a class of objects whose value is seen to depend neither upon the intensity of our liking or desire for them nor upon their

power of judgment that we train, but this results in a change in the values, which are conditioned by judgments. The chief objection to this position is that, if the value in both cases resides wholly in the liking which the object arouses, there seems to be no justification for calling the liking which is determined by the trained judgment *better* than the liking of a cruder and more immature subject. Mr. Prall evidently feels the force of this objection, and his attempt to meet it (in an earlier contribution to the same subject: *A Study in the Theory of Value*, University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. III, No. 2, Berkeley, 1921, pp. 257–8) exhibits the strain under which he is labouring. The only ground that he can adduce without question-begging is that we value *the expert judgment itself*; hence the liking which is a product of training has a dual character. Not only do we value a different object from the one which originally excited our interest, but we prefer *the later judgment of valuation* to the earlier one. Evidently this argument fails to carry conviction even to Mr. Prall himself, for he afterwards admits that the standards or qualities that are considered most valuable are those that are most satisfactory to most minds, since minds are alike in structure, though, realizing perhaps that the appeal to mere mass feeling is a very doubtful criterion of superiority, he adds rather hesitatingly that this common structure of minds is believed to be "an image of whatever we mean by the divine, so that they are best suited by what best fits them and their powers, in the end by that which is noblest and truest and most beautiful, by that which is nearest the divine itself" (op. cit., p. 281). But is this anything else than an admission that good is after all not defined by interest, but that human interest is rather determined in the long run by that which is seen to be good?

The objection that one value cannot legitimately be described

Digitized by Google

capacity to satisfy the interest of the majority,—or the broadest interest of some one person, in the last resort the demand of the integral personality. Thus, if it is to be construed in terms of interest at all, it must be identified with some other dimension of this than either its depth or range.

Concerning the exact meaning of "preference" as distinguished from these other two quantitative criteria, which he defines very clearly, Perry main-

as "juster" or "more satisfactory" than another unless judgment be recognized as an integral part of the valuing process itself, has already been urged by Professor Dewey in a reply to the article referred to (John Dewey: *Values, Liking and Thought*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XX, p. 622). But to this Mr. Prall merely retorts that a naturalistic theory such as he adopts involves the evolution of the rational out of the irrational; that it is indeed inconceivable how an irrational process like valuing can "become just or satisfactory," but that that is only because beginnings are never conceivable (*Value and Thought Process*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXI, p. 125). This, however, is merely to throw a veil of obscurity over the whole subject in order to avoid admitting his critics' contention. Whether or not the first step in the process of valuing was an animal attitude of mere acceptance or rejection, if it *becomes* rational, then, in all but its most rudimentary forms (to be found in the pig or the cow—from which indeed he draws his most effective illustrations!—but hardly in the normal adult), it must include an element of discrimination and comparison which is nothing else than judgment. To admit this, however, would have been to do what he had just before objected to, viz. to "insert thought and judgment into value, *even into the process that makes things valuable one over against another*" (op. cit., p. 124, italics mine).

Digitized by Google

tains a mysterious reserve, merely pointing out that it has a different minimal point and exhibits independent variability. He admits that its physiology is entirely speculative, and merely suggests that it may be characterized by the completeness of the satisfaction yielded, or the fitness of the object to meet the demand. In that case, however, it is difficult to understand why it could not have been subsumed under one of the other two, whilst the appeal to the constitution of the object sounds very like a lapse into just the position he is trying to controvert. He further tells us that preference reveals "the magnitude of qualitative differences," which again suggests determination by the character of the object, after which he apparently assumes that the concept has been sufficiently analysed.[1]

This account would have carried more conviction had there been any ground whatever for believing that preference represented a quantitative criterion of value at all. It is difficult, however, to see how interests can vary quantitatively in any other direction than depth or range, and certainly to say that one is "preferred" to another is no explanation. We may arrange things in one quantitative scale according to the intensity of the desires they excite, and in another according to their success in satisfying a large number of correlated

[1] Op. cit., pp. 635–6.

Digitized by Google

desires, be they the desires of one subject or of several (though it is questionable how far either of these can be rightly called a scale of *value* except in the derivative sense in which we speak of economic value). Professor Perry finds himself driven by the thoroughness of his analysis to admit a third arrangement which cannot be correlated with, or subsumed under, either of the other two, yet which he persists in representing as a scale of magnitude. On his own confession, however, to say that a thing is preferred is to say that it is chosen *rather* than another, not that it is liked *more* than another.[1] To use the same example as before, a refined though fleeting pleasure may be preferred to a possibly more lasting one of a grosser sort—the pleasure of a man to the pleasure of a pig—though the interest in it be not more but less intense, and, in many cases at least, no more inclusive. Is it not, then, far more probable that the difference between them is a difference in kind and not in magnitude at all ?[2]

It is true that exactly the same ambiguity attaches to the word *prefer* as we discovered in the word *value* itself. Just as to say that M *values* an object often means simply that he *likes* it, so to say that

[1] Op. cit., p. 616.

[2] I do not intend to argue here that pleasure as the mere hedonic-tone of consciousness exhibits quantitative variations. I am using the term, as Mill obviously did, as an elliptical expression for "a source of pleasure."

Digitized by Google

M *prefers* one object to another may mean simply that he *likes* one *more than* the other. If, however, the term is used in that sense, the standard of preference coincides with that of intensity, and Perry makes it quite plain that this is not the sense in which he is using it. When, on the other hand, we begin to arrange objects in an order of preference that is distinct from both the intensity and the inclusiveness of the interest they arouse, it is surely obvious that we are no longer evaluating them by feelings or motor tendencies at all. And on what ground, other than that of liking, do we choose one thing rather than another unless it be that we judge it to be better than that other, apparently in virtue of some property it exhibits which cannot be accounted for in terms of its relation to a subject or subjects.

As the incompleteness of Professor Perry's theory has been revealed by the completeness of his own analysis, it is not necessary for me to add any further criticisms. I have repeatedly pointed out that most naturalistic theories owe a great deal of their plausibility to the confusion of means with ends. The only real value that many of their so-called value objects possess is derived from some external end which they promote. It is not, for example, the fact that I *desire* wealth that renders this a good. It derives its whole worth from the ends which *are* of value for their own sakes that it brings within

Digitized by Google

the reach of its possessors. Or let us assume that my interest becomes centred in the success of a political measure, e.g. a measure for the provision of Old Age Pensions. It may easily happen that I almost lose sight of the objects which it is the purpose of this measure to secure. It is the success of my political enterprise, symbolized by the placing of the bill upon the statute-book, that I really desire. I cannot, however, agree with Ehrenfels that this is rightly termed "a downward movement of value" (*Wertbewegung nach abwärts*),[1] for the value, as I understand it, does not move with the interest. The goodness, if that term be used in its traditional, and, as I hold, its exact, sense, continues to reside in the ends which the measure promotes, i.e. the diminution of the hardships of the aged poor. The passing of the bill has a purely derivative value, and the extent to which my interest is centred in it does nothing to render the value intrinsic. Perry would doubtless reply that he did not regard the value of an object as relative simply to a particular subject's desire for it, and that he would estimate the value of the political measure in question by its efficacy in promoting the permanent interests of the aged poor, but he ought in consistency to admit, firstly, that it has *some* independent value in virtue of my interest in it, and, secondly, that the change which it is designed to secure would be devoid of

[1] C. von Ehrenfels: *System der Werttheorie*, Vol. I, p. 134.

Digitized by Google

value unless either the poor themselves, or I, or some other person, had definitely envisaged and desired it, both of which propositions I should dispute.

3. It is obvious, on the other hand, that many interests do centre around those objects which are in this apparently indefinable sense worthy to be. That there is a magnetism about things which are good has scarcely been denied, even by the most ascetic, since Socrates first drew attention to it, and it is undoubtedly this which gives plausibility to the belief that it is the attraction men feel towards them that constitutes their goodness. It is important, however, to recognize the recalcitrant facts which this theory fails to cover. If war, for example, is in any sense good, it is because it probably always promotes certain ends which, though limited in scope and vastly outweighed by others that are bad, are good as such, and not, as Perry would have us believe, because certain barbarous people are attracted by it. A simpler example will make this clearer. If I desire the murder of a good man, it is difficult to see how the fulfilment of this interest can be called good at all. Perry would argue that, as an end desired by me, it was so far good, but that it would necessarily involve the thwarting of the more inclusive desires of myself or of others; hence in the moral economy it should give way to broader interests. In a case of this kind,

Digitized by Google

however, the argument fails to carry conviction, just because the object of interest serves no further end which could endue it with contributory value. Few people would care, I think, to call a brutal deed of this kind good, even with the reservation that it was also in another sense very bad, and the claim that this is the generic sense of the term is thus an indication that the definition offered goes beyond its legitimate scope. In other words, "the specific *quale* to which the value terms refer" does not characterize the murder of a good man; hence the value predicate is inappropriate to it.

As I have already pointed out, it is more difficult to cite objects of value in which no interest is felt, for we do not voluntarily attend to objects in which we feel no interest, and many of their determinations are thus ignored, including often the character of value. But unless it is true, not only that objects of interest are not necessarily valuable, but that objects of value are not necessarily interesting, it will still be possible for the defenders of the interest theory to represent value as a *species* of interest, e.g. as the most inclusive interest, or the paramount interest. It will, however, be clear, I think, that, when we make a judgment, as we sometimes do, concerning the value of some object in which we ourselves take no interest whatever, it is never as an object of the feeling or desire of others that we declare it to be of worth. To the

Digitized by Google

practical man of affairs the contemplative activity of the artist, philosopher, or saint is often entirely devoid of attraction. He will tell you that it is outside the range of his interest. He may, however, adopt either of two attitudes towards it. He may remark tolerantly that its objects are evidently of interest to those who care to devote attention to them, and that contemplation itself is at least a harmless occupation, but in that case he makes no judgment of value concerning either. On the other hand, he may recognize in the philosopher's insight, or the artist's vision, objects of genuine worth from the appreciation of which he knows himself to be precluded by the limitations of his endowment. The relation of these objects to human interests is recognized in both cases, and in neither case are they of interest to the judging subject. How, then, are we to interpret the difference between them?

Professor Perry has not overlooked this difference; indeed, it would be difficult to find a situation for which his seven hundred pages of careful analysis have failed to make provision. He would describe the first as a mere judgment of value, i.e. a judgment about what he calls an "other-interest," where no immediate interest is felt. The second, if I understand him rightly, he would regard as a case of genuine interest excited by the fact that others were judged to be interested, i.e. a case of interest in interest, which is an example of the integration of

Digitized by Google

interests in a social medium.[1] My difficulty with this explanation is that I cannot discover *any* immediate interest in the second situation which could distinguish it from the first, nor can I admit that the first case is rightly described as a judgment of *value*. It appears to be precisely a case of a judgment that there is interest but no value, any genuine value that may be realized being overlooked by the subject judging. In the second case, on the other hand, there is a judgment that a certain type of object in which an interest is similarly known to be felt is *also* valuable, although the judging subject remains as devoid of interest in it as before. Is not the difference, then, once more that in the latter case "a distinct *quale*" is recognized, which does not stand in the relation of interest, or in any other relation, to a subject, and which is different from all the other factors belonging to the situation?[2] If Perry is using the value terms to refer to something else, I can only repeat what I said at the beginning of this discussion, viz. that the dispute between us is a dispute concerning the usage of terms. If he insists that the connotation of the terms has changed, I would invite the reader to judge of this from the examples cited. These value terms will only acquire the significance he gives

[1] *General Theory of Value*, pp. 378–80.

[2] For a further discussion of some of these questions see below, pp. 145–7.

Digitized by Google

them when naturalism has become the universally accepted philosophy, and I would submit that, however desirable that consummation may appear, it is not yet an accomplished fact.

4. This somewhat lengthy review of the arguments in favour of defining value in subjective terms, whether as mere feeling or as the more active attitude of interest, was designed to show that all such definitions rest on a common fallacy. Whether or not there is a sense in which we value without judging, at least we discover no *values* except through judgment; hence the subjective attitude assigned always presupposes a judgment—unless, indeed, it can be maintained that there is emotional as well as cognitive apprehension, and that value is a content emotionally presented, a hypothesis we shall have to consider among the objective theories to be discussed in a later chapter.

Even if we leave this possibility aside for the moment, there are still one or two points which require to be determined before we can claim to have made our position entirely unambiguous. For example, we have admitted the rôle of judgment in the experience of value, but we have not so far defined this rôle. Does it perform here its ordinary function of discriminating the features of reality, or is it in some sense constitutive of the value it cognizes? In other words, is the value judgment, as Professor Dewey has suggested, a special type of

Digitized by Google

judgment, or is it a simple judgment of fact which is concerned in valuing with a special class of facts? The further question, which was left open at the end of the last chapter, whether valuing, in the more exact sense of "finding worthy to be," was to be interpreted as an *exclusively* judgmental process, or whether it must include an affective element in order to be rightly called by that name, has been dealt with in the course of the foregoing discussion, for it is really identical with the question whether it is possible to value things in which no interest is felt. In view, however, of the support given to the belief that valuing involves an affective element by most of those who have devoted serious attention to the subject, I should like to mention some of the considerations which have led me to adopt the position indicated in my reply to Professor Perry.

I believe that a good deal of confusion can be avoided here by recognizing, as Meinong and Witasek have done[1] (and as anyone must do who identifies value with what ought to be), that æsthetic experience is not as such a process of valuing. For, whatever cognitive processes are presupposed in this experience, it is *ex hypothesi* devoid of judgments *about* the object, hence of the judgment that it ought to be. The judgment of value occurs later. If it be objected that æsthetic enjoyment must be value experience since beauty is a value, the answer

[1] See above, p. 72.

Digitized by Google

is that the phrase " value experience " is ambiguous. It is true that æsthetic enjoyment is an experience of a value object, but it involves no explicit recognition of its value. Thus, as Meinong and Witasek put it, æsthetic feeling, not being a judgment feeling, is not value feeling. Any genuine value feeling which occurs is secondary, i.e. it is the hedonic accompaniment of the judgment of value, and it is the essentiality of this secondary feeling that is at present under discussion. The two feelings are numerically distinct, for the valuing comes after the æsthetic experience. If this experience is prolonged, the judgment will of course occur whilst it persists, and, if it is itself accompanied by feeling, the effect will then be to heighten the pleasure originally felt, as the second feeling will fuse with the first. It is important, however, that epistemologists should recognize the distinct contribution of each to the total experience.

I have already emphasized the confusions which result from the failure to distinguish clearly between means and ends, the subtlest case of which is the treatment of material things, which are simply means to the production of an agreeable psychical or physical state, as valuable in themselves. Now I am far from supporting the claim of hedonism that such states are the only objects of intrinsic value. I am convinced that there are many others. Still less do I wish to deny the psychological truism that we

Digitized by Google

make many other things our ends, that, indeed, we seldom aim at the production of a mere state of consciousness; on the contrary, what I am trying to prove is precisely that we become so engrossed in the pursuit of these proximate ends that we often cease to give much thought to the objects to which they were in the first instance merely instruments. It is, however, with the logical aspect of the question that I am here concerned. And when we attempt to evaluate these ends, when we ask ourselves to what extent the objects of our endeavours can be called good, we see that in many cases they are of worth simply on account of the pleasure, or some other state of mind or organism, that they promote.[1]

It is just here that it is important to avoid the confusion into which the defenders of the subjective position have fallen, for in such cases it seems to be true, as they claim, that value is discovered in the feeling aroused by the object. It is not, however, itself the subjective relation of feeling for the object, but simply a predicate of the object, which

[1] It should be remembered here that it is the peculiarity of pleasure that its occurrence may render a neutral situation good or enhance the value of a situation that is already good, but that its inclusion in an evil situation makes this worse rather than better. (Cf. G. E. Moore: *Principia Ethica*, p. 214.) Thus, as argued above, my pleasure in the murder of a good man contributes no element of positive value to that evil state of affairs, but rather makes it worse than it was before.

Digitized by Google

is in such cases a conscious state. The feeling, in other words, is the object appreciated, it is not the appreciation. It is again the failure to distinguish between act and content that is the source of the error. *What* we value may be a feeling, but this is not the same thing as saying that *valuing* is feeling. Pleasure is indeed a good, but it is not the whole essence of goodness, indeed it is a factor whose worth it is very difficult to estimate, for it is always experienced in a more complex whole; moreover, though it may be thought about, and may occasionally become an object of desire (i.e. in cases of extreme unhappiness or boredom, where we are forced to attend to our own mental states), it cannot, as I have tried to show, be directly apprehended, for it belongs wholly to the subjective side of consciousness.

If, then, we give due weight to these two considerations: that æsthetic pleasure so far involves no recognition of value, and that the feelings excited by many of the so-called objects of value are themselves the real values and not a part of the valuing process, the question whether there is still an affective factor involved in the process beomes a much simpler one. The answer seems to be that, although a reaction of pleasure frequently accompanies the judgment of value, it cannot be essential to it, since the judgment may occur without it—we may recognize the value of objects in which we feel no interest.

Digitized by Google

This fact has been observed by several recent writers, who treat it, however, as characteristic of a special type of value, for which Mr. Maurice Picard has suggested the name "worth," as distinguished from value in the strict sense, which he still discovers in the affective-volitonal relation.[1] The recognition by a writer who adheres to this usage that many judgments of value are made in the absence of any noticeable affective experience is significant, though Mr. Picard's examples (the condemnation on æsthetic grounds of a picture that one continues to like, or the recognition that certain music is good though one fails to enjoy it at all) are not very fortunate, as both are taken from the sphere of æsthetics. Now we have seen that in æsthetic experience there is an emotional reaction before the judgment of value takes place; hence it is easy for his critics to argue that, if the latter does not correspond to the subject's own feeling, it is doubtless just a repetition of the judgments of others, to whose spontaneous reactions it *does* correspond, and not a product of independent reflection; in the *genuine* value experience the feeling was still primary.

I have already tried to show that this solution may

[1] Maurice Picard: *Value and Worth*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XX, pp. 480 ff. A similar view has been proposed by Mr. Stephen C. Pepper: *The Equivocation of Value*, University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. IV, pp. 107–8.

Digitized by Google

overlook some of the factors in the situation. Some examples from other departments may help to make this clearer If I dislike a person, both his actions and his personality are likely to remain without attraction for me. Nevertheless, if I am capable of taking an unprejudiced view, I shall probably recognize that he has many good qualities, which is to pronounce a judgment of value upon his character. Again, to the average man of the world the life of Browning's Grammarian makes not the slightest emotional appeal; indeed, even a life of self-sacrificing labour for the alleviation of human suffering may be too far removed from his ordinary range of ideas to awaken any immediate response in him; yet he may be quite ready to pay a tribute of respect to both. Nor can it be maintained, I think, that such judgment is merely lip-service, or an uncritical acceptance of ideals which are socially approved. It is often the expression of a sincere belief that the ends thus acknowledged are worthy of the acknowledgment they receive. Upon this point I am in complete agreement with the writers in question, though it will be clear that I should only admit their "immediate" or "primitive" value to be value at all in so far as it exhibits the characters of "worth" or "standard value," or implies a judgment concerning the worth of the object. In the absence of such a judgment I should regard the immediate value as a mere liking or interest which, if it be

Digitized by Google

sometimes called *valuing*, should be admitted to be a valuing of what is not yet known to have *value*.

On the other hand, I do not, of course, mean to deny for a moment that a genuine experience of value may have a strong emotional colouring—indeed, I have emphasised my belief that most of the objects of value are also objects of interest. We normally like the things we believe to be good, though our judgments concerning their goodness are liable to error; hence the attainment of a correct scale of values involves knowledge. It is the converse of the Socratic doctrine that is open to criticism,[1] for the good is not by any means the *only* thing we like. Emotional response is no criterion of goodness, nor even of what is believed to be good. In view, however, of the predominant importance to us of our emotional life, it is natural that we should come to associate feeling and value, even to confuse them. In a theoretical treatment, on the other hand, it is important to keep the two distinct, and to recognize that feeling, though a common accompaniment of the value judgment, is merely incidental to the valuing.

[1] i.e. the sense in which Aristippus the Cyrenaic apparently interpreted it through the simple conversion of the A proposition.

Digitized by Google

CHAPTER IV

VALUE AS A SUBJECT–OBJECT DETERMINATION

1. *Dewey's theory of value as conditioned by judgment.*—Some difficulties of interpretation—Qualities not conditioned by judgments—A second interpretation suggested—His account of value in his later work—Two interpretations again possible—The affective-volitional interpretation inconsistent with his rejection of subjectivism—The presentational interpretation based on confusion of the functions of feeling and judgment—The analogy of belief.

2. *Alexander's theory of value as a subject-object determination.*—Some confusions in his exposition—Coherence his differentia of value—Dualism in the theory: In the account of truth—In the account of moral good—His theory of beauty as expression—His divergence from Croce's position—Some cases to which his definition is inapplicable.

3. *Summary.*

1. If we accept the conclusion that cognition is the sole direct medium of value, the other question raised in the last chapter, as to the relation between the process and content of valuing, assumes an increased importance. True, it is not immediately obvious why this should constitute a problem at all, as it is natural to suppose that value, like any other predicate, is a character ascribed to reality. As stated, however, an alternative possibility has been suggested by Professor Dewey, who claims that there

Digitized by Google

is a class of judgments *which condition their own subject-matter*, and that judgments of valuation belong to this class.[1] The value is *constituted by* the valuation, and this is true in the last resort of all values.

It is important to notice that by "constitute" Dewey does not mean, as some of his critics at first supposed, that the value *consists in* the judgment. As just indicated, he uses the word in its other meaning of "conditions." The judgment brings the value into being, which means that, though mediated by cognition, it is still dependent on the activity of a subject.

The significance of this hypothesis for our argument will be apparent, and we must therefore examine it rather carefully, both in its original form (in which I have just stated it) and in the slightly modified version contained in Dewey's last book.[2]

The class of judgments which, in his view, condition their own subject-matter are the judgments of practice. If I judge that anything is to be done, he says in his first essay, the passing of the judgment is a link in the causal series leading to the performance of the act judged about. Now a judgment of value implies deliberation over the end to be pursued, issuing in the adoption of the alternative con-

[1] John Dewey: *Essays in Experimental Logic*, Chicago, 1916, Chapter XIV, *The Logic of Judgments of Practice*, See above, p. 46.

[2] *Experience and Nature*, Chicago, 1926, Chapter X.

Digitized by Google

sidered the best and the rejection of the others; hence such a judgment is a necessary step towards the realization of the value. If I judge that I ought to consult a physician, the judgment will lead to the consultation unless weightier reasons present themselves for not consulting him, and these would be judgments of negative value. It is true that we can point to many cases where the value is obviously not a result of such deliberation, as also to many valuings which are immediate responses to objects containing no such intellectual factor, but he insists that, in all cases except those of a purely appetitive liking which scarcely enters into the experience of any adult of normal intelligence, we shall find that this deliberation has been done many times in the past, and that the value is thus the fruit of previous reflection. Its enstatement is merely antecedent to the present situation. All the spontaneous appreciations of mature experience are of this kind, so that we ought only to describe them as "likings," if we qualify this term by an adjective like "contemplative" to indicate its reflective presuppositions. Thus in one of his later articles (written in reply to Mr. Prall)[1] he asserts: "I shall go further than to hold that judgment is *sometimes* a condition of the occurrence of things possessed of valuity. I hold that thought as well as liking, an affective

[1] *Values, Liking and Thought*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XX, p. 618.

Digitized by Google

thought or a thoughtful affection, is always the condition of the occurrence of value-things."

As, on the other hand, he frequently affirms in accordance with his first definition, quoted above,[1] that "value . . . may be found *without* judgment, *without implying cognition*. . . . We prize, cherish, esteem, directly appreciate, etc., and these words denote affectional or affecto-motor attitudes, not intellectual ones,"[2] we seem justified in inferring that it is really *valuing* that he believes may occur without judgment, and that he would support our contention that in such cases it is not the correlate of value. We may value, in the motor-affective sense, whether or not *values* actually exist, but in order that *a* value, i.e. a "thing possessed of valuity," may be revealed, the affection must be a thoughtful one, the liking must be accompanied by judgment, and must originally have been conditioned by this. We must do more than merely "prize or cherish," we must "appraise or estimate." For even where the value judgment is not constitutive of the value, i.e. is not a "valuation" but merely "a judgment *about* value," a valuation is presupposed; the process has simply been gone through in the past, and the value is now accepted as *given*.

[1] See p. 103 above.

[2] *Valuation and Experimental Knowledge*, Philosophical Review, Vol. XXXI, p. 326 (italics mine).

Digitized by Google

Apparently, then, there are two types of valuing, the motor-affective and the "thoughtful affective," and two species of the latter, prospective and retrospective (which he usually distinguishes as "valuation" and "value-judgment"), but, so far at least as the statements quoted suggest, there is only one type of value, which is always conditioned in the first instance by judgment. As, however, his interest is primarily logical, he devotes his attention, both in his first essay and in the series of articles that follow, almost exclusively to valuation, which he believes to be of special logical significance, contenting himself with incidental allusions to value, which, unfortunately, are not always consistent with one another, and some of which contradict this interpretation. It is only in his most recent work that he has fulfilled the promise given in one of these articles to take up the discussion of value itself at a later time,[1] and even here, as we shall see, his account of it is not quite unambiguous.

In his first articles, for example, he had sometimes confused the issue by describing value itself as simple liking: "A parent or educator will hardly admit the validity of the plea [*de gustibus non disputandum*] as universal. He may resort to mere physical or psychological means . . . to change . . . *the taste, the value* to which he objects. Then there

[1] *The Objects of Valuation*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XV, p. 253.

Digitized by Google

is no valuation judgment, but at most merely a replacement of one taste or liking by another more in conformity with his own. But even parents or teachers resort at times to an intellectual method, to the way of judgment, *to displace an old affective-motor attitude, to create a new one.*"[1] It would be easy to quote other similar passages that it is natural to interpret literally, as judgment is clearly often the condition of a new liking, indeed this is presumably the purpose of all literary and æsthetic criticism. It was thus something of a surprise to be told in the article referred to that value was *the quality of valuity*, and that liking did not constitute it in the sense of *being* it any more than judgment did, for nothing could constitute a quality in this sense. The quality was itself and nothing else. Judgment and liking constituted it in exactly the same sense, viz. in the sense of *conditioning* it, and both were equally essential conditions of its occurrence. This, however, is evidently Dewey's considered view.[2] What we have to decide, then, is whether the theory of the enstatement of value, in this sense of the term, can be consistently worked out, and, if so, whether the valuations which perform this function are, as he holds, "judgments of a special type."

The question that I have found it most difficult

[1] *Valuation and Experimental Knowledge*, p. 336 (italics mine).

[2] See *Values, Liking and Thought*, pp. 617 ff.

Digitized by Google

to determine is what Dewey believes "valuity" to be a quality *of*. Sometimes he gives the common-sense answer: "There are all sorts of things having the . . . quality of value, . . . poems, sounds, pictures, persons, flowers."[1] But it is difficult to see how a judgment can "enstate" the value of a poem or a flower, if this is really a quality and not an interest or appreciation. Usually, it is true, he speaks of "values" (in the plural) being enstated, and in such cases it is the objects themselves that appear to be conditioned by the judgment, but then these must be objects of a kind which *can* be thus conditioned, i.e. they must be *acts* like the act of consulting a physician, or *situations* like that of having bought a suitable suit of clothes, which is another of his examples; they cannot be poems, or pictures, or persons. It is obvious that an act or situation having value may come about partly as a result of judgment, i.e. partly through the decision to *perform* the act, or to *produce* the situation, but in such cases it is the *existence* of the object, not its value, that is enstated, and the process ought not to be described as the enstatement of value. What happens is that we contemplate a possibility, perceive it to be good, and endeavour to make it actual. But the quality of goodness is not an existent which comes into being as the possibility is actualized. What is worthy to be is worthy in exactly the same

[1] Op. cit., p. 617.

Digitized by Google

sense before any particular instance of it exists as it is after it exists.[1] Thus, whether or not the judgment which enstates it is of a special type (and of this Dewey himself seems in the end to be in doubt, for he hints in closing that this "difference to be brought about" may be the import of *all* propositions),[2] it is not its evaluating function that distinguishes it from other judgments. If I contemplate the possibility of consulting a physician and judge that this is an act which ought to be performed, I perform it. The *act* as an existent is then conditioned by the judgment, but its value is not thus conditioned, for it is through the recognition of the value of such acts in general that the judgment conditions the particular act in question.

It is true that Dewey cites cases where we are in doubt as to the value of an object that already exists, as evidence that it is the value itself that is enstated by the judgment, and a number of his other examples of value objects (poems, flowers, friends) might seem to be cases in point—indeed, he once suggests that I may be in doubt whether a person is or is not my friend and that reflective judgment may determine this. What the judg-

[1] I find that a similar criticism has been suggested by Professor Perry: *Dewey and Urban on Value Judgments*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIV, p. 174.

[2] *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 389.

Digitized by Google

ment enstates in such cases is, however, either (1) my *liking* for the object—the poem, the friend—which is *ex hypothesi* not the value, or (2) my knowledge that the object has value—i.e. the judgment once pronounced is a condition of future *de facto* value judgments. How either the judgment or the liking can "constitute" the quality in the sense of conditioning it is as difficult to understand as how it can constitute it in the sense of *being* it, a notion to which he had declared that he could attach no meaning. Qualities are universals; hence, if value is a quality, or objective determination, it may be *exemplified* in temporal existents, but it cannot come into being with them or cease to be when they cease.

Dewey would doubtless reply that this presupposes a metaphysic which he rejects,[1] but, if he regards value as a particular which comes into being along with its object, there can at least be no values of the type he had described, the work of constituting which has been done in the past and need not be repeated in each new situation.

There is, however, another possible interpretation of these passages, which I have always suspected to be his real meaning, viz. that value is a property, not of the object as such, but of the whole situation, object-related-to-human-attitude. To this view he

[1] Cf. his reply to Mr. D. S. Robinson: *Concerning Novelties in Logic*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIV, pp. 237 ff.

Digitized by Google

says he "has no objection,"[1] and certainly it harmonizes with many of his statements, both in these articles and in his later work, e.g. with his explicit adoption of "the current theory . . . that immediate values occur wherever there is liking, interest, bias."[2] But if this *is* what he means, it is misleading to say that "values in the plural means things having the quality: sounds, colours, birds, friends, flowers,"[3] for these are *things* in the literal sense, they are not situations. If the word "friend" is a shorthand symbol for "my-liking-for-my-friend," his various statements are easier to reconcile, but I think he will agree that this is not the sense in which we usually speak of the value of a friend, or a poem, or even a flower.

It had been my hope that, when he finally took up the question of value itself, he would make it clear which of these two interpretations was the correct one, but I have to confess that his later contribution to the subject leaves me in as much uncertainty as before, for the central topic under discussion here is the function of philosophy as criticism; hence the primary interest is still in valuation rather than in value, and his view of the latter is again revealed chiefly by implication. The conclusion which emerges most clearly is that good is

[1] *Values, Liking and Thought*, p. 620.
[2] *Experience and Nature*, p. 429.
[3] *Values, Liking and Thought*, p. 622.

Digitized by Google

sui generis, and therefore indefinable. It can only be *denoted*, though, being a content of immediate experience, it does not require definition. "Values are values, things immediately having certain intrinsic qualities. Of them as values there is accordingly nothing to be said."[1] As they are nevertheless the central factor in experience, which lends significance to all the rest, the primary function of philosophy, which is the analysis of experience, must be criticism, or an investigation of the causes and results of these immediate values with a view to the promotion and maintenance of those found most durable and of greatest fecundity. It is evaluation, in the light of scientific knowledge, of the objects of naïve appreciation, and the correction of the value judgment sof common sense.[2]

If, now, we set these conclusions alongside of the statement, quoted above, that "immediate values occur wherever there is liking, interest, bias," it becomes apparent that this latter statement is ambiguous. True, Dewey denies that value can *consist in* liking—a liking cannot *be* an intrinsic quality—but there remain two other ways in which it may be understood. *Either* the liking, interest, or bias is merely the sign that a value is present, the medium through which we grasp the quality—whereas other qualities are intellectually dis-

[1] *Experience and Nature*, p. 396. [2] Chapter X, *passim*.

Digitized by Google

criminated, value is apprehended by feeling or some affective-volitional activity—*or*, as I suggested before, value is a determination of things as liked or enjoyed by sentient beings; it is an intrinsic quality only of total situations of which a sentient organism is a constituent.

My reason for hesitating to accept the latter interpretation is that I cannot reconcile it with his scornful repudiation of "the subjective view" that value consists in interest or liking. It is true, of course, that the two theories are not identical, and that his own belief that feeling is but one factor in the value situation is the more concrete and avoids the arbitrary separation of mind from nature, which is his chief ground for criticism of his opponents' view. Yet, in intent, there is surely very little difference between them. It is still the amount of satisfaction yielded—estimated by its duration and fertility—that is the measure of the value, and it makes no difference to this that intelligence is required to determine what objects are the sources of the stablest and most fruitful satisfaction, and are therefore likely to arouse our most lasting interest and devotion. I do not think that Professor Perry and his associates would for a moment deny the rôle of intelligence, or criticism, here; but, if not, it is surely a travesty of their position to say that value on such a theory is "only another name for the object of

Digitized by Google

a particular liking on the part of some particular subjective creature. If the liking for it conflicts with some other liking, the strongest wins."[1] Yet it is only by this device that he is able to distinguish the bearings of the two positions.

Professor Dewey may remind me here that he has consistently treated judgment and liking as equally essential conditions of value, and that what he objects to in the subjective view is the very minor rôle which it assigns to judgment; and, had the articles in which he had emphasized its constitutive function been the only evidence at disposal, I should have accepted this rejoinder. In this later discussion, however, we find that with him, too, the rôle of judgment, however important, is secondary, for these motor-affective attitudes are now accepted as sufficient criteria of the occurrence of value. Thus he no longer speaks of value as *conditioned* by judgment, but only as substantiated or corrected in this way. Whereas before every value had implied an antecedent judgment, now, if I understand him rightly, every judgment of valuation implies an antecedent value, which he calls an "immediate value." The "values of primitive experience" thus play a much larger part in his later account. It is true that, at the level of adult intelligence, the factor of appraisal inevitably enters in; nevertheless, as the original starting-

[1] Op. cit., p. 425.

Digitized by Google

points of valuation, they are of great importance for his theory.

If, then, we may not regard liking, or interest, as a constituent part of the value, which, being the only variable in the situation, must be the measure of its degree, we are forced to adopt the alternative explanation that it is the medium through which these immediate values are apprehended. This theory of the "presentational" function of feeling is, of course, quite a familiar one. It has been suggested by Meinong and others, and will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. As we shall see, an affective or motor-affective state is a precarious medium of valuation; hence those who appeal to it have always in the last resort to take its deliverances to a higher court, and this is, of course, just what Dewey himself does. The question one is impelled to ask in such cases is: Granted that value is an intrinsic quality of things, and that judgment is required in every case to correct the immediate valuing of feeling, i.e. to determine whether it is a just and true valuation, is there any meaning in calling such feeling valuing at all? Where judgment confirms it, it is said to be a genuine case of value—the intrinsic quality is present. But, if judgment does not corrobate it, it is treated as an error in valuation, for the intrinsic quality is found to be, after all, absent. Clearly, then, it is on this view judgment, and judgment

Digitized by Google

alone, that is the medium of value experience, and the original feeling is irrelevant. We cannot be said to apprehend a quality through feeling, or any more complex emotional state (liking, interest, or whatever we may choose to call it), if we have to wait upon judgment to know whether we have really apprehended it or not.

I think Dewey would reply that he calls the object of liking or interest, like the object of belief, a value because it always involves choice, the acceptance of one thing and the rejection of another, hence comparison and preference, which contain an intellectual factor.[1] It is never a *mere* feeling, or emotional state, and it is in virtue of including an intellectual process, however rudimentary, that it is able to discern value quality—and if this is his meaning I have little quarrel with him. But can this really be asserted of the purely appetitive liking of the animal or the infant? He had himself declared that this contained no intellectual element, but was "blind, slavish, meaningless," and so forth, yet he continues to call the objects of such attitudes values. It is true, as he had himself pointed out, that common usage is guilty of this ambiguity, but this is no reason why philosophical usage should be vitiated by the same confusion; indeed he says himself, in this later discussion, that the claim to have the privilege of using a

[1] Op. cit., pp. 400–1.

Digitized by Google

word in two radically different senses cannot be tolerated very long.

There would be little difficulty in rendering his view consistent if he would cease to speak of *immediate values*. What he requires, of course, is a starting-point for criticism, an object to evaluate, and it may be admitted that liking or desire usually furnishes this. We want to vindicate our *right* to cherish the things that attract us, and we do not spend much time in considering the things to which we are indifferent. If, however, he wishes consistently to maintain that intelligence alone can determine the validity of the value, and that the force of the liking has nothing to do with this, he ought not to call the object of immediate experience a value at all, but rather an object whose value or valuelessness is as yet uncertain, and can only be determined when all its qualities are clearly discerned and all its instrumentalities and all that contributes to it revealed. It is a familiar fact that failure to validate is not always followed by the cessation of the liking. Would Professor Dewey hold that in that case the immediate value also persisted, or that it had disappeared and there was liking without value? In the latter case immediate value does *not* occur *wherever there is liking*. And if not, there must surely also be values without liking, though we are less likely to discover these, since the ordinary stimulus to evaluation is lacking in such cases.

Digitized by Google

Dewey believes that the true relation between immediate value and the "validated" value that furnishes the standard of conduct or taste is discovered in the relation of belief to knowledge, which has enabled epistemology to escape the rising flood of subjectivism yet to avoid the hiatus between immediate and standard values left by most of the philosophers who have tried to rescue moral and æsthetic values from this. Knowledge, he says, is a case of belief; hence, if primitive belief is transmuted by analysis and verification into knowledge, so surely may any immediate value be rendered by moral or æsthetic criticism a stable and enduring good.

I would suggest, however, that this is a misleading way of stating the case. The fact that knowledge is a case of belief is irrelevant. The relevant fact is that only *some* beliefs are found to be cases of knowledge, viz. those that stand the scientific tests of validity. Thus the relation between subjective belief and objective knowledge can only be taken as a standard for the treatment of moral and æsthetic values, if it is admitted that this relation is too often a negative one. It is not denied that the so-called "immediate values" are the natural starting-points of moral and æsthetic critisicm, but, if we are to have clear thinking on this subject, it is important to recognize that the presence or absence of a value is just the point that remains uncertain

Digitized by Google

until intelligence has revealed all the qualities, relations, and implications of the objects to which it is ascribed.

2. Unfortunately for the simplicity of our argument, a position very closely allied to my second interpretation of Professor Dewey's account has been adopted by another philosopher whose defence of it has proved sufficiently influential to give it a definite status among the rival theories of value. I refer to the theory proposed by Professor Alexander in the second volume of his *Space, Time and Deity*. Before proceeding to the examination of objective theories, therefore, we must pause for a moment to enquire whether his position may not avoid the objections we found to the explicitly subjective views.

A very brief examination will reveal that it has at least been developed with this intention, for Professor Alexander is clearly aware of the defects of most naturalistic (or psychologistic) theories, and has made a strenuous attempt to avoid these whilst nevertheless consistently denying the independence of value. His theory is thus considerably subtler and more complex than any that we have examined so far, and will, I think, be found in many respects more acceptable.

As stated, he denies the "subjectivity" of value, as this is ordinarily understood. Value, he holds, is not a mere affection of the subject, but neither

Digitized by Google

is it a quality of the object as such. It is *a subject-object determination.* "It is this totality of knower and known, of subject and object, which is true or good or beautiful."[1] And if he had held consistently to this position, it would have been difficult to criticize his theory. Instead, however, of maintaining in every instance that value belongs neither to the subject nor to the object as such, he tends to represent it as belonging first to the one and then to the other, and it is this that gives rise to the difficulties in his theory. It is perfectly possible that the classification of value theories into subjective and objective is not exhaustive, but the two classes seem at least to be mutually exclusive. There are difficulties in both views, but these are not overcome by amalgamating them.

This criticism is suggested by a number of remarks which occur quite early in his discussion. I will mention only two examples: "While the appreciation of the mind is needed to make the object true or good, to give it the character of truth or goodness or their opposites, there is a corresponding character in the object, of which in our appreciation of it we are aware."[2] "Values are mental . . . inventions. . . . The property of coherence in the object of value belongs to it in so far as the valuing subject appreciates it. But it remains a property of the

[1] S. Alexander: *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 238.

[2] Op. cit., p. 241.

Digitized by Google

object, distinguishable from the act of the subject though not existent apart from the subject." [1]

But we must examine the arguments by which Alexander supports these statements.

The character in virtue of which an object excites our appreciation is, he believes, its coherence, but he goes on to explain that "reality cannot be either coherent or incoherent"; hence truth, goodness, and beauty cannot be regarded as characters of reality as such. "Coherence and incoherence, though founded in reality, are themselves the results of our selection. . . . The value of the object, its coherence, is not something which is already in the things themselves, but is born along with the act of appreciation." [2]

Now it might have been thought that a philosopher who regarded the knowledge relation as a relation of simple compresence of subject with object would require to attribute some coherence to the world of objects, in order that it might be knowable by minds. It is surely only if, as the traditional Coherence Theory holds, reality itself is "made and sustained by judgment," that its coherence can be a product of mind, for it is not a property that can be imposed on *any* material *ab extra*. Alexander himself frequently points out that only things which have a real relation to each other will cohere, but it is difficult to understand

[1] p. 243. [2] Loc. cit.

Digitized by Google

what is meant by this relatedness of reality, if it is not itself coherence? The work of thought is simply to discover the factors which are thus related, and can therefore be brought together into systems of knowledge. We predicate redness of a rose, because we perceive colour to be one of a number of constant and definitely related qualities exhibited by material objects. We do not predicate it of virtue because redness and virtue belong to unrelated spheres. There is no point of contact between them. But if coherence were the *result* instead of the *condition* of selection, there could be no reason for combining some elements rather than others.

Evidently Alexander recognizes this, for he admits that coherence and incoherence are "founded in reality," but it is difficult to understand what he means by affirming in the same sentence that they are *also* results of our selection.[1] Nor does it make

[1] These statements recall a similar claim once made by Royce (*Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences, I, Logic: Principles of Logic*, English Translation, London, 1913, p. 122) that "absolute truth" (which he defines as the account of all types or results of activity or conceptual construction the presence of which is implied in the very act of getting rid of them) "is a 'construction or 'creation,' for activity determines its nature," yet "is 'found,' for we observe it when we act." It is obvious, however, that in confining his examples of such "absolutes" to products of activity, such as the opposition between affirmation and denial, classification, etc., which can be represented as so far "creations" of the agent, Royce is making a desperate effort to preserve a meta-

Digitized by Google

this any more intelligible to explain that values are "mental inventions whose materials are independent of the inventor," for coherence is a form, and this coherent form and not merely the elements that cohere must be discoverable in reality if this is to become the object of science. In short, this whole argument seems to be simply a subtler form of the same fallacy as we discovered in the more consistently subjective theories. The value (defined here as coherence) is presupposed in the object, and cannot therefore be born in the act of appreciation, which simply cognizes, and does not constitute or condition it.

This presupposition of a coherence which is independent of our appreciation appears again and again in Professor Alexander's account of the different values, or types of entity which cohere: contents of knowledge, acts of will, products of art, or beautiful aspects of nature. It is particularly noticeable in his account of truth (which must be a value on this view, since it is in judgments that coherence is most clearly discernible), for here the appreciation is admittedly "determined by the object." Refer-

physical position from which the force of his own logic (as exhibited in the main portion of this essay) was driving him. There is no parallel to this in Alexander's case. So far from enabling him to render his account of truth consistent with the rest of his system, this introduction of a creative activity of mind makes it difficult to reconcile the two.

Digitized by Google

ence to some of his own statements will make my meaning clear.

"Truth and error," he says, "depend in any subject-matter on whether the reality about which the proposition is conversant admits or excludes that proposition *in virtue of the internal structure of the reality in question.*" "The reality itself cannot be said to exhibit incoherence, *since all occupation of Space-Time is orderly.* Nor can the reality be said to reject an erroneous proposition; it only *exhibits features which are different* from those contained in the error."[1]

It would be easy to multiply quotations, but these will be sufficient to illustrate my point. If the reality has an "internal structure" which "admits or excludes propositions," it must have some measure of coherence, and, if this admits certain specific propositions and excludes others, to say that the former are coherent *means* that they participate in the coherent structure of the reality, which is independent of their selection by a mind and determines this. Again, it is difficult to see what is meant by saying that all occupation of Space-Time is orderly, if not that it exhibits coherence.[2] If, as Alexander further asserts, "propositions, like other

[1] Op. cit., pp. 252–3 (italics mine).

[2] Alexander even speaks once of "material coherence," such as that between a stone and the attraction of the planets, as opposed to the formal coherence of propositions studied in logic.

Digitized by Google

cognita, are perspectives of the world," which, when true, " are really in it, and in the places where they pretend to be," [1] it would be very curious if there were a coherence of these perspectives *inter se* which did not subsist between them and the other " ordered occupants " of Space-Time.

This last quotation suggests a different view of truth, which harmonizes better with many of his statements than the view that it is a coherence introduced by the knower. A proposition (or propositum, to use the less ambiguous word that he prefers) is true, according to this view, if it is a genuine perspective of reality. Its truth means its coherence with the rest of reality.[2] Its coherence with other judgments is only the criterion of this. The relation of any perspective to the rest of reality, however, is a constant relation. It does not first arise when the propositum is proposed, although it may be partly the difficulty of finding a name for this which does not imply the activity of a subject, that gives rise to the view that its characters are subjectively determined; moreover, it is true that

[1] p. 254.

[2] Alexander would doubtless object that this is its *reality*, not its *truth*, that he did not formerly distinguish between the two, but that he now recognizes the necessity of doing so. (See op. cit., p. 237, note.) What I am trying to show is that he frequently reverts to his former position, and tries to hold the two views together.

Digitized by Google

error *does* arise from faulty discrimination or selection, and this may afford a ground for believing that truth arises through a similar process. If, however, my perspectives are actual constituents of reality, their coherence with the rest of this structure is something altogether independent of my selective activity, whilst if, in attempting to select, I misconstrue and distort the reality, the result *is* a product of the cognitive process. Truth would be in the same sense a product of this only if mind imposed its forms upon the manifold of sense. If the parts or complexes of Space-Time already exhibit an order, as Alexander believes, they do not first become coherent, proposita do not first acquire truth, when they enter into relation with a mind. Alexander cannot have it both ways. He is able to maintain this double standpoint only by using the word "truth" with a sliding significance —now as the simple correlative of error (which a careful scrutiny will show is not its ordinary usage, for error is commonly regarded as a result of intellectual failure, whilst it is certainly not the most widely accepted view that truth is a product of successful intellectual effort), now as an independent character of proposita the failure to apprehend which is the ground of error. The first usage accords with his definition both of truth and of value in general, but his account of the knowledge relation as the mere togetherness of a conscious being

Digitized by Google

and an object which it contemplates really involves the second; hence he is constantly obliged to revert to it. Both views agree in defining error as the attempt to combine elements which the internal structure of reality renders incompatible, for in a faulty selection of perspectives a new relation is introduced. The error is strictly "a mental invention." The case of truth would only be parallel if coherence were similarly a relation introduced by selection. If, on the other hand, the perspectives selected already exhibit this character, the fact of being selected introduces no other change into the situation. Such propositions, Alexander says himself, "are real facts contained within the reality investigated, and when their truth is disregarded they are not different from the reality."[1] What is not clear is wherein they are different when their truth is *regarded*!

It is true, of course, that they only come to be regarded under this aspect in contrast to error, but this does not mean that coherence arises along with incoherence, but only that it is not attended to until coherence is introduced. "Were all minds perfect instruments of apprehension," he says in another place, "mirrors of reality without inequalities of the surface (in Bacon's phrase), there would be no . . . error."[2] But he again confuses the issue by reiterating that it is through the crea-

[1] Op. cit., pp. 253–4. [2] p. 259.

Digitized by Google

tion of error that truth too is "created."[1] "The distinction between truth and falsehood only comes

[1] In a subsequent article (*The Artistry of Truth*, Hibbert Journal, October 1924) Professor Alexander presses the analogy between truth and beauty farther by treating truth as a product of art. Mathematics, for example, is, he thinks, pre-eminently a work of art and remote from reality. As Einstein holds, geometry when it is true is not real, and so far as it is real is not true, whilst even the laws of the applied sciences like chemistry and biology are due to the intervention of mind, which has "invented for itself amidst the endless particularity of the real world these abstract and compendious statements, which are therefore works of art rather than of reality" (p. 295). It is true that his constitutional tendency to take both sides of an argument at once makes him hesitate to draw the extreme nominalist conclusion that nothing is real but the particular existent, and he confesses himself reluctant to admit that such laws as the law of gravitation or some of the basic principles of chemistry and physiology are mere human constructions. But, if he feels that the status of some truths defies this interpretation, he ought not to apply it without further justification to others, least of all to the laws of the most exact sciences, in which the variability and fallibility, and the generally experimental character, of human inventions is least apparent. Nor ought he to do so without explaining his *volte face* from the position he had adopted in an earlier chapter of *Space, Time and Deity*, where we were told that "the laws of the construction of things and those of the relations of things to one another are not . . . inventions of the mind imputed to nature, but part and parcel of the constitution of nature, and far more important parts than the particular facts from which they are supposed to be merely derived by our human thought." (Vol. I, p. 227. Cf. also his repudiation of the position of Mach and his followers, op. cit., p. 293.)

Digitized by Google

into existence through the conflict and co-operation of many minds," though, a few sentences farther on, we find that this is again treated not as the source of truth but merely as its criterion: "The divergences of standard minds from the isolated minds of the victims of error," he says, "are the mode by which we *come to apprehend* propositions as true."[1] In other words, error is a conflict not between mind and mind but between mind and reality (a distorted perspective and the actual world). It is reality that "compels the distinction," though it is through the conflict of the twisted mind with standard mind that we come to recognize it.

Alexander's first and more explicit view of truth is hard to distinguish from Pragmatism, and little as his system has in common with that doctrine, he is sufficiently serious with it to declare that "the once true proposition may turn out even to be erroneous for the newer knowledge. . . . Truth varies and grows obsolete or even turns to falsehood. Hence a theory may be true for one generation and false for the next,"[2] though he tries as usual to qualify this by saying that the original proposition "remains true and real as such within the narrower range of ancient revealed fact," so that "truth is at once eternal and progressive." But is there any meaning at all in these statements occurring side by side, unless we interpret them as an oscillation

[1] p. 258 (italics mine). [2] p. 263.

Digitized by Google

between two different views of truth? Any theory entertained by a group of people over a considerable period of time presumably includes *some* propositions which will stand the test of later investigation, though it will also doubtless contain misconstructions due to the fact that some of its bearings are so far unknown. Its locus in reality is dimly apprehended but not yet clearly defined. It will thus be variously formulated by the collective judgments of different ages, the demarcation of reality being progressive. To take a very simple example: Biological development did not present the same features to the followers of Aristotle as it presents to contemporary scientists. A different and broader perspective of reality is revealed to the latter, and there is probably less distortion. It remains true, of course, that the Aristotelians apprehended it in the way they did, and that they believed their view to be the true one, but these are different propositions, and are not what Alexander refers to when he says that the original propositions "remain true and real." What he means can only be, then, that the earlier belief was partly correct, i.e. was a correct apprehension of some of the features of reality, and that so far it remains constant. In other words, what is eternal is the relation between any content and the rest of reality—truth in his second sense. What changes is the perspective which the mind obtains of this whole—truth in the first sense.

Digitized by Google

If there is anything unchanging in the latter, it is what there is in it of the former, and this, I would suggest, is all that we usually call truth.

A rough symbolic representation may make this clearer. If the letters *fclj*, *lxycj*, *plycmn* represent, say, the features of biological development as it was understood by the Aristotelians, the biologists of the seventeenth century, and the followers of Darwin respectively, each of these doctrines can be wholly true, as Alexander declares it to be at some stage in the growth of knowledge, only if truth is a variable. But in that case it is meaningless to say that the construction *fclj* " remains true for the range of facts open to the minds of the earlier generation." It is merely true that it was a truth, in this sense, for the earlier generation, but this is another truth about the first, it is not the same truth remaining. If *plycmn* is the present " truth " on the subject, *fclj* has not " remained true " even for the range of facts open to the earlier generation. Only *cl* is true for that range of facts. But *cl* is not biological development as the Aristotelians understood it. It is only as much of that reality as was correctly apprehended by them. This indeed " remains true and real," [1] but to say this is

[1] Even this cannot be asserted without qualification, for such beliefs inevitably undergo modification, and require restatement in the new context in which they reappear. The character of knowledge is more organic than such a scheme allows for.

Digitized by Google

to give another meaning to "truth," for it is not true only within the narrower range of ancient revealed fact. If it proves constant, as it at present appears to be, this will be due not to its selection by the collective judgment of the ancient scientists, nor to the work of any mind at all, but to the fact that it belongs to the nature of things; that the propositions which it includes "are really in the world and in the places where they pretend to be."

This rather detailed discussion of truth will enable us to deal more briefly with the other values, as Alexander himself does. In the case of truth, he had been concerned to make clear its primary dependence upon reality. In beauty and goodness, on the other hand, there is less appearance of external determination, and his task here is to exhibit the contribution of the subject to each, although he believes that a dual determination is traceable in every case. All three types of value are properties of the subject-object complex, but the character of truth is determined by the object, subject to the selective capacity of the subject, the character of goodness by the subject, limited by the conditions imposed by external nature, whilst in beauty the connection of the two is more intimate and more completely reciprocal—they are organic to each other.

It is not necessary for me to devote much space to Alexander's theory that moral goodness arises

Digitized by Google

out of human affections and desires, and consists in the adaptation of these to a social environment,[1] as I have already discussed several others that resemble it very closely. The primary goods, according to this view, are the objects that satisfy human desires. The claim to satisfy these is the primary claim made by human agents. Morality consists in the adjustment of these claims so that the greatest sum-total of satisfaction is achieved. As human beings are in many respects alike and similar circumstances are constantly recurring, the same types of action are constantly demanded; hence it is possible to formulate general rules of action, which we call moral rules. The goal of all moral actions, however, is satisfaction, which is the only intrinsic good. Good, as Professor Moore would put it, *means* satisfaction; thus to ask *why* satisfaction should be considered good is meaningless.

It is hardly necessary to repeat the popular criticism that the identification of good with satisfaction is either tautologous or question-begging. I have tried to show that the only ground for regarding the satisfaction of desire as necessarily good is that some pleasure is incidental to it, and pleasure, when regarded in isolation, appears self-evidently good. On the other hand, it does not enhance the goodness of every organic whole into which it enters, but may actually diminish this; moreover,

[1] Op. cit., pp. 274 ff.

Digitized by Google

it is certainly not the only intrinsic good. To assume, then, without further discussion that the only moral problem is to discover by what means the greatest amount of satisfaction is attained, is to be guilty of exactly the same fallacy that we have traced in several other versions of this theory. It is true that this is *one* moral problem, but there are many others. What constitutes the good itself, or the ideal, is the general problem of moral philosophy, or, more accurately, of the theory of value, for the question of moral goodness is strictly speaking but a part of a broader problem. If it is believed to consist in human satisfaction and nothing else, some attempt should at least be made to demonstrate this, though, so long as greater worth is attributed to a transitory æsthetic enjoyment than to the prolonged indulgence of an animal appetite, however innocuous, so long as men are willing to sacrifice a lifetime of prosaic contentment for a few hours of heroic exaltation, this proposition will demand a more convincing proof than any that has yet been given of it.

Alexander does not, of course, claim, any more than his associates in this view have done, that the satisfaction of every isolated desire is good, for some people strive for their own satisfaction even though this conflict with the legitimate claims of others. Goodness, he maintains, is essentially a social demand. The Good is what is willed by the Collective Will.

Digitized by Google

An individual will is good in so far as it coheres with the wills of the other members of society, wills a good which is the common demand of these mutually adjusted individuals. The evil will is the will that continues to make an isolated claim.[1]

It is when we raise the very obvious objection: What of the prophet or reformer, the moral seer, the "enemy of the people," who has the courage to follow his own vision in opposition to tradition and public opinion? Is not this a conservatism which opposes all real progress?—that the dualism we discovered in Alexander's theory of truth reappears. Although "the good non-mental reality is brought about by persons themselves through their wills," yet all advance in goodness is made, he says, in response to an external demand. Our increasing knowledge of, and adaptation to, our environment result in an enlargement of social relations and an increased complexity of conditions, involving new demands upon the individual and a revision of the old standards to fit the new situation.[2] But in that case moral good is not determined primarily by the Collective Will, but by the conditions of human and external nature. "In the case of good," he had said, "there is no antecedent coherence or structure in the non-mental reality,"[3] but he now tacitly admits a coherence between human affections and appetites and the objects which satisfy these, an

[1] Op. cit., pp. 275–8. [2] p. 282. [3] p. 278.

Digitized by Google

adaptation of the human constitution to its environment, which obviously implies some degree of coherence also among the activities of different human beings owing to their common affecto-motor tendencies (as exhibited in herd activity even at the pre-human level), all of which is antecedent to the emergence of the social will, properly so called, and determines the object of this. Once more he seems to be attempting to combine two irreconcilable views, in this case the naturalistic and Hegelian views of moral good, and once more he cannot have it both ways. If the content of the good will is determined by conditions external to it, which is clearly what he really believes, then the will itself does not "make and sustain goodness," [1] and the use of such a phrase confuses the whole issue. The collective will does not determine what objects shall be satisfying, for this is a matter of common human tendencies and needs. It is again simply the criterion for the individual of what is most satisfying to the group.

The attempt to hold these two views together leads to the same contradictions as in the case of truth. For example, Alexander tells us that there are "degrees in perfection of the moral life" (corresponding to the stage of development of the social group and its adaptation to its environment), but no "degrees of goodness." But one wonders

[1] Op. cit., p. 279.

Digitized by Google

what this perfection is which is progressively attained in the course of the moral life, if it is not perfection of goodness. "To be good," he says again, "is to be good, and though the goodness of one age may be inferior to that of another age, and some part of goodness may lapse into evil, what is good once, like what is truth, remains good . . . for the circumstances under which it was good." [1] But surely when one age discards the good of another age, if only because it is found inadequate to the satisfaction of its more complex tendencies and more varied desires, the rejected end may fairly be called less good than the goal of the more developed group. Moreover, nothing that was good in this sense to one age would presumably become actually evil to the next unless it were also a source of some dissatisfaction, involved the thwarting of some tendencies through the satisfaction of others, and in that case it was never an entire and unmixed good, and a completer adaptation to the environment may have revealed sources of purer satisfaction, a "higher degree of goodness." [2]

Professor Alexander's account of æsthetic value is more acceptable, as it is both more natural and more accurate to represent beauty as an amalgamation

[1] p. 282.

[2] It will be obvious that I am using the word "good" here in Alexander's sense. This should not be interpreted as an inconsistency in my own usage.

Digitized by Google

of mental and non-mental factors. As, moreover, I shall have to refer to this view again in my concluding remarks on the nature of æsthetic value, I will confine myself here to pointing out one difficulty to which his theory of all value as a subject-object determination gives rise in this connection.

In beauty, he tells us, some elements are contributed by the mind, others by the object in which the beauty is found. Neither factor alone can constitute an æsthetic object. The contribution of the object consists in its adequacy to express what mind brings to it for expression. "Try as we may to exclude the mind from the object felt to be beautiful, we cannot separate them because one part of the beauty comes from the mind and one part from the external thing." [1]

It is important to understand, however, that, as he has made clearer in several later contributions to the subject,[2] he does not mean to defend the view of Croce that a work of art is the translation into material form, for purposes of communication, of a purely mental experience—the thought or imagery of the artist—the physical embodiment being a mere practical or technical matter which is indifferent to the artistic experience. In that case,

[1] Op. cit., p. 296.

[2] *Art and the Material*, Adamson Lecture for 1925, Manchester University Press, 1925, and *The Artistry of Truth*, referred to above, p. 147, note.

Digitized by Google

he argues, the primary æsthetic factor would not be expression at all. If the work of art is itself expression, the primary experience is an emotion finding embodiment in the material itself. It is the artist's excitement about a subject-matter seeking vent in creative activity. It is not the reproduction in an external medium of an intuition in the mind of the artist, but the giving form to an otherwise undirected and formless emotion.[1] Hence the integral part played by the objective factor in his account of æsthetic experience. Without the material medium there could be no beauty, for an æsthetic experience awaiting external expression is a contradiction. "Neither the materials alone suffice nor the thoughts of the mind which are mxed up with them. The mere paints or the marble, even when they issue from the artist's hand, are not beautiful in themselves; they mean beauty only to the eye . . . which can mingle its vision with them, which has the secret of these material compositions. Nor are the human thoughts or feelings of the artist sufficient; they must find their expression in the materal—the words or notes or marble block."[2]

He gives numerous examples of the intimate union of the mental and the physical in works of art, none of which seem to be open to the kind of criticism

[1] *Art and the Material*, pp. 17–18.

[2] *The Artistry of Truth*, pp. 297–8.

Digitized by Google

brought against his account of the other values, and which certainly render his view more acceptable than the more extreme position of most other adherents of the expression theory. The only scruple that I feel about adopting his version of it in its entirety is that the term "expression," whilst according best with his definition of value, seems scarcely broad enough to cover all that he tries to include under it; hence his adherence to it sometimes necessitates a departure from the natural interpretation of the facts. It may indeed serve to define the beauty of a work of art, even where the chief emphasis is laid on the contribution of the material, as in one striking passage where he declares that the artistic experience is not so much invention as discovery. Very much as the scientific thinker with no foreknowledge of the truth, but with simply a passion to find it, discovers in nature a law or fact, so the sculptor, possessed by a mood of mind of whose meaning he is but dimly aware, chips off the flakes of marble and lays bare the figure that is concealed in it, expressing, as Michelangelo said, no thought that does not exist there already.[1] For, however passive the artist may be to this revelation of the potentialities of his medium, it is the creative power of his mind that gives form to the formless material, and to elicit these potentialities may be accurately called *expressing* them, albeit this is not

[1] *Art and the Material*, p. 28.

Digitized by Google

what has usually been meant by the statement that the beauty of an artistic creation lies in what it expresses. It is in his interpretation of the beauty of natural objects or of simple sense-data such as colours or tones, some of which seem to possess independent æsthetic value, that one would have expected his emphasis on the material factor to lead him beyond the limits of his original theory. For, if it be the artist's task to *discover* what is inherent in his material as the scientist discovers laws of nature, what are we to say of those cases where the potentialities of the physical lie fully wrought out before us. To appreciate a work of art the spectator must be able to enter into the artist's experience sufficiently to apprehend his meaning, and this probably always involves the imputation to it of characters which do not belong to the material object as such. For æsthetic appreciation "the Hermes is alive and divine, though physically a piece of dead marble." But is it necessary, or even consistent on Alexander's theory, to trace a parallel imputation in natural beauty, where the form and harmony which the artist imposes on his material have been achieved without his co-operation? Granted that art is "an amalgamation of mind and material to form a new reality," is it not possible that, when the contribution of mind is withdrawn, the *old* reality may sometimes possess a form and a unity of its own, and may present features which

Digitized by Google

are themselves harmonious? I do not mean of course to deny that a poet or painter may endue it with a far richer content by reading his own meanings into it, clothing it with the wonder of his mind's imaginings. I would merely point out that it may have *some* value which is independent of these secondary imputations. An unhewn block of marble, a chance combination of words, are formless and devoid of beauty, but it is surely rather far-fetched to place a mountain scene, a chamois among his native crags, or the fragrance of a woodland flower in this category until they are forced into the mould of the subjectively determined. And is not Alexander overlooking some important æsthetic characters when he declares that the sinuous movements of a snake, or a tiger, or of a puppy at play, seem beautiful to us because of ideas imported from the dance; or that the beauty of a moral object such as a burly policeman shepherding little children across a crowded street lies in the contrast in size, or the assurance to the observer of the beneficent intention of the law,[1] and not at all in the dignity and fitness of the relationship itself, though this be appreciated by none of the persons concerned? Still more forced is the suggestion that a simple musical tone or a pure colour are beautiful only by contrast with the compounded. Unless they possessed some intrinsic superiority to the mixed

[1] *The Artistry of Truth*, p. 299.

Digitized by Google

shade or note, there could be no ground for attributing beauty to the one rather than the other. They must be beautiful before they can be *more* beautiful, though it may be only through appreciating them comparatively that we discern their positive worth.

I am not at the moment concerned to discuss whether Alexander's theory of beauty is the true one, which is a matter on which I am in any case ill equipped to judge. I am only pleading here, on behalf of those to whom it is more acceptable than most of the current æsthetic doctrines, for consistency in applying it. If the *creation* of beauty means the eliciting from a physical object of all that it has in it to become, it is surely illogical to deny beauty to those less inchoate objects which have no need of this formative process, and whose value consists, not in the mental characters that they express, but in the simpler properties of colour, proportion, and harmony that they exhibit. Even if, as he claims, there is no difference in kind between natural beauty and the beauty of art, but only one of circumstance and proportion,[1] may it not be that this difference lies in the proporton in which we endue the object with our own meanings, and that this scale is a vanishing one, pointing beyond it to things of brilliance and grace that owe nothing to such formative or interpretative activities ?

[1] *Art and the Material*, p. 31.

Digitized by Google

3. We have thus completed our survey of the theories of value as a subjective, or partly subjective, character enumerated at the beginning of the second chapter, and are now in a position to affirm that, as our preliminary investigation of the modern bias towards *Psychologismus* led us to suspect, the assumption that it consists in a relation to the subject of experience invariably begs the real question of value. The various definitions of it as *feeling*, *desire*, *interest*, or, in more abstract terms, as *a determination of the subject-object complex*, are largely variations upon the same theme, and it is only an equivocal use of the verbal form, "I value," or of the specific value terms, truth, goodness, etc., or the confusion of psychical states having value with the activity of valuing, that gives them an appearance of plausibility. Where, on the other hand, the medium of value is admitted to be judgment, this is usually held to imply its independence of the subject. The opposite hypothesis, viz. that such judgments are of a special type whose content is brought into being through the mental act itself, has been shown to be fallacious, at least in its interpretation of the value predicate, which is not a particular whose existence can be conditioned like that of temporal objects.

The principal interest that these theories have for us is that they all illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing the content from the activity of valuing so long as we retain the psychological point of view,

Digitized by Google

from which value seems to be necessarily value *for a subject.* It is only when we raise the logical question: are the objects which we value really *valuable,* and by what standard can we evaluate them?—that we recognize that no analysis of subjective activities sheds any light upon the real problem at issue.

It remains then to enquire whether the view of value as *an indefinable objective predicate,* which seems so far to have vindicated itself as the most tenable theory, can be maintained in face of the many objections that have been urged against it, or whether there is yet another alternative that can be demonstrated as the only completely satisfactory view.

Digitized by Google

CHAPTER V

OBJECTIVE THEORIES OF VALUE AND SOME CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS OF THESE

1. *Meinong's later theory of value as impersonal good.*—His transition to the objective position—His distinction between personal and impersonal value—His failure to correlate these with actual and potential value—Feeling still the medium of value—Impersonal value mediated through "emotional presentation"—This psychological doctrine rejected—His further arguments in defence of the objective view—His personal values really instrumental—Judgment the medium of all genuine value experience.

2. *The theory of value as a relation between objects.*—This theory rejected.

3. *Santayana's attack on the theory of value as an indefinable predicate.*—Equivocation in his use of *good*—Lack of parellelism among his analogies—His own naturalistic definition—His adoption of the criterion of inclusiveness—His failure to recognize the intellectual character of the problem—His question-begging attempt to convict his opponents of his own equivocation—His question-begging criticism of the Refutation of Egoism—Irrelevance of his relativist argument—His question-begging appeal to a principle of rationality.

4. *Urban's criticism of the theory of value as an indefinable predicate.*—Value not to be identified with values—Value not a part of the nature of a thing—These criticisms based on misinterpretations.

5. *A defence of the theory.*—Some objections answered.

6. *Urban's theory of value as "an objective."*—Hiatus between his metaphysic and his psychology—His ascription of value to

Digitized by Google

"impossible objects"—His *a priori* value propositions—His identification of value with reality.

1. It has been my principal aim so far to exhibit the fallacy contained in the wide-spread belief that value involves a valuing process, an *object* of value being always an object that is valued *by somebody*. I do not, of course, dispute the obvious truth that it is through valuing that we become aware of value. I am merely arguing that it is related to valuing in the same way as any universal is related to any act of awareness. Its *esse* is no more *percipi*, or *intellegi*, or *sentiri*, than the *esse* of objects or their properties is *percipi*.

I am aware that this will still be regarded as a highly disputable proposition, and that there are a number of other considerations that may be adduced in support of the opposite view. The most important of these is the metaphysical objection that, although it is perfectly possible that value may be independent of any *particular* mind, it is nevertheless meaningless apart from Mind. As, however, the main purpose of this essay is epistemological, I must defer what I have to say upon this question till the concluding chapter, where I shall attempt to show some of the metaphysical bearings of the position I have defended.

To confine myself for the moment to the epistemological issue, it should now be clear that the plausibility of the various rival views under dis-

Digitized by Google

cussion depends upon the exact meaning given to the word *value*, which seems actually to be subject to different usages. In the interests of consistency and accuracy I have challenged the legitimacy of defining it as *liking* or *interest*, maintaining with Russell, Moore, and others that, though as a unique concept it is necessarily indefinable, its significance is sufficiently indicated by saying that it is *what ought to be*, valuing being, then, simply the recognition of what ought to be, which is, of course, merely incidental, and is doubtless often absent.

I have already mentioned several references in contemporary philosophy to this lack of correlation. The writer whose position has been most affected by it is probably Meinong, whose later theory contains a number of important modifications and additions, all of which are apparently logical consequences of its discovery. As these finally involve his transition to the objective standpoint, they are of especial interest to us, and I therefore propose to spend a little time in examining the grounds on which he makes the transition, and in trying to indicate by means of my partial agreement and partial disagreement with him the position that I believe to be the most tenable.

As Meinong does not notice that the only real duality in meaning is in the current uses of the verbal form, *to value*, he ends, like some of the

Digitized by Google

writers already referred to,[1] by recognizing two distinct types of value: the value of the object liked, which is constituted by the liking, and is therefore personal (or subjective), and a value which is independent of this subjective preference and which he therefore denominates impersonal or objective.[2] It is the acknowledgment of this latter type that is his new contribution. He does not think that it conflicts in any way with his older theory of personal value,[3] and he intends it simply to supplement this.

He tries at first to relate the two by means of the distinction between actual and potential value. Actual value, he tells us, involves the existence, not only of subject and object, but also of general conditions favourable to the exciting of the requisite feeling in the subject and an immediate occasion for this. If any of these factors be lacking, the value is only potential. I do not actually value a treasure that someone else possesses, as the occasion for me to do so is lacking. I *should* value it if I possessed it. The inhabitants of California did not value their gold mines whilst these remained undiscovered. Their value was potential until circumstances admitted of its actualization. A child or a feeble-

[1] See above, p. 145.

[2] *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie* (in which is embodied the substance of his paper, *Für die Psychologie und gegen den Psychologismus* published in Logos, Vol. III).

[3] Criticized above, pp. 71–83.

Digitized by Google

minded person does not value the care taken of him by others, but this is of potential value to him. He would value it if he had the intellectual capacity. Even the object itself may be absent. There are many goods that we *should* value if they existed. Their character makes them potentially valuable, but, being as yet non-existent, they cannot be actually valued. Value thus passes through successive phases of potentiality as the various conditions of its actuality fall away. The object itself may be lacking, as may the intellectual capacity of the subject. The emotional capacity of the subject is, Meinong thinks, the most essential ingredient, and this is probably always required. Hence he suggests as a new definition of value: "The value of an object consists in the fact that a subject either does, or could, or ought as a rational being (*vernünftiger Weise*), to take an interest in it." [1]

What he does not seem to notice is that the only case in which the value itself is rightly called potential is where the object is something not yet actual, so that value is predicated of a universal, not of a particular. So long as our reference is also universal we recognize its reality, saying, for example, that "hospitals are valuable institutions," whereas, if our attention becomes directed to the non-existent particular, we admit its potentiality and say: "A hospital would be valuable to this town." On the

[1] *Für die Psychologie und gegen den Psychologismus*, p. 9.

Digitized by Google

other hand, it is apparent from his own examples that the emotional as well as the intellectual factor may be lacking without affecting the actuality of the value. The feeble-minded person, who does not even recognize the care bestowed upon him, entirely fails to appreciate it. This, then, is an object of value that is not valued, for the fact that he may have the emotional capacity for appreciation (which is in any case doubtful) is surely irrelevant, if it is never excited by the object in question.

Evidently Meinong himself is not quite satisfied with this argument, for, after leading us to expect from his examples that it was to bridge the gulf between personal and impersonal value, he never extends its application beyond the personal class (although, as we have just seen, it is exactly the personal factor that is often lacking). His reason for this is clearly that he perceives the inaccuracy of opposing impersonal value to personal as potential to actual, as if the former were always hypothetical in character, whilst he realizes that the distinction does not even apply to the non-existent.[1] It seems thus to be the part of discretion simply to admit the incompleteness of the personal aspect, and to undertake an independent examination of the impersonal notion which is required to supplement it.

The importance that he continues to attach to his earlier theory is easily explained by the fact

[1] *Grundlegung*, p. 137.

Digitized by Google

that he apparently never doubts that valuing is emotional in character. Now feeling is not as a rule regarded as in itself a medium of apprehension. If the relation had been recognized as cognitive, it would have been natural to attribute the value to the object cognized. Feeling, on the other hand, is merely a reaction to things whose qualities are discriminated in cognition; it has not itself any "presentational" function, hence, if it be the medium of value, this must presumably consist in the emotional relation itself. It is thus the origin of impersonal, not of personal, value that constitutes a problem for those who adopt the affective view, and has led most of them simply to deny its reality. Meinong, however, is more rigorous in his analysis than many of his associates, and he perceives that there is a possibility of reconciling the affective view of valuing with a belief in the independent reality of value, if we admit that certain realities are emotionally, not cognitively, apprehended, and characterize it accordingly as the *felt* goodness of objects.

Obviously this involves a revision of the traditional view of feeling, for although, as we have seen, some writers have tried to exhibit a parallel between feeling and cognition in respect to generalization and even reasoning,[1] very few have explicitly

[1] For a theory of affective reasoning see Ribot: *La Logique des Sentiments*, Paris, 1905, referred to p. 27 above.

Digitized by Google

tried to effect a further *rapprochement* between them.[1] Meinong gives a detailed exposition of his theory in a pamphlet, *Über Emotionale Präsentation*, presented to the Imperial Academy at Vienna.[2] As his argument may be unfamiliar to some of my readers, it seems worth while to quote in full the summary he gives of it in his later work:

"Is it altogether out of the question," he asks, "to retain the reference to experience whilst dispensing with the reference to a subject of experience? Those who regard value as a matter of feeling will hardly be able to help contrasting it with things that are matters of knowledge, particularly with those things whose properties and laws it is the natural function of cognition to apprehend. Though these properties and laws are always such as can be apprehended by our powers of presentation and judgment, yet it is only under exceptional epistemological conditions that this is any indication of their dependence upon the cognitive subject. Ordinarily the exact opposite is believed to be true, viz. that the content appre-

[1] It will be remembered that for Dewey "immediate value" seemed to be a *felt* quality in things, though he apparently did not consider it necessary to justify this treatment of feeling as presentational. There are numerous allusions in current philosophical literature that suggest a similar view, but, so far as I know, Meinong is the only writer who has offered a psychological defence of it.

[2] Referred to above, p. 71.

Digitized by Google

hended is as independent of the act of apprehension, is as much *given* to it, as any problem is given for solution. Now it is possible to regard the special character of this situation as a result of the uniqueness of the cognitive relation, and to deny that anything of the kind can occur outside the cognitive sphere. It is just here, however, that the mistake seems to be made. Emotions, and notably value feelings, may perform a presentational function, and so become vehicles of knowledge, just as presentations and judgments are, without thereby losing any of their special character. Thus just as (in spite of the subjectivity of the secondary qualities) we should not think of speaking of colour *for a person*, or hardness *for a person*, or warmth *for a person*, so there is no need to regard every value as personal simply because we only discover it through the medium of value experiences." [1]

Now, had we accepted Meinong's previous analysis of value feeling, and were we thus convinced of the need of retaining the reference to affection, it might have been possible for us to endorse this account, which at least acknowledges the objectivity we claim to have demonstrated. It will be remembered, however, that we failed to find the differentia of value feeling in its affective aspect even in the case of "personal value"; hence we certainly do not need to resort to the *tour de force* of attributing

[1] *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie*, pp. 151–2.

Digitized by Google

a "presentational" function to feeling in order to account for the experience of value as impersonal or objective. Even, then, if this "emotional presentation" be a genuine psychological fact—and Meinong's demonstration seems to have convinced very few psychologists of this—we could not admit its relevance to the experience of value. What distinguishes the feeling of value from other affective experiences is its association with the judgment that an object ought to be, and no objective reality is mediated by this simple emotional reaction.

The principal interest of this new contribution to the subject lies in its other aspect, i.e. in the admission that, whatever the mode of presentation, there is a value that has no specific reference to a subject of experience. Meinong seems to have been led to this conclusion in the first instance by the recognition that psychological analysis fails to do justice to many of the ideals of everyday life, and that these, moreover, are not of an exclusively practical kind. Even from a purely theoretical standpoint common sense finds it unnatural to place the value of an object entirely outside it in a subject with which it appears and disappears. To such considerations empirical psychology is as little able to do justice as it is to the opposition of true and false, yet a philosophical theory of value cannot neglect them if it is to be true to its task. What is

Digitized by Google

required, he decides, is a concept more nearly related to that of absolute value, which, whilst harmonizing with the discoveries of modern science, shall nevertheless take into account the standards and ideals of ordinary life.[1] He sums up these demands, which empirical psychology has failed to satisfy, in the striking pronouncement: "Wem es für eine Selbstverständlichkeit gilt, dass das Leben der Güter höchstes nicht sein kann, der wird also von der Forderung eines Subjektes für allen Wert gerade bei den höchsten Gütern abgehen müssen."[2] Now it is not often at the present day

[1] *Für die Psychologie und gegen den Psychologismus*, p. 9.

[2] "He to whom it appears self-evident that life itself cannot be the supreme good must be prepared to admit that such supreme goods may require no living subject for their realization" (*Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Wertttheorie*, p. 146).

This recalls Professor Moore's similar attempt to do justice to the common-sense view. "In the case of goodness and beauty,". Moore says, in a passage already quoted, "what such people" (i.e. the people who defend the objectivity of value) "are really anxious to maintain is by no means merely that these conceptions are 'objective' but that . . . they are also . . . 'intrinsic' kinds of value." They would object just as strongly, for example, to the conception of belonging to a type which tended to be favoured by the struggle for existence more than another, though this is an objective conception. The intrinsic character of value, on the other hand, is "just as incompatible with this evolutionary interpretation as with any and every subjective interpretation." That these writers are both contending for the same thing becomes even clearer if we pursue this passage a little further, for Moore goes on

Digitized by Google

that we meet with the rather naïve belief that life as such is good, much less the highest good of all; on the other hand, there are, as we have seen, few who altogether succeed in avoiding "the naturalistic fallacy," which defines "good" in terms of some natural property of living beings such as pleasure or desire. If, then, sufficient grounds have been adduced for rejecting all such definitions, it will be clear what Meinong means by this statement. If value consists neither in life itself nor in any property of a living subject, some goods at least must be devoid of reference to such a subject: hence if their goodness is definable at all, it must be in terms that include no such reference.

He adduces a number of considerations in support of his thesis,[1] most of which are familiar enough and have been criticized by various opponents

to oppose this "intrinsic value" to the naturalistic or positivistic notion that defines it in terms of natural properties such as pleasure or biological utility, definitions that are based upon just the assumption Meinong criticizes, that the highest good is, or implies, life. (G. E. Moore: *The Conception of Intrinsic Value*, Philosophical Studies, pp. 255–6. See also his exhaustive treatment of this subject in *Principia Ethica*, Chapters I–IV.) So long as this assumption holds, it will not occur to anyone to ask whether the ends of hedonism or of evolutionary ethics *are* really good. Moore, however, like Meinong, challenges the assumption, when this question at once suggests itself, and the *petitio principii* contained in all naturalistic definitions of good is exposed.

[1] *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie*, pp. 145–51.

Digitized by Google

of the position, but which together constitute a considerable body of evidence in its support. He points out the unnaturalness of the attempt to give a personal character to the classical triad of values—truth, beauty, and goodness—by postulating a collective subject whose valuations constitute the standards regarded as super-personal by individual experience. He even reverts to some of his earlier examples in which the insufficiency of the personal view was becoming apparent: that of the child who fails to value an education that is nevertheless a genuine object of value though he die without recognizing it, or that of the feeble-minded person who is never aware of the care lavished upon him. Such individuals do not stand in the relation of subjects to the value, though they or their qualities may in some cases be the real *value objects*. Again, there is the familiar difficulty of errors in valuation. It is customary for the defenders of the subjectivity of value to argue that the error in such cases is an error of judgment that is prior to the actual valuing, i.e. that the subject values the object (a charm, say, or a magic potion) on account of qualities that it does not really possess; these, however, are valuable qualities; hence the feeling itself is not misdirected. It is easy for him to show, however, that this does not cover all the cases, but that there are actually examples of erroneous feeling, as witness our scepticism in respect to the dictum *de gustibus non*

Digitized by Google

disputandum. Even those who do it lip-service are commonly content to rest in the belief that they are themselves right and their opponents wrong. They do not really believe that the opposition of truth and falsehood is inapplicable to such cases, but regard the feelings they repudiate as "emotional errors." The paradox of such a belief is even more obvious in the sphere of morals than in the sphere of taste. Would anyone admit, for example, that a man was neither right nor wrong in preferring love and fidelity to malice and perfidy, but that this was a matter of personal feeling?[1]

Meinong's strongest argument in favour of objectivity is, however, the argument already quoted, which I have myself used in some of the preceding discussions—I mean the argument that we do not judge the objects apprehended by a subject to be dependent upon that subject for their *being*, but only for their *being experienced*, and why should not value follow the analogy of other objects of experience? Why should it alone depend for its being upon the subject which apprehends it? That the defenders of the subjective view have paid

[1] Meinong evidently does not see whither this recognition of truth and falsehood in valuation is leading him. Once admit emotional apprehension, and it is difficult to deny the possibility of a corresponding misapprehension. But can *a misapprehension* be altogether emotional?

Digitized by Google

so little attention to this very obvious objection is of course due to the fact that they trace the value to the affective or motor-affective relation; hence it is not according to them, in the first instance, an apprehended object at all. If, however, Meinong's doctrine of emotional presentation can be established, or if the arguments I have adduced in favour of the cognitive view have any weight, this question becomes a very pertinent one, though, so far as I know, no direct answer has ever been vouchsafed to it.

For Meinong, however, all this applies only to one class of goods, viz. those which he usually designates "the highest." Not all values, he still maintains, are independent of an epistemological subject, not every value feeling is presentational, —indeed, so many experiences testify to the inseparability of the subject and object of value that, were it not for other evidence to the contrary, it would have seemed as if this relation were an indissoluble one. The child's toy is of value to the child, his violin to the musician, my stove, or the letters of my dead friend, are of value to me, simply in virtue of the fact that they arouse feelings of pleasure when judged to exist in a special relationship to ourselves. Apart from this they have no value whatever. We must avoid the one-sidedness of excluding personal values from our theory altogether, for "this reaction against absolutism . . . is not less

Digitized by Google

contrary to the facts than the opposite error of relativism, . . . it being one of the most notable characteristics of values that they exhibit a specially close relation to subjects."[1]

Now it will be clear from my previous remarks on this and other dualistic theories that I can find no grounds for thus co-ordinating the two types of value, but that I should rather regard any object included among Meinong's examples of "personal" value that was of value for its own sake, as really belonging to the impersonal class. It should be remembered, however, that Meinong had formerly recognized *only* this personal type;[2] hence to have denied the intrinsic character of these would have involved the repudiation of most of his earlier work. Thus, in spite of his reaction against *Psychologismus*, it is easy to see that he shrinks from admitting the full consequences of adopting the epistemological standpoint. Moreover, it is comparatively easy for him to avoid this so long as he adheres to the affective view. Had he perceived the defects in his analysis of value feeling, and recognized that the essence of valuing is always a judgment of value, he must have seen that the psychological distinction between personal and impersonal resolves itself, when viewed epistemologically, into the distinction

[1] Op. cit., p. 166.

[2] See especially *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie* and *Über Werthaltung und Wert.*

Digitized by Google

between means and ends.[1] A psychological analysis will naturally treat every value as in the first instance personal. Its data are the temporal states of a particular organism, hence its interest is necessarily centred in the process of valuing. When, however, Meinong raises the question whether value feeling may not apprehend objects that are independent of it, as cognition does, it is evident that the centre of interest has shifted to the value itself, and the question at once arises why *all* value feeling should not have this mediating function. If we never regard colour, or warmth, or hardness, as *personal*, though they are cognized by persons, why should we continue sometimes to treat value as in this sense *relative to persons*? It is true that it is sometimes, if not always, *realized in persons*, but he sees himself that this is a different use of the term "personal," and it is not in this sense that he wishes to use it here. "Feelings that are objects of value," he says, "clearly do not thereby become *value feelings*, in the sense that the value in question is to be described as a personal value. . . . It would perhaps be less ambiguous to call these values *pertaining to* the subject, rather than values *for* the subject."[2] The arguments of the last

[1] Meinong comes very near to admitting this, when he suggests that "the pure unsullied value concept" (*der eigentliche, sozusagen ungetrübte Wertgedanke*) is probably to be sought outside the personal sphere (*Grundlegung*, p. 143).

[2] Op. cit., p. 147.

Digitized by Google

chapter should, however, have been sufficient to show that it is only in this sense that a value is ever both intrinsic and personal. The musician's violin, or the child's toy, are merely instruments to the production of pleasurable consciousness, or of some other desirable state of a person, i.e. personal values in Meinong's first sense are personal simply in so far as they are instrumental to personal values in the second sense in which he declines to use the term. The toy is a source of entertainment; the instrument, as the word itself implies, is a means to the production of melody, the personal element in whose value is the æsthetic pleasure it yields; the letters of a dead friend are revivers of cherished memories with which they have become so indissolubly associated that they have come to stand as symbols for them. There is no difference between the value in these cases and in Meinong's other examples of education for the child, or the care of others for the feeble-minded. In all of them it is personal in so far as it is instrumental to some state of a person. The fact that there is recognition of it in the one set of examples and not in the other is irrelevant.

It should be easy to apply this argument to every case of personal value that Meinong cites. As Professor Moore demonstrated conclusively in his famous refutation of egoism, no object of intrinsic value can ever be specifically of value *for a person*,

Digitized by Google

for to be of intrinsic value means to be truly good in itself, which means to be a part of universal good, and so good in the same sense for others.[1] That the consciousness of a living being should contain a balance of pleasure over pain may indeed be considered a part of universal good, as may the exercise by him of certain activities, e.g. that of æsthetic contemplation, but these are objects of value realized in persons, they are not values only *for* those persons. It must be apparent to any impartial critic that they are things which ought to be.

It becomes more and more evident towards the close of his book that Meinong's admission of affective presentation was a letting in of the waters that were to flood his house, for he is next obliged to admit that this is not necessarily confined to cases of impersonal value. Even personal value feeling has its object—the heart may be set on the possession of money or worldly goods, or upon some external triviality—and if such feeling is ever a medium of apprehension, it is difficult to deny that it may be so in these cases as much as in others. He still insists, however, that we cannot predicate any independent value of the object in such cases.[2] The value consists in the emotional significance of the object for a subject, and what is thus wholly relative cannot be described as an absolute. But how, then, are we to know that we can describe any

[1] *Principia Ethica*, pp. 99 ff. [2] *Grundlegung*, p. 161.

Digitized by Google

experienced value thus? Since he denies the rôle of judgment here, what criterion have we of the genuine objectivity of any value, if it be not the presentational function of feeling? By what right do we characterize the value of "external trivialities" as merely personal or relative, whilst we affirm that the objects represented by the classical trilogy of the true, the beautiful, and the good have an impersonal value that has some claim to the title of absolute?

Meinong seeks a last desperate resort in the notion of validity (*Berechtigung*). We must ask, not merely whether the value holds for this or that subject with his particular disposition and in his particular circumstances, but whether it would hold for every subject, and we can only learn this by enquiring whether the attribution of value is valid. Validity, however, is admittedly a property of judgments. "A judgment is . . . valid if it is true, if it corresponds with the facts."[1] At this point he appears to see whither his argument is leading him, and tries to retrieve his position by adding that the term may sometimes be extended to cover presented feeling. We should, indeed, consider it an abuse of language to speak of "true feelings" or of "feelings that accord with the

[1] It will be remembered that an almost precisely similar argument is used by Dewey in *Experience and Nature*, Chapter X. See above pp. 161–2.

Digitized by Google

facts," but we frequently speak of feelings as "justifiable," or "valid." In order, however, to avoid the circular argument that an object has value which arouses value feeling but that this feeling is only really *value* feeling if the object is of value, he has finally to concede that "the real significance of this determination of validity is not a matter of feeling but of truth or fact,"[1] and what is this but an admission that it is after all a matter of judgment?

Thus, in recognizing the objectivity of value, Meinong is forced to admit the necessity of judgment for its discrimination. That it is mediated by feeling is indeed a tenable proposition, and he has no thought of abandoning it, but he perceives that emotion is an untrustworthy guide to fact. How can we be sure that our affective reactions refer to any external reality? Only, he finally confesses, through their correspondence with another more reliable medium of knowledge.

That this view of the impersonal character of value has found little favour among recent writers has already been abundantly demonstrated. In addition to Meinong's rather tardy defence of it, it is supported by Moore and Laird,[2] and by Russell

[1] Op. cit., p. 165.

[2] In rather slight treatment in *A Study in Realism*, Cambridge, 1920, Chapter VII, pp. 125–48; as the main thesis of his later work: *A Study in Moral Theory*, London, 1926.

Digitized by Google

in one of his early works.[1] On the other hand, it may be justly complained that those who take the opposite view have seldom devoted much pains to its refutation;[2] hence, if there is any truth in my contention that every form of the subjective theory really presupposes an objective good, I may perhaps claim to have offered a sufficient vindication of it if I simply supplement this argument by a rather more direct attempt to meet the two most important criticisms that have been made of it by contemporary writers.

2. There remains, it is true, a further possibility upon which I have not so far touched, viz. that value may be not a determination of objects but a relation between objects, but I do not propose to devote much space to this alternative, as it does not seem to me really to describe the concept of value at all. That the adaptation of an organism to its environment, for example, constitutes neither moral goodness nor any other intrinsic value has been conclusively demonstrated by so many writers from Huxley onwards,[3] that it would be superfluous for

[1] *The Elements of Ethics*, Philosophical Essays, I, London, 1910.

[2] Cf. e.g. Mr. Picard's summary dismissal: "I shall not discuss a third view, presented by Moore and Russell, that value is a quality, for I agree with Urban's position that this view is encumbered with insuperable difficulties" (*Value and Worth*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIX, p. 477).

[3] Cf. again Professor Moore's masterly criticism of Naturalistic Ethics, *Principia Ethica*, Chapter II.

Digitized by Google

me to undertake another refutation of it, whilst Professor W. H. Sheldon's recent suggestion that it consists in the fulfilment of any tendency—be it the tendency, physical or conscious, of a human organism, or that of some other living being, or even a tendency of dead matter[1]—really falls under the same condemnation and has consequently found little favour among his contemporaries.[2] For to admit it without qualification would mean so to increase the extension of the term that we could, for example, regard any accelerating agency as a good to a moving body, any retarding medium (e.g. level ground to a stone rolling down a hill) as an evil, which would simply be to deprive it of its ordinary significance and to use it in an entirely new sense. If, on the other hand, we limited it to the fulfilment of tendencies which were directed to some end or purpose, we should be presupposing either the value of all ends, i.e. of reality as it is, or of each particular end which came into question, and the definition would thus become involved in the same circle as other relational views.[3]

I therefore beg leave to omit any further discussion of this theory, and to pass on to the criticisms

[1] W. H. Sheldon: *A Definition of Value*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XI, p. 121.

[2] See e.g. Professor Urban's criticisms: *Value and Existence*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIII, pp. 453–4.

[3] W. M. Urban, op. cit.

Digitized by Google

of the view of value as an indefinable predicate that have been offered by Mr. Santayana and Professor Urban. My reply to the latter will give me an opportunity of considering a last alternative which he has suggested, viz. that value is not a property of objects but itself an "objective," validity being a mode of reality distinct both from the existence of particulars and the subsistence of universals.

3. Of the few detailed criticisms which our theory has received, Santayana's attack in his *Winds of Doctrine* upon Bertrand Russell's "hypostatic ethics"[1] has undoubtedly proved the most damaging, probably because it is directed more at the pre-occupation with the dialectical implications of essence at the expense of the facts of temporal existence than at any lack of consistency in the arguments, for the criticism of a predominant interest in the abstract or theoretical always makes a wide popular appeal. Even Mr. Russell himself was admittedly shaken by the force of the attack, and has since abandoned his early position for one more closely allied to Mr. Santayana's own.[2] It is thus with a good deal of trepidation that I undertake a defence of his former view. As, however, the theory I am trying to develop agrees with it in most essentials, it is important for me to show that it is not completely undermined by this line of

[1] As set forth in his essay: *The Elements of Ethics.*

[2] See his *Philosophy*, New York, 1927, pp. 230–5.

Digitized by Google

criticism. For a very acute analysis of Santayana's own position (which is closely related to several others that we have examined) I would refer the reader to Mr. S. C. Pepper's essay: *The Equivocation of Value*,[1] some remarks in which may help to explain his almost perverse misunderstanding of an English realist's use of the word *good*.

I call this misunderstanding almost perverse, because what Santayana appears to object to is Russell's consistency in adhering to the usage of *good* as *that which ought to be on its own account*. He is quite willing to follow this usage himself so long as the reference is to "the static realm of essence," but, finding that the philosophy he is criticizing endorses his Platonic distinction of essence and existence,[2] he tries to make the dualism complete by refusing to apply value propositions that are valid within the former sphere to "the flexible and changing realm of existence," which, he declares, "is distorted and mutilated by the imposition of this alien absolutism." What he thus unconsciously does, is to slide over to the sense of *that which is liked or enjoyed*, when he turns from qualities in the

[1] S. C. Pepper: *The Equivocation of Value*, University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. IV, 1923.

[2] For details of this see his *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, New York, 1923, pp. 67 ff.; *Soliloquies in England*, London, 1922, pp. 228 ff; *Essays in Critical Realism*: "Three Proofs of Realism," London, 1920, pp. 179–83.

Digitized by Google

abstract to things having qualities. As, however, he is quite unaware of the equivocation in his own usage, he believes that Russell's categorical value judgments are falsified by the conditions of concrete existence. "The contradiction [that for me a thing should be good which for you is evil, or, as Russell puts it, that for me a thing ought to exist on its own account while for you it ought not] would be real undoubtedly," he says, "if we suggested that the *idea* of good was at any time or in any relation the *idea* of evil. . . . These disembodied essences are fixed by the intent that selects them, and in that ideal realm they can never have any relations except the dialectical ones implied in their nature, and these relations they must always retain. But the contradiction disappears when, instead of considering the qualities in themselves, we consider the things of which those qualities are aspects." [1]

Actually, however, a contradiction in the application of a term only disappears when the term comes to be used with a different meaning, and, though Santayana does not admit this second usage here, he has given us a very clear definition of it in another context. "Happiness," he says in stating his own ethical view, "is the only sanction of life. . . . The question, however, what happiness shall consist in, its complexion if it should once arise,

[1] G. Santayana: *Winds of Doctrine*, London, 1913, p. 142.

Digitized by Google

can only be determined by reference to natural demands and capacities. . . . *Natural disposition*, therefore, *is the principle of preference* and makes morality and happiness possible."[1] The distinction of what is excellent can be made in the last analysis "*only by an irrational impulse*." The substance to which the form of reason is given remains irrational; so that "rationality, like all excellence, is something secondary and relative, requiring a natural being to possess or to impute it."[2] It is surely a far cry from this to the recognition of good as *that which ought to be!*

Being unaware of this equivocation, he tries to explain the paradox that what ought originally to exist *for its own sake* comes, when it does exist, to be something which ought to exist for a person of one natural disposition, but perhaps ought not to exist for a person of another disposition. Essences, he repeats, have only dialectical relations, hence *that which ought to exist for its own sake* can only be opposed to *that which ought to exist as a means* or to *that which ought not to exist at all.* Existing things, on the other hand, have in addition so many factual relations that anything may possess contradictory qualities if viewed in its relations to different things. A thing may be to the right of one person and to the left of another; grass may be green to a person

[1] *The Life of Reason*, New York, 1911, Vol. I, p. 238.

[2] Op. cit., pp. 46–7 (italics all mine).

Digitized by Google

with normal vision, yellow to one who has jaundice; a cylinder is both round and square; a thing may be at once large and small, many and one, good for me and bad for you.[1]

It is obvious, however, that many of these cases are by no means parallel. Right and left are not qualities of things that enter into different relations, they are themselves relations; large and small are quantitative, many and one numerical, estimates; hence none of these bears any real analogy to the predicate good. And certainly neither Russell nor any other supporter of this theory would deny that a complex entity might be both good and bad—the world, for instance, is clearly both, for it has good and bad constituents, just as a cylinder has parts that are round and parts that run at right-angles to these. Moreover, this theory does not regard *good* as a primary quality any more than *green*. It is not to be supposed that a jaundiced man, unless he be bereft of reason as well as of normal vision, will deny that the grass is green because his sensory organ has for the time being ceased to function properly. Why, then, should a thing by analogy cease to be good because there are those who are temporarily unable to appreciate it? When we say that good is that which ought to be, we are endeavouring to locate our indefinable essence in the realm of existence where alone it is actual; we

[1] *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 142.

Digitized by Google

are not, as a rule at least, referring to its supersensible reality or subsistence. Among existing things those are called good that not only do exist but that ought, or are worthy, to exist for their own sakes. And if a thing is worthy to *exist* for its own sake, this means that, when all its factual relations have been considered, it is still judged better that it should exist than that it should not, in short that, whatever its special relations to you or to me, it is a part of universal good and ought, therefore, to continue to be. If, however, I suddenly begin to talk of a thing as not being good *for me*, I cannot mean that it ought not to exist for its own sake for me, for that is meaningless. I can only mean that it does not *please* me, that I do not *wish* it to exist, that it does not fit into the scheme of things that I call *my interest*. In short, I am now using the word in an entirely different sense, and all attempts to reduce Russell's or any similar arguments to absurdity by interpreting them in this way are beside the point, for they never use the term in this sense.

Most of Santayana's examples seem to miss the point in this way. When, for example, he complains that these writers imagine that "the truth of a proposition, attributing a certain relative quality to an object contradicts the truth of another proposition attributing to the same object an opposite relative quality," so that, if a man here

Digitized by Google

and another at the antipodes call opposite directions up, only one of them can be right,[1] he forgets that there is no analogy, in their usage, between the relation "up" and the predicate "good," which is applied to a thing on its own account (i.e. by reason of its intrinsic nature, not on account of its relations to this or that person), and so is not relative at all.

Santayana's real mistake was in admitting Russell's argument that "pleasure and its rivals" (desire, interest, etc.) "are not synonyms for the abstract quality good but names for classes of concrete facts that are supposed to possess that quality,"[2] for he evidently believes that, in the realm of existence at least, some of them *are* synonyms for it—that it is applicable just where they are applicable (e.g. to oysters by those who like them, as much as to human actions that are approved), and is inapplicable to any classes of fact which do not enter into the relations they imply. If he had formulated his own definition at the outset (for, whatever he may say to the contrary, in his naturalistic usage the term is clearly definable, indeed, as we have seen, he has himself defined it in other connections),[3] he could have rejected Russell's theory *in toto*, and might have avoided the absurdity of criticizing his usage in contexts where those who follow this usage would not think of applying it.

[1] *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 143. [2] Quoted op. cit., p. 140.
[3] See also below, p. 227.

Digitized by Google

He admits, it is true, that there may be bad as well as good desires in a deeper sense than that in which we might be tempted to call all desires bad which are opposed to our own, but this turns out to be only in Professor Perry's sense that "passing passions and fancies thwart the more comprehensive interests of the soul which entertains them."[1] He will not admit what his opponents must maintain, viz. that *bad* may be applied not merely to some of the most comprehensive of the individual's interests, but even to some of the most comprehensive interests of the race. The wholesale extermination of the physically unfit or the feeble-minded, for example, are measures which would doubtless promote some of the broadest racial interests. Mr. Santayana must be prepared, then, to call these good desires.

If no subjective relation such as interest is admitted as a criterion, nothing but physical stress can, he thinks, make one opinion as to value prevail over another, for in the realm of existence reason is apparently impotent. It is the moralist who shouts loudest who wins his case. This conclusion, however, is certainly not deduced from any statement of Russell's, but is based solely on his own premise that "to speak of the truth of an ultimate good would be a false collocation of terms. . . . The ultimate intuitions on which ethics rests

[1] *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 146.

Digitized by Google

are not debatable, for they are not opinions we hazard but preferences we feel."[1] For felt preferences are simply enjoyments, feelings of immediate pleasure. Certainly we do not call these true, but neither would Russell and his associates see any reason for calling them the fundamental goods, or for treating them as the criteria of value. If they debate over questions of morals, it is because they believe the problem of ethics to be something more than the discovery what things are enjoyed, viz. the determination what things are by virtue of their intrinsic properties fit to be enjoyed. Some things are worthy to be for their own sakes, and what things these are is not determined by irrational preference. It is a matter of judgment, for it is the discrimination of a character of reality. Thus it is *not* the moralist who shouts loudest, but the philosopher with the profoundest insight, the scientist with the keenest powers of analysis, who must finally prevail.

Curiously enough Mr. Santayana traces in the writers he is criticizing an oscillation between two views similar to that of which we have convicted him. Whenever they discuss concrete values, he says, they appeal, not to self-evident propositions, but to the constitution of human nature, in other words, they adopt the naturalistic usage. When, for example, Russell argues that the good is not

[1] Op. cit., p. 144.

Digitized by Google

pleasure because nobody would choose a fool's paradise, or because poetry is preferred to bathing on a hot day though the pleasure it yields is obviously less intense, or because the love of the dead may be the best thing in life though it is clearly a source of much pain, etc., the reason for the preference is not that the superiority of such ends is self-evident, but that the people who choose them are the required sort of people.[1] What constitutes a man "the required sort of person" he does not explain, but it seems safe to assume that he means a person who would choose the ends that were most interwoven with his other interests and purposes, and were thus better, not in themselves, but in relation to his particular scheme of life. But if so, it is open to Russell to reply that what *he* requires is rather a person capable of assuming an impartial standpoint and performing the analysis required in order that the superiority of these ends may *become* evident, when Santayana's charge again falls foul of the mark. In any case, he plays straight into the enemy's hands in his next sentence by himself raising the question whether such ends, however comprehensive, are *really* better than, for example, the unmixed pleasure of Plato's oyster, pleasure without knowledge. To this question, he thinks, there is no unconditional answer, and certainly it would be difficult for him to furnish

[1] p. 147.

Digitized by Google

one, for to say that the best people prefer them would involve a circle. The only answer is clearly that the judgment is an immediate one, and this is just what Russell and his associates have maintained. No external criterion is ultimate. A searching analysis can always press the question further.

Santayana's last criticism refers to the refutation of egoism adopted by Russell from Moore, which again seems to him to be applicable only to abstractions. What the critics of this argument usually fail to observe is that it is a deduction from Sidgwick's Axiom of Rational Benevolence, and that, as the qualifying adjective implies, this principle and its corollaries appear axiomatic only to those who have conceptual powers and use them. This does not, however, involve being transformed from a human being into a letter, as Santayana seems to suppose.[1] If it is evident that it is better to secure a greater good for A than a lesser good for B,[2] it is equally evident, *from the point of view of the universe*, that it is better to secure a greater good for the man across the street than a lesser good for myself. Nor is there any special need for the sympathetic rapport to which Santayana appeals, in order that I may determine wherein that good consists. It is often perfectly possible to envisage

[1] p. 148.

[2] See H. Sidgwick: *Methods of Ethics*, London, 1884, p. 381.

Digitized by Google

intellectually *what ought to be* in relation to another. If, on the other hand, I argue that my happiness is a greater good *for me* than any alien end that my imagination fails to encompass, it may once more be asked what I mean by a good that is not good as such, good from the point of view of the universe, and the only answer to this would again seem to be that I mean *my happiness is my own interest.* And, if I am further pressed to say what I call my interest, which is *ex hypothesi* not an interest from the point of view of the universe, the reply seems to be my own satisfaction, in the last resort my own happiness (which is the only entirely private or personal end), when the proposition I am defending no longer seems a very important one!

Santayana complains that this rational interpretation cannot be an ideal for the tigers, "for it would suppress the tragic good called ferocity which makes, in their eyes, the chief glory of the universe." The inertia of nature, the ferocity of beasts, the optimism of mystics, and the selfishness of men and nations must be accepted, he urges, as conditions of various incommensurable goods, which we have no right to condemn because they are again incommensurable with those that we prize.[1] But it should be remembered that neither nature, nor beasts, nor mystics (if their experience is one of a super-rational immediacy), nor men, nor nations

[1] Op. cit., pp. 149–50.

Digitized by Google

(so long as their ends are selfish and therefore incommensurable), ever consider their so-called *goods* from the point of view of their intrinsic goodness, or of what ought to be. If they did so, they would be considering them *from the point of view of the universe*, when in many cases they would cease to speak of them as *good* at all.

As Mr. Santayana holds that in ethics (as presumably in any discussion of value) the *argumentum ad hominem* is the only available argument, he will perhaps forgive me for concluding by a resort to it. As Mr. Pepper has ingeniously shown, he is only able to derive any standards from his own naturalistic theory,[1] which defines good as the object of impulse or feeling "suffused with pleasure," by recognizing among our impulses the impulse to reflect, whose object is a life "consistent, complete and satisfactory when viewed as a whole." Even this impulse can only afford a standard of action, if it has priority among the impulses; hence he has to transform it into a *principle of rationality* having a scope and an authority which clearly show that it was not developed from individual interests at all, but has been brought in *ab extra* to evaluate between them. So far from having the animal origin attributed to it, it is a principle or postulate that is not genetically derived.[2] Moreover, the

[1] As set forth in his *Life of Reason*, Vols. I and V.

[2] See S. C. Pepper: *The Equivocation of Value*, pp. 115–18.

Digitized by Google

function that it performs is precisely that of the axiom on which Russell bases his refutation of egoism. "When we apply reason to life," Santayana says, ". . . this view, as it presents each moment in its relations, extends to all moments affected by the action or maxim in question; it has no more ground for stopping at the limits of what is called a single life than at the limits of a single adventure. To stop at selfishness is not particularly rational. The same principle that creates the ideal of a self creates the ideal of a family or institution." [1]

As we have seen, this failure to maintain the naturalistic standpoint in the domain of value is by no means peculiar to Santayana, though there are probably few writers who would have the temerity to criticize others for employing a postulate which they themselves explicitly adopt, or for an equivocation with which they are themselves chargeable. It may safely be affirmed that no one who has tried to derive a standard of value from the individual's pleasure, or interest, or desire for satisfaction, has ever succeeded in bridging the gulf between this and the obligation to regard the claims of others over which Mill took so fatal a leap,[2] for the gulf between the "is" and the "ought" is by its nature an

[1] *The Life of Reason*, Vol. V, pp. 249–50, quoted by S. C. Pepper, op. cit.

[2] *Utilitarianism*, Chapter IV.

Digitized by Google

impassable one. All those who approach it from the side of the individual end, as Santayana does, by summoning resources from the other side in the hope that it will never be observed that these have no relation to those with which they started. These reinforcements seem, moreover, always to be derived from the same source, viz. the axiom that Sidgwick inherited from Butler and Bentham and that inspired him with the hope of reconciling their opposing systems, and that Santayana rejects in the earlier work to which I have been referring as not applicable to any concrete situation. If, then, he and those who follow his method still decline to treat it as self-evident, we may fairly demand that they define the status that they give it when they employ it as a regulative principle in their own systems.

It would thus seem that the line of criticism that accuses the theory we are defending of being divorced from experience is itself chargeable with overlooking an important factor in experience, whilst its sliding use of the value terms causes most of its more specific charges to miss the mark.

4. Its abstract rationalism is not, however, the only ground upon which this theory has been attacked. Professor Urban's objection, referred to above, is brought against it from an entirely different angle, and, though less calculated to

Digitized by Google

arouse popular sympathy, is really of a more serious character.[1]

Urban agrees that value is rightly identified with that which ought to be on its own account, but argues that, if it is so characterized, it cannot be described as a quality, though some writers (e.g. Russell and Meinong) confuse the two notions. Value, in the sense of that which ought to be, and value-quality are distinct concepts. His own account of the former (which has some kinship with the views of Rickert and Windelband) is a very difficult one, and I am not sure that I have fully grasped his meaning. Before considering his positive arguments, however, I must try to exonerate the "quality view" from the charge of inconsistency with which he thus dismisses it.

To say that value is *that which ought to be on its own account* is not, of course, to define it. Urban agrees with those who treat it as a quality in regarding it as a simple, indefinable concept, but he submits that in that case it is a *that*, and must not be confused with value as a *quale*, a *what*. He has

[1] Urban has himself shown, in the paper to which I refer, that Professor Perry's criticism (Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XI, p. 153) that value qualities are always found upon examination to refer to the sentient subject rather than to the object, relies upon examples of qualities which are, indeed, subjective, but which are not properly described as *value* qualities at all (*Value and Existence*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIII, p. 458).

Digitized by Google

three arguments against the identification of the two.[1]

In the first place, he criticizes the identification of *value* with *values* in the plural, meaning by these such qualities as the good and the bad, the beautiful and the ugly, the pleasant and the unpleasant. The abstract noun, value, he urges, is not a general term for these qualities. It is something judged because of these qualities.

It may be questioned, however, whether any modern writer really means to confine value to a definite number of so-called tertiary qualities. Had any one so intended, it seems likely that he would have succeeded in framing a definition in terms of them. Value defies definition just because it is a property apparently attaching to a great variety of different objects that have no other common characters. They are alike only in the fact that we recognize them as worthy to be. The classical triad of the true, the beautiful, and the good (to which in the popular reaction against asceticism it has become customary to add the pleasant) acquired the title of *values*, or value-qualities, *par excellence*, because it was particularly easy to see that the things possessing them were *good as ends*, objects of intrinsic value, whilst it was not so often recognized that this was equally true of many other things. Once this is perceived, however, it is no

[1] See op. cit. pp. 456–60.

Digitized by Google

longer possible to identify value with these qualities. They are simply *cases* of intrinsic value; the objects that possess them are *classes* of value objects, but they do not exhaust the genus. Such statements as "Truth is always valuable," "What is beautiful is necessarily good," are not analytic propositions for they can be intelligibly denied—indeed, it is by no means certain that the former is not actually false. If it be asked to what other objects value can attach, it may be pointed out that strength, for example, is not good simply as a means to other ends; it is intrinsically better than weakness. Order and stability have a value that is not merely æsthetic; they are essentially better than chaos or flux. Harmony is so universally recognized as good that value is often defined in terms of it.[1] Freedom seems preferable in itself to servitude, and not merely by reason of the greater range of activity of which it is a condition; indeed, it too has been suggested as the ultimate value concept.[2] Human affection is of value quite apart from the pleasure it promotes or from any other end that it may serve. Moreover, as Moore has pointed out, all the greatest intrinsic goods are complex; hence, although they must presumably contain some

[1] e.g. by L. T. Hobhouse: *The Rational Good: A Study in the Logic of Practice*, London, 1921.

[2] By G. S. Fullerton: *Handbook of Ethical Theory*, New York, 1922, p. 117.

Digitized by Google

elements that are of value *per se*, they may as organic wholes possess a far greater worth than can be attibuted to any of these elements in isolation or even to the sum of them.[1] It is just because they recognize that value is *not* co-extensive with the traditional value qualities that Russell and others have attempted to define its range by identifying it with that which ought to be.

The illustration of von Hartmann's which Urban uses in support of his argument shows that he has misunderstood them on this point. "Suppose," he says, "the world were a paragon of evil, a miscarriage, or a hell, it would still be a value for knowledge, and for the artist beautiful." He objects as von Hartmann had done, that "from the presence of these qualities, beauty, knowledge-value, etc., the positive value of the object itself does not follow."[2] Certainly it does not, but this is because a world of that kind would be a very complex object, some elements in which would have positive and others negative value; hence it could not in any case derive its total value from the former alone. As content of knowledge possessing truth, or as object of æsthetic appreciation, it would have positive value—"the beauty of its light as a painter might see it," considered in isolation, might well be worthy to be

[1] See *Principia Ethica*, Chapter VI, pp. 185–8. For examples of this principle see below, p. 278.

[2] *Value and Existence*, p. 457.

Digitized by Google

on its own account—but some of its other aspects, specifically its moral and hedonic aspects, would have a negative value far outweighing these; moreover, its value as an organic whole need not be identical with the sum or difference of the values of its parts; in other words, the peculiar interrelation of its factors might produce an effect more sinister than these could have suggested in isolation. We could thus deny positive intrinsic value of the whole in just the same sense in which we affirmed it of some of its aspects, i.e. we could declare, as the conscience of modern Christendom has declared, that it is a thing that ought not to be.

There is thus no ground for opposing the value qualities to value in the broad sense of what ought to be; indeed, no conflict between the two is possible, for the former are simply specific determinations of the latter, though the value of a complex whole need not correspond to the sum of its moral, æsthetic, and other qualities.

Mr. Urban's other two criticisms may be treated together. Value, he objects, is never a part of the nature of anything. "It is perfectly possible to assume a world with all its qualities, details, and laws, and still have to ask whether it has value or not. A thing may have its full quota of qualities without being judged valuable any more than existent." There is a contradiction in treating value, interpreted as that which ought to be, as a *quale* of certain

Digitized by Google

objects, for their qualities determine what they *are*, not what they *should be*. The positive value judgment, *A is as it should be*, would be tautology, if this meant that A was qualified in a certain way, whilst the negative judgment, *A is as it should not be*, would be a logical absurdity, since, if A exists it is already as it should be, for it cannot be other than it is.[1] Mr. Urban is aware that this argument, which he adopts from Croce,[2] is likely to be charged with question-begging, since it presupposes the metaphysical proposition that the real is *ipso facto* good, which would be denied by those holding a different metaphysical view. It can certainly be argued that many things exist that are by no means as they should be. He replies, however, that the argument is valid, *if value is a quality*, for " the judgment of quality presupposes that the thing is not other than it is." If value, or oughtness, is a quality, then this is a part of the thing's natural make-up. What it should be constitutes *on this view* a part of what it is, and the proposition that it is as it should be conveys no information, whilst the proposition that it is not as it should be is a contradiction.

Now this criticism would be valid, if the theory under discussion actually interpreted value as *a*

[1] Op. cit., p. 459.

[2] B. Croce: *Über die sogenannten Werturteile*, Logos, Vol. I, 1911, p. 71.

Digitized by Google

natural quality of objects. Its natural qualities show us what an object is, and, if value is one of these, then to say that it ought to be as it is, is simply to say that it is as it is, and to say that it ought not to be as it is, is to say that it is not as it is, which is absurd. It is significant, however, that the defenders of the view have never themselves employed this phraseology. It has always been those who opposed it who have referred to it as "the view of value as a quality," and I have myself used this term only in replying to the criticisms of those who have given it that name. The avoidance of it by Moore and his associates is clearly due to its exclusive association with natural properties the identification of value with which would involve "the naturalistic fallacy." Surely, Moore himself has sufficiently demonstrated that, though it is an objective predicate, value is *not* a quality in this sense,[1] and I can discover no other defender of the objective view who has so regarded it. Thus Croce's criticism is beside the mark. There is no contradiction in regarding "oughtness" (if we consent to use this barbarous word) as an indefinable predicate that is assigned to some objects over and above their natural qualities, whilst it does not attach to others though they have their full quota of these.

5. It would seem, then, that the difficulties with

[1] See Chapter III, pp. 114 ff. above.

Digitized by Google

which our theory is encumbered are not so insuperable as they have appeared to some recent writers, a discovery which tempts one to speculate whether the refusal to admit its claims may not be due, in part at least, to an unconscious preference for a view that has more positive implications. If value is a simple, indefinable concept, it is an element in experience that we recognize when we meet it, but that does not admit of further treatment by empirical psychology. On the other hand, a relation that varies with the states and circumstances of the subject is a complex notion, susceptible of exact analysis, and thus offering a fruitful field for scientific investigation. The alternative view, it is felt, savours of scepticism. If value is indefinable and unanalysable, by what marks are we to know it when we meet it? The only answer seems to be that it is known immediately, or intuitively—the usual refuge from scepticism is found in the moment of mystic illumination.

It is easy to see, however, that this is a total misrepresentation of the position here defended. It is only a reality too vast in its extent or its complexity to be apprehended by man's natural faculties that demands a supernatural revelation. So far from presenting any such complexity, value is a simple notion, as easy to comprehend as yellow, or hard, or loud, though, not being like these perceptible to the senses, our understanding of it is more analogous

Digitized by Google

to the recognition of a self-evident truth than to the perception of a sense quality. The grasping of all simple notions is a matter of direct intuition. If a thing is complex, we may require to analyse it in order to understand it, but when we reach its ultimate constituents, the nature of these, being simple, is apparent. We cannot define yellow or sweet, but we have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of these terms, and our understanding of the predicate *good* is similar in this respect to our understanding of any other primary notion. It follows from this that, if the objects that possess this determination are sufficiently simple and clearly defined, their goodness will be immediately apparent. It is indisputable that human affection, or order, or peace, are things good in themselves. Or, if there be a lingering doubt in any of these cases, just as it may sometimes be doubted whether an object is *really* yellow, or *really* sweet, it is easy to resolve it by comparing them with their opposites. The contrast of acidity enhances the sweetness of a taste ; a yellow shade becomes yellower beside a red or a green. Similarly, if anyone is in doubt as to the value of love, it seems at least self-evident that it is better than hate, just as order is better than chaos, or peace than strife. And, if the naturalist objects that these things are only judged good because they are found to be conducive to human well-being, I would reply that that is " putting the

Digitized by Google

cart before the horse," for we cannot know what things constitute well-being, which is a good state of society, until we have discovered what things are good.

This enables us to determine the element of truth contained in a recent suggestion that the fundamental value category is not *good* but *better*, and that good and bad may actually be defined in terms of better, which of course involves the admission that goodness and badness are not after all simple notions, but include an unperceived relation.[1] This is certainly a paradoxical interpretation of the situation, and seems moreover to be erroneous, for surely such a proposition as *peace is better than strife* presupposes either that peace is good or that strife is bad; these propositions do not presuppose it. That the complex, relational statement is more obvious to common sense than the simple one does not give it logical priority. The complex is frequently prior in the order of knowledge to the simple, but this does not mean that it is prior in the order of being. The discovery, in other words, is a psychological one, and the failure to distinguish between this and the logical aspect of the question is once more at the root of the confusion.

There is, however, a more obvious difficulty that the opponents of our theory will not omit to

[1] A. P. Brogan: *The Fundamental Value Universal*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XVI, pp. 96 ff.

Digitized by Google

raise. If value be an object of immediate knowledge, how are we to account for the diversity of opinion as to what things are good? Ought there not to be almost universal agreement over this, as there is over the identification of simple sense qualities like yellow or sweet? There seem to be two answers to this question.

In the first place, it must be remembered that, though value itself is a simple notion, most of the objects that possess value are highly complex; hence their total value is often difficult to estimate. Some of their elements are obviously good, others are as obviously bad, but it may be difficult both to determine whether the goodness of the former does or does not outweigh the badness of the latter, and to distinguish the independent value (if any) of the whole as an organic unity.[1] Such a complex as *hatred of cruelty to an innocent creature* includes more than one element the badness of which far more than outweighs the goodness of any of the other elements, yet it seems to have some positive value as a whole, though this may be overlooked owing to the absorption of attention in the badness of the parts.

Secondly, it is only claimed that *intrinsic* value is a matter of immediate knowledge. On the other hand, most of the objects with which we are concerned in everyday life are obviously instrumental,

[1] Cf. G. E. Moore: *Principia Ethica*, pp. 216–19.

Digitized by Google

and in relation to these two questions have always to be determined, viz. (1) Are the ends which they promote really good? And (2) Are they the best means to the attainment of these ends? It seems clear that much of the prevailing confusion as to the things that are good results from differences of opinion on the second of these questions; it is not due to uncertainty concerning the things that are worth having for their own sakes. I have tried to show that the actual object is in many cases a subjective state such as pleasure or contentment, and it is often an exceedingly debatable question what are the surest means to the attainment of ends of this kind. And even where the good to be attained is not of this nature, the propositions in question frequently involve a technical knowledge of causal relations which is by no means immediate, so that their truth may be a genuine matter of dispute.

As there is a possibility of misinterpretation here, it is important that I should make my meaning clear. I am in complete agreement with the writers on this subject who have drawn attention to the artificiality of the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value.[1] Clearly there is not a difference in *kind* of value corresponding to this division, for the value of the means is wholly derivative, though means and ends are

[1] John Dewey: *Experience and Nature*, pp. 366–7, 397–8; John Laird: *A Study in Moral Theory*, pp. 43–4.

Digitized by Google

often so closely associated that the value seems to attach rather to the series as a whole than simply to the end term. The means participate in the total structure of the situation and their value, if rightly viewed, is therefore intrinsic; it is not another kind of value of a lower order. If the association is looser and more external, so that many other objects would serve equally well as means to the end in view, their value decreases to vanishing point. It is proportionate to their organic connection with the end. It is obvious, on the other hand, that the distinction between contributory and consummatory *objects* is one of the basic distinctions of experience, and I think it will be found that it is to this that most of those who speak of instrumental and intrinsic *values* really refer. It is not disputed that the value of both is identical, but this is an intrinsic property of consummatory objects, which is reflected in contributory objects only in so far as they are means to the former, and in proportion to their essentiality as means. It follows that what is really meant by the common charge that most of the evils of modern civilization result from the failure to distinguish intrinsic from instrumental value is that things constantly associated in experience with consummatory objects, and thus participating in their value, are dissociated from them in thought, and believed to be themselves the possessors of intrinsic worth. This is one of the

Digitized by Google

commonest of the errors in valuation that it is the function of critical reflection to expose.

6. Whatever may be true of the other critics of this view, however, it would certainly be a misrepresentation to charge Professor Urban with a prejudice against abstract and indefinable concepts. His repudiation of it seems rather to be due to a distrust of its simplicity, which he attributes to a failure to observe some of the finer distinctions involved, and it is evidently the aim of the new theory that he proposes to supply this defect.[1]

In spite of his defence of the affective view of *valuation*, Urban denies as emphatically as any of the defenders of the "quality theory" that value itself can consist in a relation either between a subject and an object or between objects themselves, but he declares that these alternatives do not exhaust the possibilities. Value, he says, is a specific form of objectivity. It is substantive, not adjectival; it is not a *what* but a *that*. In calling it a specific form of objectivity he means to contrast it with being and existence. "Over against the world of *mere* objects as such," he quotes several times, "are the categories of being and value, all inclusive categories of the world"—though if by "being"

[1] His account of this theory is contained in the latter part of the article already referred to, and in two subsequent articles: *Knowledge of Value and the Value-Judgment*, and *Ontological Problems of Value*, Journal of Philosophy, Vols. XIII and XIV.

Digitized by Google

he means existence or subsistence (and it is difficult to see how else he can be using it so long as he opposes it to value), we shall see presently that he does not really consider this an all-inclusive category.

This is clearly a very abstract and technical theory, and it is not always easy to follow Urban's exposition of it; hence I must ask his pardon if I appear at times to do less than justice to the profundity of his thought. We have seen that (owing as I believe to the misconception that it treats value as a natural quality) he believes the so-called "quality theory" of value may be dismissed as contradictory and so in the last resort meaningless. I think, however, that a brief examination of his own view will show that it is even harder to attach any important meaning to this; indeed, one cannot help feeling that the reaction against *Psychologismus* that it exhibits has carried him so far in the opposite direction that he has almost passed beyond the sphere of human thought altogether. To put this more specifically: Having in his early work[1] made an important contribution to the psychology of value, and desiring, like Meinong, to make it clear that he regards the metaphysic of value as a separate problem, he now goes so far as to deny that there is any very important connection between the two provinces. A psychological

[1] *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*, referred to in Chapter II above.

Digitized by Google

investigation is apparently not in his view even the *ratio cognoscendi* of the more significant aspects of value, for, not only is this based on *a priori* knowledge, it is not even experience that draws attention to the presence of the non-empirical factor; nor is this empirically verified, for he affirms it in defiance of experience. It is just here that it becomes exceedingly difficult to attach any clear meaning to his statements. We must, however, examine them in somewhat more detail.

We are told, in the first place, that value is not a determination of being, by which it is meant that, not only is it not necessary that an object of value should exist, it need not even subsist, for value is an irreducible form of objectivity, or reality, "lying between being and non-being."[1] Now, as I have already stated in referring to the arguments of Meinong and Dewey, I do not regard existence as a necessary presupposition of value. It may undoubtedly attach to the potential or subsistent. When, however, Urban goes on to attribute it to objects that belong to neither of these spheres, i.e. to "impossible objects," such as round-squares, or changeless or unmixed happiness, or complete self-realization, which he admits may contain a contradiction in their very natures, or to frictionless machines, or perpetual motion machines, I confess myself unable to follow him. It may be true, as

[1] *Value and Existence*, p. 464.

Digitized by Google

he suggests, that some of these fictions have an instrumental value for theory, but in that case, surely, they enter into the conceptual structures of scientific thought, and must thus be regarded as subsisting. Apart from this reservation, I cannot attach any meaning to such statements as that a round-square, or unmixed happiness (which seems also to contain a contradiction) are things that ought or ought not to be. They are simply things that *cannot* be. The difficulty of deciding whether it is positive or negative value that he ascribes to them is sufficient evidence that the predicate has not much import when thus broadly applied.

In view of its supposed independence of any mode of being, we might have wondered how it was possible to know anything about value at all. As stated, however, Urban believes that this knowledge is derived from an *a priori* source. "There are," he says, "at least two value propositions which can be made about objects *a priori*." (1) "*To every object—in the widest sense of the word—positive or negative value must be predicated*" (hence its association even with impossible objects). (2) "*Every value stands in a system of higher or lower.*" "With our way of experiencing is bound up the notion that, beyond the valued thing, there is another thing that has another value, either more or less." If these statements are not self-evident, however—and I cannot see that they are—we must demand

Digitized by Google

to know the grounds on which we are to accept them. Urban apparently believes that they *are* self-evident, though he admits that they are contrary to the witness of experience. There seems thus to be a conflict between *a priori* and *a posteriori* evidence. "It is true, of course," he says, "that in actual valuation we find indifference to some objects," but this "psychological indifference" is to be explained as simply a refusal to acknowledge a value really present.[1]

Now, I have all along maintained that there must be many objects whose value is as yet unacknowledged, but I am at a loss to understand how, in the absence of such recognition, we can say *which* these objects are, much less affirm that *all* objects have a value, positive or negative; but then, unlike Professor Urban, I do not know this *a priori*. Thus I cannot avoid the suspicion that, in denying valuing to be even the *ratio cognoscendi* of value, he has been guilty of the proverbial indiscretion of emptying the baby out with the bath.

When we turn to his second postulate the situation becomes even more strained, for here again it has to be admitted that experience affords no warrant for the commensurability of all values, which is certainly repugnant to common sense. Yet he persists: "Though it may be disputed, it has meaning at least to say that the fact that two plus

[1] *Knowledge of Value and the Value-Judgment*, p. 676.

Digitized by Google

two equals four is more important than the fact that all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right-angles; or, as Wundt somewhere in his Ethics maintains, the postulates of morality are *more important* than the axioms of logic."[1] Again I confess that I am unable to discover the meaning in these statements, unless it be that some truths are of greater practical utility than others, and this is certainly not the interpretation he intends, for such commensurability is only occasional and could not be affirmed *a priori*.

One would suppose, however, that he must have some grounds other than their very disputable self-evidence for accepting these two propositions. Certainly their opposites are not inconceivable—indeed, as we have just seen, experience suggests them, but he explains that this is *because we do not understand the term value broadly enough*, and here, I think, we have the clue to the meaning of his statements. In the last resort his category of value does *not* lie "between being and non-being," wherever that may be! It is not an independent category over against being, i.e. over against subsistence and existence. Rather it is because, as his examples show, he represents the scope of value as so broad that it includes both of these, and extends beyond them to take in such entities as round-squares and frictionless machines and unmixed happiness, that

[1] Op. cit., p. 679.

Digitized by Google

he is able to make these statements concerning it. But this extension of the sphere of value is not deduced from his two postulates; they are deduced from it. Though *a priori*, they are, as Locke would have put it, not "intuitively" but "demonstratively" known.

Thus broadly conceived, however, the value concept gives rise to a dilemma, for the term either loses all connotation through this enormous increase in denotation, or it becomes coincident with reality in the most inclusive sense. After a long struggle to escape between these horns, Urban decides in favour of the latter alternative, though he is at great pains to guard himself against misinterpretation here. He does not mean, he says, to assert the paradox that the all of reality has *positive* value, nor that all objects are either good or bad in the narrow ethical sense.[1] Nor must "reality" be confused with the more limited conceptions of "existence" and "logical possibility," for it is just the failure to distinguish it as an independent form of objectivity that has led to all our confusions on the subject. Nevertheless, "we cannot think reality ultimately without raising it to the sphere of value," and just as we find it intolerable without this, "so we find it equally difficult to think value without giving it some form of being."[2] We must at all

[1] Op. cit., p. 675.

[2] *Ontological Problems of Value*, p. 309 and p. 321.

Digitized by Google

costs avoid "the intolerable inanity of interesting ourselves in the unreal," in the manner of F. A. Lange, or Santayana, with their "world of imagination"—though it is difficult to see why this should be more intolerable than attributing value, and hence reality, to round-squares! As, however, he is aware of the objections to most previous accounts of this coincidence (e.g. those of Windelband and Rickert), and can only justify it on the grounds that it is a fundamental demand of the human mind that there should be *some* connection between the two and that most of the other suggested connections have been found to lead to confusions, he is naturally unwilling to dogmatize about it, and really treats it as no more than a working hypothesis. It is true that he tries to support it by his two postulates, but, as these cannot really be first principles and require in their turn to be supported by it, this merely involves him in a circle. Finally he suggests one other ground for accepting it: Value, he had several times suggested, must be a category distinct from existence and truth, because non-existence and untruth are the contradictories of these, whereas negative value is not the contradictory of positive value. Reality, on the other hand, has, he now adds, a double meaning. It may be identified with existence, or subsistence, or with these taken together, but it has another meaning in which "unreal" is not the mere contradictory of

Digitized by Google

"real" but is analogous to such terms as *un*-natural, or *in*human, which imply negative value. "In the ultimate concept of reality there is a eulogistic element that cannot be eliminated." [1] And in that case the category of value is ultimate. To be real implies first and foremost to fall somewhere or other within the sphere of value.

I cannot see, however, that this linguistic usage really furnishes any support for the belief that reality necessarily implies value. It merely shows that it is sometimes assumed to do so, the terms being then used in accordance with the assumption. Such a usage is, however, comparatively rare. "Unreal" is far more often used in a sense precisely parallel to "untrue." Moreover, is not Urban doing here precisely what he had declared that he did not mean to do, viz. implying that the all of reality has positive value? For what else can be meant by saying that "a eulogistic value-connotation is inseparable from the notion," and that "unreal" always implies negative value?

To sum up this whole discussion, it is evident that Urban is only able to give any meaning at all to his conception of value as an "objective" by trying to make it coincident with reality, so that everything that is real has value, and everything that has value is in some sense real. Whether even this proposition has meaning is a question that I must

[1] Op. cit., p. 323.

Digitized by Google

reserve for the next chapter, where I shall have to examine other theories that are based upon the same presuppositions. I would merely add here that Urban's account possesses an advantage over many of these in avoiding the elementary blunder of identifying reality with existence, and supposing, therefore, that whatever does not exist in the physical world must have a mode of existence that is somehow mental. In the meantime, it may perhaps be claimed that the view of value as an indefinable predicate has been vindicated against the most serious objections made to it, whilst this last alternative theory has not been found to possess the advantages claimed for it of being freer from contradiction or of profounder philosophical significance.

Digitized by Google

CHAPTER VI

SOME METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY DEFENDED

1. *Introductory.*—Summary of the preceding arguments—Negative character of the theory of value as an indefinable predicate—Its positive implication.

2. *Criticism of the idealist's inferences from the objectivity of value.*—The inference to the spiritual character of reality based on the identification of reality with existence—Or on the belief that all relations are internal—Or that value pertains only to conscious beings—And that such value implies the coherence of a world order—The real implications of the objective character of value—An objection answered—The idealist's new appeal to the internality of relations—His preoccupation with the subject-predicate type of proposition—His claim to the Platonic inheritance—Summary of the argument against Idealism.

3. *The theory of value as ontologically mind-dependent.*—An inductive survey of the principal types of value objects—The relation of each type to consciousness examined—The æsthetic character of truth—Investigation of the æsthetic factors in other objects of intrinsic value—The relation of æsthetic value to consciousness—Æsthetic experience not necessarily value experience—Æsthetic value too broad to be defined—Witasek's classification of æsthetic types—His first three classes independent of consciousness.

4. *Summary and conclusion.*

1. If we refer once more to the classification of theories attempted at the beginning of the second

Digitized by Google

chapter, we shall find that the task there assumed of establishing one of these by a process of elimination has now been as far as possible completed. We have seen that value cannot consist in the affective relation of subject to object, for the specific character that distinguishes so-called "value feeling" from other affective states is simply its association with a judgment of value, whilst the same *petitio principii* is involved in the attempts to trace it to interest or desire, which are only related to it at all inasmuch as they commonly include this feeling, and so presuppose the judgment which it accompanies. The judgment itself cannot, however, be constitutive of the value, for value is not a particular that is brought into being through an act of judging or any other mental process. Though usually predicated of the actual, it may apply equally to the possible. Again, the theory that professes to avoid the disadvantages of both subjective and objective views by treating value as a subject-object determination is found to combine two inconsistent positions, one of which is open to the same objections as other relativist theories. Once it is perceived that its reality does not depend upon a subject, however, it becomes apparent that it must be apprehended, like other objective determinations, intellectually, for, even if "emotional presentation" be a genuine mode of experience, it can give us no criterion of validity; hence we require judgment to distinguish

Digitized by Google

genuine from illusory values, i.e. to be certain that what is presented, or apprehended, is value at all. Lastly, the view that it is a relation between objects themselves is always found either to resolve it into something that is clearly *not* value, or to presuppose it in the objects related, whilst the theory that it is a unique type of objectivity seems to have little meaning, unless this be made to coincide with reality in the broadest sense, whilst even then it has too little connotation to describe a concept which, though admittedly *indefinable*, is by no means *indefinite* in its significance.

The only alternative that seems thus to be left to us, if we are to develop a consistent view, is to regard value as *a unique determination of objects, apprehended through judgment, but subsisting, like any other predicate, independently of the judging subject.* As this view emphasizes the indefinability of value, and insists that its relation to a subject who *values* is contingent and asymmetrical,[1] it is difficult to give at all a detailed account of it. It appears peculiarly barren of implication, which, as suggested, may be a reason for its unpopularity. In view of the predominantly destructive character of my argument in the preceding chapters however, it becomes an important part of my task to indicate in this

[1] i.e. there are acts of valuing not directed to an object of genuine value (errors in valuation), and doubtless many objects of value that have never excited the appreciation of a beholder.

Digitized by Google

concluding section just *what* I believe its few implications to be. Though the property of value be not imputed to things by a subject that contemplates, loves, or desires them, it may still be possible to discover to what circumstances in the constitution of external reality it owes its explanation; and, as this question has received at least two different answers, I should leave the view I have defended open to various interpretations were I to close without indicating which of these I believe it to imply.

Now, the fact that value is discovered in objects that are independent of us, and that it cannot be analysed into any simpler characters of these objects, reveals it as a character of reality itself. To quote a forcible statement of Professor Laird's: "If our convictions are not shams, all our directions in terms of value must have an absolute, not a relative, basis. . . . On any other theory there are *no* values, but only certain anthropomorphic tendencies and satisfactions."[1] It was precisely their refusal to admit this disjunction that forced us to convict the naturalistic theories examined in the previous chapters of begging the question. If the standards of beauty or goodness are psychologically generated, they are "completely relative to the human species, the mere perquisite of one particular anthropoid herd,"[2] and it is not legitimate to ascribe to them any axiological force.

[1] John Laird: *A Study in Moral Theory*, p. 303.

[2] Op. cit., p. 302.

Digitized by Google

We have, however, still to determine how much the belief that value is an irreducible predicate of things enables us to infer as to the further character of reality.

2. The implications that the writers of the last half century have found in this proposition are very familiar. That values are "absolute" or "eternal" has been regarded as either a ground or consequent of a belief in the unity of reality, in the organic nature of this unity, in the spiritual character of the universe, and, in the last resort, in the value connotation of reality itself. These claims are not, of course, as a rule advanced singly, and it is easy to see their very close connection. As, however, one or other of them is occasionally defended where no conclusion is drawn as to the rest,[1] it is convenient to keep them distinct.

I do not intend, of course, to raise the whole issue between Idealism and its critics, which has been debated almost *ad nauseam* in recent philosophical literature. As, however, several of the arguments I have employed would probably be endorsed by the defenders of that position, it is desirable that I should make clear how far I am prepared to admit their inferences from them. As a belief in the spiritual character of reality has not always been held to involve the other beliefs with which I have

[1] e.g. a pluralist may defend the spiritual character of reality without inferring anything as to its unity.

Digitized by Google

connected it, I will treat it as the central doctrine at issue, and will discuss the validity of these other propositions in so far as they are adduced in support of it.

There can be little doubt, I think, that the association of this doctrine with our theory has sometimes been due simply to the elementary blunder of identifying the real with the existent. The consequences of this confusion were pointed out by Professor Moore [1] at a time when the distinction still required emphasis, and should scarcely need repetition now that it has become a commonplace. Yet it is difficult to interpret even some quite recent discussions of the subject as anything but survivals of the old superstition that, whatever cannot be defined in terms of physical existence, must be a mode of, or in some way dependent upon, the only other recognized type of existent, viz. a mind. For we find value regarded as unquestionably mental even by many who are emphatic in rejecting any form of relativism. As, however, it is not held to derive this character from its relation to the mind that apprehends it, the only alternative is that it must exist *in* or *for* or *through* some other mind, and as in most cases no human mind can be exhibited as its medium, it is commonly treated as evidence of the presence and operation of a Divine Mind.

[1] *Principia Ethica*, pp. 111–12.

Digitized by Google

The validity of this inference clearly depends on the completeness of the disjunction in the major premise, and it is the uncritical assumption of this that I believe has been the cause of so much inaccuracy and confusion. It is particularly difficult to understand why this assumption is so often made in respect to value by writers who would admit unquestioningly that mathematical and physical laws, indeed all universals, lack the character of temporal succession which is the differentia of psychical existence—that these abstract, timeless, immutable realities have little kinship with mind as we know it. They, indeed, impose their categories upon thought, but, at least so far as the evidence of experience goes, they receive no determinations from our thinking, which exhibits regrettably little of their orderly and systematic character. To this value is treated as an isolated exception. Of these predicates it alone is held to be not a subsistent but a mode of existence. All other universals find occasional embodiment in spatio-temporal existents, but admittedly imply nothing more as to the ultimate constitution of reality than that this must be broad enough to include many modes of being, some of which are apparently unique and irreducible. Value, on the other hand, is held to involve consciousness, in the last resort a Divine Consciousness, clearly because, *qua* existent, there must be a medium in or through which it exists, and this

Digitized by Google

cannot be a physical medium and is *ex hypothesi* not the finite mind that values. The inconsistency is thus due to the failure to press the distinction to its logical conclusion. If value be similarly a subsistent, it may be known either by a human or a divine mind, but it is not dependent for its being upon either.[1]

I do not, of course, mean to suggest for a moment that this rather blatant fallacy has been the sole basis for the spiritual interpretation of reality, but simply that it is *one* ground on which this has been inferred from the otherwise quite insufficient premise that some real things are also valuable. The most forcible arguments associating the two beliefs are those that connect them with the other basic

[1] It is interesting to recall that this was admitted, albeit not unequivocally, by Malebrance, in whom a Platonism more genuine than that of most of its modern adherents was warring against the pantheism towards which his Cartesianism was driving him. Cf. *Éclaircissements sur la Recherche de la Vérité*, X: "La raison que nous consultons n'est pas seulement universelle et infinie, elle est encore nécessaire et indépendante, *et nous la concevons en un sens plus indépendante que Dieu même. Car Dieu ne peut agir que selon cette raison, il dépend d'elle en un sens, il faut qu'il la consulte et qu'il la suive.* Or, Dieu ne consulte que lui-même; il ne dépend de rien. Cette raison n'est donc pas distinguée de lui-même, elle lui est donc coéternelle et consubstantielle. Nous voyons clairement que Dieu est obligé de suivre l'ordre. Nous voyons donc la règle, l'ordre, la raison de Dieu; car quelle autre sagesse que celle de Dieu pourrions-nous voir, lorsque nous ne craignons point de dire que Dieu est obligé de la suivre?" (Italics mine.)

Digitized by Google

propositions of Objective Idealism. Of these, two in particular deserve consideration.

The commoner of the two is based on the claim that all relations are found, when rightly apprehended, to be of the internal, or organic, type, i.e. that they are so "grounded in the nature of the related terms" that it follows from the fact that the term is what it is, or has all the qualities it has, that it *must* have these relations.[1] All related terms thus form organic unities, and are meaningless abstractions when viewed apart from these wholes, or systems, whilst the systems themselves are radically altered, if not destroyed, by the loss of any of their members. The relation between part and whole is completely reciprocal. And if all relations are internal in this sense, the subject-object relation must be internal. Its relation to a subject must be so much a part of the nature of the object that what it is, or might be, in itself becomes an unanswerable or rather a meaningless question. Thus, as Kant held, all that we know owes its character partly to its relation to the knower, all that we value partly to our valuing, whether this be construed as a cognitive relation or not, for mind and its world are interdependent. Value, then, may be an intrinsic character of things and not a subjective affection externalized and imputed to them. Nevertheless,

[1] See G. E. Moore: *Philosophical Studies*. IX, "External and Internal Relations," p. 308.

Digitized by Google

since the whole realm of objects is in this organic relation to a subject, it is still, in a wider sense, mind-dependent.

The very forcible objections that have been urged against this position have considerably lessened its popularity in recent years. It has been pointed out that the relations between any *simple* entities, e.g. the points on a line or the instants of time, are purely external, i.e. they cannot affect the character of the related terms, for, if these owed a part of their character to their relations, they would be complex, and in that case their ultimate constituents must be simple, and therefore independent in this sense. The simplest constituents of any complex entity cannot be internally related.[1] Thus although a whole cannot exist without its parts, the objects which form its parts

[1] E. G. Spaulding: *The New Rationalism*, New York, 1918, p. 85. Mr. Spaulding suggests that even those who maintain the internality of all relations, hence of the knowledge relation, really make a tacit exception of one case of this, for they evidently believe that their account of the epistemological situation represents a state of affairs that is independent of, and prior to, their own or anyone else's knowledge of it. Though he regarded all other objects of knowledge as phenomenal, Kant believed his theory of knowledge to be an account of the knowledge situation as it is in itself, and his followers in the idealist tradition have always made the same assumption. Thus even for them there is one relation that is not internal, one object that owes nothing of its character to the fact of being known (p. 84).

Digitized by Google

may perfectly well exist without being in the relation of part to whole,[1] and need not be qualitatively different when they do and when they do not stand in that relation. The new "relational properties" that a stone acquires through becoming one of a pile do not follow from its other qualities, nor are these as a rule modified in any way by the fact that it finds a place upon the pile. Relations, in other words, are not properties, though the preoccupation of the Aristotelian logic with the subject-predicate type of proposition may account for the common failure to dispute this identification. The many familiar examples to which the same remarks apply are sufficient to prove that some relations are not internal in this sense, a conclusion which renders the assumption that the relation of object to subject—and hence of value-object to valuing subject—involves the interdependence of its terms, a very precarious one unless some other grounds can be adduced for accepting it.[2]

[1] G. E. Moore: *Philosophical Studies*, p. 288.

[2] It has been argued by Mr. A. C. Ewing (*The Relation between Knowing and its Object*, Mind, April and July 1925) that the knowledge relation (of which on this view valuing is usually a species) must be internal, because the object is either a part cause, or (if it is a universal) a part ground, or (if it is in the future) an inference from the cause or ground, of the knowing, and these causal and logical relations are internal relations *par excellence*, for their effects, or consequents, are produced by, or follow from them. If this is all that is meant by the internality of the know-

Digitized by Google

The second argument, though more complex, is not really independent of the first, for, where it does not rest on the confusion of reality with existence, it too may be shown to depend on the belief that all relations are internal. I refer to an argument based on the assumption that value, though not epistemologically relative to consciousness, and thus rightly called objective, can pertain only to the conscious states of living beings.[1]

ledge relation, there seems to be no objection to admitting it. Some of the features of the Battle of Waterloo were doubtless part causes of my knowing it now. It must have been a different event in order that I might now be ignorant of it (other relevant circumstances remaining the same). According to this account, however, the relation is not *organic*, for it is not reciprocal. It is internal in respect to the knowing but external in respect to the object known, for to represent the Battle of Waterloo as in any respect dependent upon my knowing it would be to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent. This, however, is precisely the argument that the supporters of the Coherence Theory of Truth use when they maintain that, for example, the proposition $3 \times 3 = 9$ is different for different knowers, and is truer for the mathematician than for the schoolboy, for in that case, it not only produces effects upon them in the absence of which it could not have been what it is, but the manner in which they know it *produces effects in it*; not only is it a factor constituting true knowledge, but the fact of becoming knowledge *makes it true*.

[1] See Hastings Rashdall: *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Oxford, 1907, quoted below (p. 291, note). Cf. also W. D. Ross: *A Symposium upon Ethical Objectivity*: I, *The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics*, International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXXVII, 2, p. 118: "I conclude . . . that good does not mean 'such as to arouse some

Digitized by Google

Now, quite clearly, the spiritual character of reality cannot be directly inferred from this proposition. It would be sufficient that a consciousness should emerge here and there, some of whose states exhibited value. The defenders of this belief usually go on to urge, however, that there is no genuine value unless its occurrence is more than fragmentary and sporadic. To call a thing good means that it exhibits some measure of order and coherence, which in its turn rests upon, and is an indication of, a deeper order of the universe itself; for a mere will-o'-the-wisp appearance, illuminating for a moment here and there a dark and hostile world, would be an impertinence to which this name would be quite inappropriate.

It will be easier to appreciate the force of this position if we consider a few of its applications.

We ascribe value to knowledge, it is argued, because knowledge reveals the systematic interconnections of the real world. If the world exhibited elements of irrationality, rendering all our calculations uncertain, and reducing all laws to mere approximations representing the average for a wide range of varying particulars, it would, indeed, still

experience in a mind.' Yet I have the conviction that apart from mind there is no such thing as good or value. The only possible conclusion is that good is a characteristic only of minds and states of mind." For a discussion of the validity of this hypothesis itself see below, pp. 291 ff.

Digitized by Google

be necessary for the practical purposes of life to calculate the probability of events, and knowledge would thus retain a part of its value as a means, but its intrinsic worth would have diminished in proportion to its decrease in system. The mere enumeration of resembling particulars would be devoid of all but a purely practical utility. Similarly, if the objects we call beautiful were not an expression of a deeper harmony than is presented by a mere pleasing combination of colours or tones, would they appear sufficiently important to be classed among things good in themselves? "If we penetrate at once into the depths of the problem," says Münsterberg, a vigorous defender of this position, "we find that, just as all logical values express the self-perseverance of the world, *all the æsthetic values refer to the self-agreement of the world.* . . . Both satisfy the will, and are therefore valuable; but they satisfy the will not because they adjust themselves to the personal desires of the individual, but because the over-personal structure of the beautiful, as of the true, must satisfy every possible subject. . . . *They refer to the structural principle of the only world which can mean a real world for us.* Thus the individual will finds both the beautiful and the true world *as an eternally given a-prioristically determined world.*"[1]

[1] Hugo Münsterberg: *The Eternal Values*, Boston and New York, 1909, pp. 165–6 (italics mine).

Digitized by Google

The claim in respect to moral values is equally instructive. Is there any reason, it is sometimes asked, why we should consider the welfare of others instead of merely gratifying our own propensities without reference to any broader claim, unless we have grounds for believing that human beings are "members one of another" through participation in a spiritual unity that gives meaning and value to each individual. The Principle of Rational Benevolence is not a self-evident principle; indeed, taken at its face value it is highly disputable. If I and those whom I call my brethren are really unrelated monads in a pluralistic world that reveals no pre-established harmony, how can I estimate the claims upon me of any other creature, and what reason have I under such circumstances for considering them at all?

This, it is true, is an extreme example. The situation is not often so crudely conceived in the writings of philosophers. More frequently the sense of obligation is recognized as an empirical fact, which, however, as Kant pointed out, involves a contradiction until it is reinforced by metaphysical postulates. Experience, in other words, includes moral experience, which consists in an allegiance to standards that have not the hypothetical character of human constructions. "Just as the data of sense-experience are found to manifest certain regularities from which 'laws of nature,' as they are

Digitized by Google

called, may be inferred, so also in our moral experience a certain law or order can be discovered, with a claim to be regarded as objective, which may be compared with the similar claim made on behalf of natural law. If we take experience as a whole, and do not arbitrarily restrict ourselves to that portion of it with which the physical and natural sciences have to do, then our interpretation of it must have ethical data at its basis and ethical laws in its structure."[1] As, moreover, it is commonly felt that so far-reaching a claim requires to be validated, such statements are usually followed by an exposition of the metaphysical status of these laws. "A comprehensive view of . . . ultimate reality," it is said, "must include an account of things and persons, laws and values. If we are unable to reach a view of it as a whole, *then we have attained no philosophy*; if we can reach such a view, then we must be able to see how existing beings and the laws or orders of their behaviour on the one side, and the realm of moral values on the other side, harmonize *so as together to make a unity*."[2]

The argument, when followed in detail, is persuasive and the conclusion impressive. It is rather difficult, however, to believe that so weighty a

[1] W. R. Sorley: *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, 3rd edition. Cambridge, 1919, p. 7.

[2] Op. cit., p. 509 (italics mine).

Digitized by Google

metaphysical structure can be safely erected on so slender a basis as the objective character of the simple indefinable predicate *good*. I think, moreover, that a critical examination of the steps by which its advocates reach these conclusions will be sufficient to convince the reader of their precariousness. I cannot, of course, undertake this examination here, but must content myself with insisting that the occurrence of value logically implies no more than the *possibility* of the spiritual unity of reality. Both the absolutist and the theistic interpretations are hypotheses that the discovery of value as an intrinsic character of things suggests, but this discovery is not sufficient to establish either. It would at most harmonize with an independent proof, could this be adduced. It must be admitted that we are likely to ascribe less value to knowledge if we are so sceptical of its systematic character that we refuse to employ this even as "a regulative ideal," but this decline has been greatly exaggerated, and seems to be due chiefly to the absence of the æsthetic appeal made by a completed, harmonious scheme. Moreover, though the advance in scientific knowledge and the development of new logical methods may force us to renounce such a goal as a fiction of imagination having no basis in reality, this in no way mars the beauty of those simple and orderly demonstrations that are attained in some departments, nor does it render the "piecemeal,

Digitized by Google

detailed, and verifiable results" which thought has substituted in any degree less worthy to be or to be achieved. Indeed, these are probably our only reasonable ends, if it be true, as Mr. Bertrand Russell once suggested, that the faith in the oneness of the world embodies "a failure to effect thoroughly the Copernican Revolution," the only unity (besides the subjective unity of each individual's experience) that the actual world presents being the "tentative and partial unity exhibited in the prevalence of law in those portions of the world which science has hitherto mastered, from which it would clearly be dangerous to generalize, since it may be just their simplicity and regularity that has enabled us to discover this, hence they afford no ground for supposing that what is as yet undiscovered is at all analogous in this respect."[1]

If this be a correct statement of the scientific position, the metaphysician must clearly be more modest in his demands, if sound results are to be obtained. If he attains no philosophy till he has reached a comprehensive view of things and the laws of their behaviour in a harmonious unity with the realm of values, he must evidently renounce the hope of such achievement, though there may be some who prefer to make a less ambitious claim for

[1] Hon. Bertrand Russell: *Mysticism and Logic*, London, 1918, "On Scientific Method in Philosophy," pp. 101–2.

Digitized by Google

philosophy. It is true that the fulfilment of humbler hopes will yield *quantitatively* less of value, but there is no reason to believe that what is achieved will be *qualitatively* of less worth, and as the more extensive claims have never been fulfilled, it seems to be the part of wisdom to content oneself with the attainment that is actually possible, resting assured that with even this end to pursue we are likely to die ere we know it. Even were the only possible achievement the collecting and recording of isolated facts, it would still be better to know these facts than to ignore them, for the worth of knowledge is not exhausted by its practical utility, nor by the æsthetic quality of its orderly connections; hence even this would from a theoretical standpoint be a task not wholly futile.

It is scarcely necessary to labour this conclusion by applying it to other fields of value. It is surely absurd to deny that a graceful curve, or a patch of pure colour like the violet of the spectrum, would be of worth were they the sole elements of beauty in a world of ugliness and confusion, and had they no deeper significance in respect to its real constitution. And the claim that moral values constitute an *order* that is independent of the human subject and determines his conduct seems similarly unwarrantable in view of the difficulty experienced by the more clear-sighted moralists in harmonizing even the primary ethical concepts that they acknow-

Digitized by Google

ledge.[1] Clearly these are not deduced from a single principle, nor do they form the inductive basis of any such principle. When Sidgwick and others call them self-evident, they mean simply what they say, viz. that, when viewed from the impartial standpoint of reason, they cannot be denied without absurdity. From this standpoint, other things being equal, every unit under consideration, be it a person, or a moment in a person's life, or anything else, has an equal claim to regard. The common objection that other things never *are* equal is a practical difficulty of application; it does not affect the formal validity of the principle. Such a principle, then, would be theoretically valid were it the only truth accessible to human reason, or were its connection with other principles totally obscure.[2] Whether human beings be monads whose actions no Deity has harmonized or members of a spiritual realm of ends makes no difference to its intellectual claim to acceptance, though doubtless it affects enormously the force of its emotional appeal. Nor should this failure to exhibit "a realm of values," much less to relate it to the world of existing things or the realm of natural law, be regarded as a radical defect of moral

[1] Cf. Henry Sidgwick on the reconciliation of the Principles of Rational Prudence and Rational Benevolence (*Methods of Ethics*, pp. 494 ff.).

[2] So that there appeared to be a real antinomy between, say, the duties of self-realization and self-sacrifice for the good of others.

Digitized by Google

philosophy, which may need to moderate its claims in this respect as much as the other philosophical sciences. It may not be possible to derive from the recognition of *good* as an objective property either a system of moral laws or a metaphysical theory, yet, if it be a simple, unanalysable predicate, it must be as easy to identify it in the actions of persons, or the relations between persons, that constitute the moral sphere, as in other objects and situations, and by generalization from such particulars to reach certain moral principles, though whether these will always harmonize is a question that can only be answered from experience. If an act is recognized as good, it is obligatory simply in virtue of *being* good, not as embodying a principle belonging to a moral order, and whether or not this moral order can be discerned makes no difference to the force of the imperative.

The difficulty commonly raised here that this hypothesis fails to account for the apparent insolubility of some moral problems, or for the training and discipline that are necessary in the moral life, or again for the differences in moral judgment in different environments and at different stages of civilization, has already been dealt with.[1] Good is a simple property, and the simplest examples of it e.g. a courageous deed or an act of spontaneous generosity, are commonly recognized and com-

[1] See Chapter V, pp. 239–43 above.

Digitized by Google

mended, just as equally simple cases of evil, such as an act of unprovoked cruelty or of petty meanness, are generally condemned. It is seldom, however, that the factors to which the value predicates attach are sufficiently isolated to be easily discriminated. The situations with which our value judgments deal are ordinarily very complex, and include many obscure factors which a person of little analytic aptitude or training may easily overlook, but which may contribute to an indefinite extent to their positive or negative worth. "Who can say," asks Professor Laird, "what obscure motives are fulfilled or used to be fulfilled in the sacred customs of Central Australia, or in any religious festival? The whole environment to which such duties conform is enormously complicated, and it should not be supposed that the simplest judgments of sense are at all a fair analogue. A fairer one, let us say, would be the signs of glacial action on the rocks, or the knocking of the engine of a motor-car. These to trained observers are spontaneously and unreflectively perceptible, and the mere fact that they convey nothing to an untutored folk, or to an unmechanical passenger, is not at all to the purpose." [1] Moreover, any moral situation is likely to contain elements that are bad as well as elements that are good, just as many æsthetic objects contain elements of ugliness as well as elements of beauty. It is

[1] John Laird: *A Study in Moral Theory*, p. 103.

Digitized by Google

perfectly easy to recognize the value of such elements once they are discerned. It requires more skill and training to estimate the value of the whole *as* a whole, though to the experienced observer this is sometimes as immediately apparent as that of the parts. Lastly, it is probable, as I shall presently try to show, that moral goods are always instrumental, and it may require experience or instruction to determine what the results of an action are likely to be, whilst it is by no means certain that there are not actually incommensurable goods, and therefore a conflict between the rules for their promotion, constituting a real antinomy of the moral life.

To return from this slight digression, the claim that objective value is a product of systematic unity, and that all evidence of such value therefore points to the unity of the real, seems to be negated by the kinds of objects in which value is discovered, many of which fail to exhibit the necessary comprehensiveness either in internal constitution or in external affiliations. The result is the same to whatever field of experience we turn for our examples. A pluralistic world has little claim to be valuable as a whole, yet it may contain as many *factors of value* as the postulated whole of Idealism.

When a theory lacks empirical evidence, however, it is useful to be able to appeal to an *a priori* argument. It is here that the idealist resorts once more to the doctrine of the internal, or organic, character

Digitized by Google

of relations. If things owe their determinate natures to the relations in which they stand, being meaningless abstractions apart from these relations, the notion of an occasional or isolated value obviously involves a contradiction. A thing can have value only as a constituent of a larger whole, and the amount of the value will be proportional to the inclusiveness of the whole. Moreover, if all the constituents of reality are related in this way, reality as a whole must be more valuable than any portion of it—in fact, only the completed whole of reality can be *completely real*, for any part of it, however comprehensive, involves some exlusions, and therefore some negations, i.e. it lacks something of reality. The "degree of reality" attained means, then, the degree of comprehensiveness and system, and this *is* the degree of value. In other words, reality is itself a value concept, its criterion being inclusiveness and organization. The true universal is not the mere class of the particulars (or species), representing their common characters; it is the organic unity of all the particulars in all the species subsumed under it. It alone is fully concrete and in the true sense "individual."

It would be superfluous to elaborate so familiar a doctrine.[1] As already stated, the idealist's claim

[1] It is important to remember in discussing this subject that an ambiguity has attached to the term "organic unity" ever since Professor Moore, allowing his logical zeal to outrun his discretion,

Digitized by Google

that all relations are of the internal or reciprocally causal type is clearly an illicit generalization. Not all but only some unities are organic in this sense, notably the living organisms from which the name is derived. It is true that, in cases where there is such reciprocal determination, no part can have much value except in relation to the remaining parts, since most if not all of its value is derived from the function it performs in interaction with these. Where, on the other hand, the relation is

affirmed his right to use it in a different sense from that which it had borne in the Hegelian tradition, viz. as referring to a whole whose value as a whole "bears no regular proportion to the sum of the values of its parts." The consciousness of a beautiful object, for example, has far greater value as an organic whole than the sum of the values of mere consciousness, which seems to be zero, and of a beautiful object existing out of relation to any consciousness, which is in any case comparatively small. (See *Principia Ethica*, pp. 27–36.) Now, quite clearly this is not the same thing as a whole whose parts are in the relation of causal dependence or reciprocity (as in the human body and other living organisms), and *have no value at all*, nor perhaps even meaning, apart from the whole they constitute. It was not, however, to be expected that Dr. Moore's criticisms would deter idealists from using the term in its traditional sense. What has happened has been that a number of his own associates have adopted his usage (e.g. C. D. Broad in *The Doctrine of Consequences in Ethics*, International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXIV, No. 3; Bertrand Russell in "The Elements of Ethics," *Philosophical Studies*, I, p. 55. I have myself used the term in this sense in the preceding chapter). Thus, if we are to avoid confusion, we must be careful to keep the two meanings distinct.

Digitized by Google

not of this type, it is at least not obvious that the relata derive their value from it. Being themselves independent of the relation, it is perfectly possible that their value may also be independent of it; indeed, it is easy to discover wholes, which are organic in Professor Moore's sense,[1] some of whose parts have a value (positive or negative) that is *not* derived from their relation to the other parts, and that they retain whether they enter into such a whole or not. Some of the colours and lines in a picture may have æsthetic value even in isolation. I have already reminded the reader that a pure scarlet or bright orange often excite genuine æsthetic pleasure apart from any reference to their context, and this is also true of certain curves and perhaps of circles. Yet clearly the picture as a whole may have an intrinsic value immensely greater than that of any or all of its parts; or its value as a whole may be negative—it may be a definitely bad picture—whilst nevertheless including these minor æsthetic features. To take a rather less simple example, any enjoyment as such is good; bad poetry, on the other hand, is admittedly bad; yet my enjoyment of bad poetry—a complex of good and bad elements—constitutes a whole that is markedly worse than the bad element alone.

Such wholes, then, fail to exhibit the character traditionally associated with organic unities. If,

[1] See footnote, p. 276.

Digitized by Google

however, we admit that the parts of any whole can have a value that is independent of their relation to the other parts, wholeness, or comprehensiveness, ceases to be the criterion of value. Whether the world as a whole is good or bad may thus be a question it is impossible to answer, as may also the different question whether the good elements in it outnumber the bad elements—indeed, once we cease to be obsessed by the demand for unity, such questions have very little meaning. Yet we may be perfectly clear as to the goodness of some elements in the world and the badness of some others, and can thus avoid the paradox of explaining its glaring evils as illusions due to the fragmentariness of our experience or our intellectual failure to reach a sufficiently inclusive point of view. Only if the "concrete universal" were the type of all universality, and all relations were thus internal, would idealists be justified in representing their Absolute as the Perfect Individual, and the value of all finite things as proportional to their reality, meaning by this the part they play in the whole.

It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the idealist's neglect of the "abstract universal" is again due to the failure to distinguish realities of other orders from existents. In any case, it is a direct result of the belief that all judgments are of the subject-predicate type, which is less patently false on that view than on any other, as every factor in experience

Digitized by Google

that is not itself an existent can then be treated as adjectival to, or an attribute of, some existent. If, however, the pitfalls of nominalism are to be avoided —and most idealists claim to be inheritors of the Platonic tradition—at least as much reality must be attributed to the universal as to any particular existent, and to this end a synthesis of the antithetical notions of existence and universality is accomplished by transferring the notion of individuality from the particular to the universal. These new universals, or Concrete Individuals, are thus not derived by abstraction from the particulars. The particulars are rather said to derive their reality from these hypostatized entities, in which they "partake" as Plato's particulars "partook" in the Ideas. It is they that are abstractions, if viewed apart from the universal, which is an organic unity of the individuals subsumed under it. Increase in denotation means corresponding increase in connotation; the *summum genus* is the complete system of Reality. A universal that exhibits no such increase in individuality but is reached by a departure from the realm of existence altogether, is simply a class concept obtained by reflection on, and comparison of, particulars. A system like pure mathematics thus represents no independent reality, but is merely "a truncated evolution which embodies relativity almost pure and simple," though "the abstraction is never quite

Digitized by Google

complete (for then it would annihilate itself)";[1] whilst the hypothetical judgment, the common form of a scientific law, is "a divergence from the concrete evolution of thought" and therefore "destitute of finality," demanding "a reversion to concrete thought by the fact that it presupposes a self-existent whole."[2]

Once it is recognized, on the other hand, that there are other categories of being, not all of which are adjectival to existence, it becomes obvious that not all propositions can be of the subject-predicate type. The analysis of relational propositions that do not conform to this type involves a logic that is not a logic merely of classes but of ordered classes and series, which do not always form hierarchies leading by a process of subsumption to a class of classes, or *summum genus*, but may exhibit other types of correlation in which the correlatives are independent variables. It is true, such a system represents a divergence from both physical and mental existence, for its universals are not concrete or individual, yet its power of maintaining itself, with no indication of the supposed tendency to self-annihilation, suggests that it is not after all a divergence from reality, but rather an instance of another mode of reality, independent of existence. If the subsistent were merely an attenuated representation of the

[1] B. Bosanquet: *Logic*, 2nd edition, Vol. I, p. 195.

[2] Op. cit., p. 263.

Digitized by Google

existent, the mathematical a function of the biological, the organic view of universality might furnish us with a complete account of reality. To those, on the other hand, who discover some universals *ante res*, and not at most *in rebus* as the idealists, for all their vaunted Platonism, have done, other modes of being will continue to present as important a field of investigation as existence.

It is difficult to resist the temptation to consider for a moment the idealist's claim to represent the Platonic tradition in this matter, though it would be presumptuous in one who is no classical scholar to yield to it very far. Most philosophical writers, however, like to have the authority of Plato for their opinions, and as both idealists and their critics [1] have laid claim to the Platonic inheritance here, it may not be entirely impertinent or irrelevant to draw attention to one or two passages in Plato's Dialogues that seem to shed light on this issue.

It is obvious that all later monistic philosophies have been influenced by the famous passage in *The Republic* in which the other Ideas are subsumed under the Idea of the Good, and reality is systematized through its relation to a value concept. Nor do I wish to dispute the legitimacy of an idealistic interpretation of this; indeed, many other

[1] Cf. Hon. Bertrand Russell: *The Problems of Philosophy*, New Edition, London, 1927, Chapter IX (though Mr. Russell is not in the habit of making this claim), or the later works of Mr. Santayana.

Digitized by Google

passages can be adduced in its support. I would merely suggest that, where Plato is as reluctant to commit himself to any positive teaching as he is in this case, it is hardly accurate to represent him as the author of a systematic doctrine. Is it not far more probable that he envisaged more than one possibility here—that as artist and mystic he felt the immense appeal of the organic view, though as mathematician he was accustomed to attribute to the Ideas simply the regulative function of scientific concepts or laws, regarding them as abstract, in the sense in which a mathematical concept is abstract, rather than as unities of the vitalistic or teleological type, which could be described in the idealist's terminology as "elements in a vast unitary vision and experience constituting a single spiritual world"?[1] For this world is reached, according to the account commonly given of it, by systematizing the varied experiences of a particular finite mind, a process that is extended until these particular minds are themselves organized into "a completer whole of experience," i.e. it is a movement in the direction of *a concrete living experience* surely foreign to the mind of Plato, whose aim was the impersonal aim of science, his method throughout the method of progressive abstraction, passing from the sense particular to the law it embodies, and from these

[1] B. Bosanquet: *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 385.

Digitized by Google

various single laws to a dimly apprehended unity of knowledge—a far-off vision of a whole of truth, which is for him alternately a product of scientific insight and an object of æsthetic wonder.[1] The Good, Socrates tells Glaucon in this much-quoted passage, is like science and truth but is beyond these, and is known by dialectic, a science that is of the same nature as mathematics but goes beyond it, for it uses the principles of mathematics merely as working hypotheses.[2] It is, however, these rather than the immediate data of experience that furnish the point of departure whence the goal of knowledge is reached; nor is this, when attained, a "completed whole of experience" but simply a starting-point of deduction, the first principle of a science of universals ("beginning and ending in Ideas"), which is not so far concerned with existence at all. "You are aware," he says, "that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences, assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses which they and everybody are supposed to know.... And of this kind [of knowledge] I spoke as intelligible, although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses, not ascending to a first

[1] Cf. J. A. Stewart: *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, Oxford, 1909.

[2] *The Republic* (Jowett's Translation), London, 1892, Book VI, 506–10.

Digitized by Google

principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis. . . . And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses—that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends."[1]

May it not, then, have been the discernment of a difficulty profounder than most of his modern disciples have suspected that made him decline to show "how the beautiful and the just are likewise good," or to give any such explanation of the Good as he had given of justice and temperance and the other virtues—in short, to relate his first principle of knowledge to any value concept—lest, as he says, his indiscreet zeal should bring ridicule upon him?[2] If so, it is surely a little ironical that this doctrine should have come to be associated with an ethical monism that identifies the two.

An even clearer evidence of his hesitation to relate them is found in the discussion of the categories in the *Theætetus*, where there is no practical interest to

[1] *The Republic*, 510–11. [2] *Republic*, 506 E.

Digitized by Google

divert attention from the theoretical aspect of the question. It is stated here that the soul perceives by herself the universals of all things, such as being and not-being, sameness and difference, unity and the odd and even numbers, and other arithmetical notions. This property of being apprehended without the medium of sense is then declared to belong also to moral and æsthetic notions—beautiful and ugly—good and evil—but these value categories are kept distinct from the categories of being. Socrates says: "The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflections on these and on their relations *to being and use*[1] are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by education and long experience."[2] It is difficult to interpret such passages in accordance with an organic theory that makes value categories the criteria of reality. If this appears the natural interpretation of other passages, where the value concepts have become objects of æsthetic appreciation, it may be the safest course to set these alongside of those that treat

[1] Or value—ὠφέλεια.

[2] *Theætetus*, 186 C. Professor Stewart (*Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, p. 66) understands the passage thus, and cites Natorp as a further authority. Natorp interprets it as follows: "Schliesslich werden die Grundprädikate zusammengefasst, *unter den zwei Hauptklassen* Sein und Wert,—οὐσία und ὠφέλεια (*Platos Ideenlehre*, Leipzig, 1921, p. 113—italics mine).

Digitized by Google

them as a subject of speculative enquiry, and consider what view of Plato's final position can be reached by a comparison of the two.

To sum up this whole argument: There seems to be no sufficient basis for the metaphysical propositions sometimes inferred from the doctrine of the objective or intrinsic character of value, which is, on the contrary, peculiarly bare of implication. Unless the value predicate is confused with the act of valuing, there is no ground for supposing it to be any more mental than the other universals that stand as predicates of our judgments, for it need not fall under any category of existence. If, however, it is neither relative to mind nor itself a mental construction, nothing can be inferred from it as to the *existence* either of a finite or an infinite mind. Nor does it imply that unity or coherence of reality which is usually interpreted in spiritual terms, for experience reveals no more than an occasional coincidence of harmonious factors, be it in a concatenation of laws, in the beauty of a sunset, or in an act of brotherly love. Such factors do indeed exhibit organic connections, but this is no evidence that *all* relations are organic, and that these are therefore portions of a more inclusive harmony, and there seems to be sufficient proof from other sources that many of the relations of experience are external. Whether reality is a universe or a multiverse cannot, then, be deter-

Digitized by Google

mined from the fact that things having value appear within it. Their appearance has no special bearing on this metaphysical issue. Still less is there any ground for believing that reality must itself be the supreme value, nor even that, as such, it has any value at all. Though the coherences within it may suggest an ultimate coherence, they certainly do not necessitate this, whilst there are many facts that suggest an opposite conclusion. To point out that nature exhibits such features is simply to affirm the reality of value; it warrants no inference as to the value of reality. It affords no more support to optimism than to pessimism.

It is true that many of the things we consider good do exhibit coherence, and that, the more far-reaching this coherence is, the greater the value, but this proves no more than that harmony is one of the things of intrinsic worth. It does not mean that harmony and comprehensiveness *are* value, or even that they are sufficient criteria of value, for we also apply the predicate to entities too simple to include these relational characters. It is surely particularly easy to see that we do not always value things in proportion to their comprehensiveness, as the defenders of this theory claim. Innumerable objects that we call *good*, from The Grammarian's researches into the history of the enclitic δε to the unimaginative affection of a little city clerk for his wife or child, are neither themselves specially comprehensive

Digitized by Google

nor do they derive their value from their contribution to any larger whole.

It may be true then, as Russell once suggested, that " insistence on belief in an external realization of the good is a form of self-assertion, which, while it cannot secure the external good which it desires, can seriously impair the inward good which lies within our power, and destroy that reverence towards fact which constitutes both what is valuable in humility and what is fruitful in the scientific temper " ;[1] in other words, that in postulating a moral order, or harmonious system of reality, we are not employing hypotheses that experience verifies so much as creating fictions that reason may demand for the systematization of knowledge, but that are nevertheless merely constructions of imagination to which there is no ground for supposing that experience will ever entirely conform.[2] But the values we discern in the world of our experience are not invalidated by our failure to construct a metaphysical theory on their foundation. Since they are demonstrably independent of our appreciation, we must regard them as real and valid within the

[1] Hon. Bertrand Russell: *Mysticism and Logic*, I, pp. 31–2.

[2] Cf. H. Vaihinger: *The Philosophy of 'As If'* (translated C. K. Ogden, London, 1924), esp. pp. 266 ff. For a more definitely Kantian statement of this position, see a paper on *Value and Existence*, by Leonard Russell, in *A Symposium on Ethical Objectivity*, International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2.

Digitized by Google

limited range of their application. The only deductions that we can make from them, however, are negative, though among these it seems legitimate to include the statement that a philosophical theory for which universals are abstract, not concrete, and which admits the possibility of external relations, is easier to substantiate than one that effects a more complete unification of reality.

3. Our task of substantiating the view of value as an indefinable predicate, and of defining its metaphysical bearings, seems thus to be as far as possible completed. It only remains to discuss one or two further questions that arise in this connection, the answers to which make its exact import a little clearer. The most interesting of these is a question which is raised by most of the philosophers who defend the objectivity of value, but which, in order to avoid all possibility of confusion with the relativist views examined in the preceding chapters I have purposely left aside for discussion at the end of this investigation—I mean the question whether value, though epistemologically objective, may not be ontologically mind-dependent; in other words, whether, without requiring to be known or felt by a subject, it may not be predicable exclusively of living subjects and their states, and therefore realizable only *in* a consciousness. I have already shown that, in any case, no important metaphysical

Digitized by Google

conclusions can be drawn from this hypothesis,[1] but the validity of the hypothesis itself has not so far been discussed.

This second type of mind-dependence will of course be defended by those who find grounds for believing that the structure of reality is itself mental, for in that case all other factors must be subsidiary to its manifestation in thinking beings. What is of interest to us is chiefly to know whether the claim is made in respect to *value* even by those who give a different account of external nature.[2]

[1] See above pp. 265 ff.

[2] The first volume of Dr. Hastings Rashdall's *Theory of Good and Evil* contains so vigorous a defence of the view that *good* is an indefinable quality, mediated through judgment, that the reader might easily suppose these arguments to be a prelude to an account of value as an independent character of things, which would assist him in finding an answer to this final question. When we reach the second volume, however, we find that such occasional statements as: "The important point to insist on is . . . that it is in actual consciousness that value resides and in nothing else" (Vol. I, p. 65), or: "There is a good state and a bad state of intellect, of feeling and of will. The good consists in a certain state of all three of them" (Vol. I, p. 75), were left unsubstantiated in the earlier part of the book, because they were regarded as corollaries of a proposition to be enunciated later, viz. that by far the most favourable position for the establishment of the objectivity of value is that the objects of our knowledge "exist only for mind, and have no reality of their own apart from mind" (Vol. II, p. 198, quoted by J. G. Riddell: *The New Intuitionism*, Philosophical Review, Vol. XXX, p. 561). Thus in spite of the superficial

Digitized by Google

Now this is a question to which our theory affords no general answer. It is certainly not self-evident that value can pertain only to consciousness—indeed, the claim that nothing can be of worth except minds and their states seems an unwarrantable assumption of human egotism. Even could it be shown that all the recognized values were realizable (or actualizable) only in or through minds, this might be merely an indication of our lack of appreciation of the non-human values and not a proof of the limitation of value to the conscious sphere.

resemblance between his view and the one we have adopted, this particular tenet is seen to rest upon a presupposition that we have rejected; hence it can afford us no authority for accepting his conclusion.

The same observations apply to Professor Sorley's statement that "intrinsic values do, as a matter of fact, always require persons as their bearers; nothing is ultimately of worth for its own sake except persons or some quality or state of a person" ("Value and Reality." *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series, London, 1925, pp. 252–3), for he afterwards admits that these values have "an objectivity which is independent of the achievements of persons in informing their lives with them" (p. 257, quoted from *Moral Values and The Idea of God*, 2nd edition, p. 238). Thus the belief, of which he offers no further proof, that they pertain only to persons, presumably rests upon the dogma already criticized that whatever is real must *exist* either physically or mentally; hence all laws, be they scientific principles or moral imperatives, which for finite minds "remain a 'not yet' and may be a 'never quite,'" imply a Supreme Mind that is "the source of all law and the home of all values."

Digitized by Google

It is true that the latter alternative is the simpler, and, in the absence of further evidence, is therefore to be preferred, but it could never be more than a provisional hypothesis, and could only be established even conditionally by a survey, not merely of all the *classes* of values—moral, æsthetic, and so forth —but of all the objects in these classes, for the association of value with consciousness might in some cases be accidental. Any such inductive proof would thus be necessarily incomplete—it might still be invalidated by future exceptions—though the discovery of *present* exceptions would be sufficient to *disprove* it. It seems worth while, then, to pass in review the principal types of value object to see whether there is sufficient negative evidence to overthrow the claim, or whether it ought to be provisionally accepted.[1]

It should be noted that this is to be an examination of types of *object*, not of types of *value*, for value itself, being a simple notion, cannot be analysed into species. What we mean by a moral good is not an object having a certain kind of value, but a certain kind of object having value. An æsthetic good is an object of a different kind, similarly possessing value. It is generally believed that the

[1] I confess that I have very little to add to Professor Laird's careful investigation of this question in *A Study of Moral Theory*, pp. 100 ff., to which I would refer the reader for some helpful illustrations.

Digitized by Google

things possessing it fall into definite classes, though, as these things are really exceedingly various and of many degrees of complexity, those to which value attaches in the highest degree being probably always organic wholes, which frequently contain more than one valuable element among others that are neutral and possibly some that are of negative worth, a scientific classification is difficult either to obtain or to utilize. Both philosophy and popular thought have therefore contented themselves with a rough and ready grouping, derived partly from an empirical survey of the objects in which value is discerned, but clearly aided by a discrimination of the various attitudes assumed by the subject in valuing, which are believed to afford a clue to differences in the objects that arouse them. This, at least, is the obvious basis of the distinction between moral and æsthetic values, which are the two most widely recognized types, the moral attitude being marked by what Professor Urban calls its "transgredient," the æsthetic by its "immanental reference"—the one prospective, pointing beyond the act of which it is predicated to its consequences for justification, the other contemplative, resting in the object, devoid of practical or instrumental considerations.

As to the further classes of value objects there is less unanimity of opinion, for it is sometimes denied of truth, the third member of the traditional triad,

Digitized by Google

though it is commonly ascribed to knowledge, and always in practice, though not quite so universally in theory, to happiness (hence by association to the innumerable objects contributory to happiness whose value is really instrumental) and to human affection. These, with the occasional addition of an independent class of "religious values" seem to be the groups ordinarily recognized. That these groups are themselves exceedingly complex and may include very heterogeneous objects is obvious from the range they cover, whilst it is easy to discover apparently valuable objects that cannot be fitted into any of them. As it is unlikely, however, that a more elaborate classification would shed much further light upon the application of the value predicate, I shall content myself for the purposes of this argument with an examination of the types most commonly distinguished.

To take the simpler cases first: It is clear that human affection is a value realized only in conscious beings, and this is also true of happiness, which, in the strict sense of the word, is a state of consciousness and nothing else. It is also very plausibly claimed of moral values, which, it is said, involve moral agents. There cannot be heroism without a hero, nor charity without a giver active in good deeds.[1]

[1] I am willing to admit Laird's amendment that a *conscious* agent is not essential, as moral predicates are applicable also to

Digitized by Google

In this case, however, it should be remembered that the conduct we commend as specifically moral is the expression of a principle of reason demanding impartiality as between the self and others, a disinterested regard for the welfare of all concerned. Even the spontaneous, unreflective acts to which we sometimes apply ethical predicates are probably always the outcome of a habit of just and impartial treatment—a consideration that might afford a basis of reconcilation between Kant and the sentimentalists. It is unlikely that a man so engrossed in matters affecting his own personal welfare as to be blind to the claims of others to equal consideration would ever be impelled to sacrifice his life or opportunities for another, though it must be admitted on the side of Kant's critics that the immediate motive force in such cases is more often sympathy or affection than respect for an abstract principle, and that the action is then only evoked by those to whom the agent is bound by natural ties, or whose plight makes a specially strong appeal to his emotions. Nevertheless, the act embodies the principle, i.e. it is performed only by one whose habitual performance is regulated by this in some degree, though he may not explicitly appeal

unconscious behaviour, but this does not seem to affect the argument very much, as it is probably simply thinking beings, whether momentarily conscious or not, that the advocates of this position consider essential to value.

Digitized by Google

to it in every instance. Were this not the case, it could not rightly be described as *moral*. On the other hand, a principle of this kind no more implies the occurrence of such acts than the law that $2 + 2 = 4$ implies that couples exist in the physical world. The fact, then, that moral acts, *if they occur*, involve conscious moral agents gives us no information as to the status of moral principles, which need not be regarded as more intimately related to consciousness than other universals. I am not prepared, for example, to deny the reality of perfect justice, though this may never have been, and perhaps never can be, realized in conscious existents, any more than I should deny the reality of perfect circularity though for experience this is a limiting concept, or of infinity though all immediately experienced objects are finite.

The question of religious values is a little harder to determine. So far as it is to the intercourse or communion with a higher Being that value is ascribed, a conscious subject is clearly a factor in the value object. On the other hand, there seems to be sufficient evidence for a religious experience of a purely contemplative nature whose object is not regarded as "personal,"[1] and in such cases the value is presumably ascribed to the object alone and

[1] Cf. e.g. B. Bosanquet's essay: *What Religion Is*, London, 1920.

Digitized by Google

not to the relation between subject and object. Unless, however, this object is regarded as in some sense a Consciousness, as it surely is even in the most "super-personal" of mystic experiences, the value seems not to be specifically religious. An object of æsthetic or moral value has merely become the object of a particularly *personal* appreciation. I would suggest, then, that consciousness, though not personality, is indispensable to the occurrence of a genuine religious value.[1]

It is a very difficult question whether value can be correctly ascribed to truth at all. Clearly a knowledge of truth may be of immense value, both as an end and as a means,[2] but this again involves a

[1] I am assuming the validity of the claim that this experience has objective reference, and that its whole worth is not confined to the subjective effects of the belief. A discussion of this question would obviously be beyond the scope of this essay.

[2] I cannot agree with Sidgwick that neither common sense nor "the sober judgment of reflective persons" is able to justify the importance which we attach to knowledge except, by considering "its conduciveness in one way or another to the happiness of sentient beings," and thus tolerates apparently unfruitful knowledge only because it is aware that "experience has frequently shown how knowledge long fruitless may become unexpectedly fruitful, and how light may be shed on one part of the field of knowledge from another apparently remote," whilst "even if any branch of scientific pursuit could be shown to be devoid even of this indirect utility, it would still deserve some respect on utilitarian grounds as furnishing to the enquirer the refined and innocent pleasures of curiosity, and because the intellectual dis-

Digitized by Google

consciousness possessing the knowledge. Of the nature of truth itself there are, of course, a number of different views that it is not my task to evaluate. To confine myself to two of the most widely accepted, it is held to be: (1) a relation between the knower and the object of knowledge, in which case it cannot be realized apart from knowledge, and it would be more accurate to speak of *true knowledge* than of *a knowledge of truth*. As, moreover, false knowledge is not knowledge at all, the distinction between truth and knowledge disappears altogether on this view, and there can be no undiscovered truths. Or it is: (2) a relation in the nature of things, meaning merely "that the facts are so."[1] This is the view of common sense, which regards knowledge as developing whilst truth is eternal, but it is difficult to see how such a view can claim *value* for truth, if this is not attributed to reality as such. To use another of Laird's suggestive illustrations: "There may be value and importance in *knowing* that Popocetepetl is higher than Shooter's Hill, but this true proposition itself is only a state of affairs."[2] Yet the scruple that gave Meinong

position which it exhibits and sustains is likely on the whole to produce fruitful knowledge" (H. Sidgwick: *The Methods of Ethics*, pp. 398–9). The claim that it is to the knowledge of truth rather than to truth itself that the principal value pertains does not involve this position so long as its intrinsic character is recognized.

[1] J. Laird: *A Study in Realism*, p. 126. [2] Ibid.

Digitized by Google

pause recurs with particular force here: He to whom life itself is not the supreme good must admit the possibility of a good that requires no living subject for its realization. For is it not to truth *par excellence* that we are wont to ascribe this super-personal value?

The solution of this apparent antinomy is, I think, that truth itself, and not merely the knowledge of it, may possess some value (since we do not suppose this to attach exclusively to that portion of it which has so far become accessible to the human mind), but that, so far as it is an intrinsic and not a contributory value object, its character is always æsthetic; hence we find that value attaches in a comparatively high degree to some truths, or rather to some interrelations of truths, in a lower degree to others, and not at all to an isolated truth such as Laird cites. That this has not been more frequently recognized is doubtless due to the fact that our attitude towards truth, as contrasted with beauty, is seldom free from some tinge of utilitarianism; hence we fail to distinguish clearly between its instrumental and intrinsic aspects, and our simultaneous appreciation of both leads us to regard it as a value object of an independent type. Much of what is ordinarily believed to be an entirely disinterested scientific curiosity is probably inspired partly, as Sidgwick argues,[1] by the hope of discover-

[1] See footnote, p. 298.

Digitized by Google

ing something that will serve, directly or indirectly, to the fulfilment of a human need or purpose. It is true that this motive is sometimes absent, and the thinker is innocent of *any* ulterior aim, but is not the source of his inspiration in such cases just the order and clarity of his demonstrations, the harmony of the conclusions reached by many separate enquiries, and the approximation towards a systematic body of knowledge that they represent?[2] And can we regard the almost universal demand for order, or system, as anything but the expression of an æsthetic need? I am not suggesting, of course, that this need is assured of satisfaction. Whatever may be true of the mere accumulation of *knowledge*, however, I do not believe that the most atomistic philosopher would attach value to the facts themselves so long as they remained wholly dissociated. It is to the harmony of one fact with another that we ascribe value, hence we attribute as much to undiscovered truths, so long as we postulate this harmony among them, as we do to our own demonstrations, however great the æsthetic pleasure we derive from them.

The answer to the question whether the value of

[2] Cf. Bertrand Russell: *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 156: "The world of being" (i.e. of universals) "is unchangeable, rigid, exact, delightful to the mathematician, the logician, the builder of metaphysical systems, and all who love perfection more than life."

Digitized by Google

truth is dependent for its realization upon consciousness would seem, then, to be in the negative, at least so far as its intrinsic aspect is concerned, though, as we have identified this with æsthetic value, our final conclusion must depend on our decision concerning the objects of that type.

Moreover, this analysis of truth suggests the question whether all intrinsic value objects may not be æsthetic, the other recognized values, such as the moral and the religious, being either wholly instrumental, i.e. of derivative value only, or, like it, sometimes instrumental and sometimes æsthetic. As an affirmative answer to this question would greatly facilitate the solution of the problem at present under discussion, it may be our simplest course to deal with it before proceeding further. Our answer to it will not, of course, have any direct bearing on the character of objects that are merely instrumental, but, as very many of the things that serve as means to the production of the things of worth are material objects, it is obvious that they in their turn have no bearing upon our main problem.

What we require to determine is whether the differences between the various classes of so-called "intrinsic values" are really differences in their intrinsic characters, or whether they are simply varying modes and degrees of utility, the residuum that is found to be of worth for its own sake being

Digitized by Google

always of the same general kind. Should this be the case, we should have discovered, if not the definition of value, at least its apparent locus, the necessary condition of its appearance.

Desirable as this simplification might appear, however, it will be evident that the complexity of the situation does not allow of it, when it is remembered that valuing, in the strict sense of the term, is judgment, and that feeling, which is the *essence* of æsthetic experience, is merely incidental to an experience of value. For, if value is predicated of things that evoke in us no emotional response, we can hardly include these in the class of æsthetic objects, even though their value be more than derivative. Although the only intrinsic worth we could discover in truth lay in its æsthetic aspect, we felt constrained to allow some slight value to the *knowledge* even of isolated truths, or to an accumulation of such fragments of knowledge even though no connections between them were perceived, and they must thus be devoid of æsthetic appeal. Such an achievement seemed at least better than bare ignorance. Evidently, then, there is at least *one* class of value objects that is not æsthetic. These comparatively rare cases of a worth that excites no emotional response are not, however, the sole exceptions to the principle we are trying to establish. No one, I suppose, would seriously deny that pleasure is of value for its own sake, yet it is seldom if ever

Digitized by Google

æsthetically enjoyed, for it is not as a rule an object of direct apprehension but only of marginal awareness. It is true that, in comparatively rare cases, the happiness of others may become an object of contemplation, but this is always a very complex whole, and it is difficult to estimate the contribution of any one factor in making it a source of satisfaction.

Exactly the same thing seems to be true of love, which is an experience we live through and not, normally at least, an object we contemplate. It is, of course, a factor of great biological utility, both in its sexual and its parental form, but this seems to be merely an incidental element in any but a strictly pragmatic evaluation. Yet it is only in comparatively rare cases that love in another becomes, for an artist or poet, an object of æsthetic appreciation.

The plausibility of our hypothesis is doubtless due to the fact that a number of other values, which have been traditionally regarded as independent, are seen to be really æsthetic wherever the object is more than instrumental. This can, I think, be demonstrated of moral and religious values, as well as of the value of truth. It was admitted very readily by the Greeks, who had not the predominantly practical interest of the modern world, which demands the priority of the moral (though the very fact that this *is* a practical value should be sufficient

Digitized by Google

evidence that it is not, in this aspect at least, intrinsic). It was certainly Aristotle's meaning when he described the best life as the life of contemplation, moral or practical activity being merely a state to be gone through in the course of its attainment, since it aims always at some ulterior end; it is never desired for itself.[1] Moreover, it seems reasonable to believe that *the purest pleasure* is realized, as he suggests, in the contemplation of objects of the highest value, "the divinest part in us apprehending things noble and divine," so that the most valuable total state of affairs may be a subject finding its happiness in the contemplation of æsthetic objects.

The question of moral values is, however, very controversial, and cannot be so summarily dismissed. It is true that few philosophers would now defend the extreme Kantian view that the good will is the *only* object of unconditional value (though much popular thinking still implies this). It is a psychological truism that "will-in-general" is a nonentity, and that no particular volition can be evaluated without some reference to its effects. The only live issue is thus whether moral goodness is of any intrinsic value at all, or whether we value it merely *by reason of* these effects, which are good in a non-moral sense. This is one of the principal questions that have divided the moralists of the last

[1] *Nichomachean Ethics*, X, 7.

Digitized by Google

hundred years, though it has been found to be a far less simple issue than it appeared to the earlier Utilitarians and their critics. It is impossible for me to enter into all the subtleties that have been introduced into the controversy by modern writers.[1] I have raised the question merely in order to point out that, here again, the cases in which we feel hesitation in describing the moral object as merely instrumental are precisely those in which the attitude we adopt towards it is not the specifically moral attitude with its "transgredient reference," but rather the attitude of contemplation and æsthetic repose.[2] Few people, for example, would probably

[1] G.E. Moore (*Ethics*, Home University Library, No. 52, Chapter V) and Bertrand Russell ("The Elements of Ethics," *Philosophical Studies*, I, pp. 19–25) have argued rather guardedly in support of the Utilitarian position. C. D. Broad (*The Doctrine of Consequences in Ethics*, International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXIV, No. 3) makes some suggestions in favour of the opposite view, which is also supported by Rashdall in spite of his defence of "Ideal Utilitarianism." A vigorous defence of the Utilitarian claims has also been offered by John Laird in a reply to W. D. Ross (International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4), though this is difficult to reconcile with his insistence in *A Study in Moral Theory* on the pre-eminence of moral value. He would presumably argue that the act and its consequences form too close a unity to be dissociated, but this is surely not always the case, and it would seem extremely paradoxical to ascribe *moral* value to some of the desirable consequences of a fortunate act.

[2] I notice that a similar view is taken by Mr. D. W. Prall in a paper on *The Metaphysics of Value* (University of California Publi-

Digitized by Google

care to deny the intrinsic worth of an act of heroic self-sacrifice, for our appreciation of such an act is often almost as great when it fails of its purpose as when it is completely successful, and it is straining the facts very far to maintain that this admiration was evoked purely by a consideration of the beneficial consequences that *might* have resulted from it under more favourable circumstances. Exactly the same thing is true of character, which it has also been customary to regard as an end in itself. It was evidently the supreme value they attached to this that led the Stoic philosophers to declare that virtue alone was good; yet it is easy to see that the perennial appeal that their strenuous disinterestedness makes to the "moral consciousness" of mankind, compelling us to acclaim Stoicism one of the loftiest ethical codes ever propounded, is really the appeal of the æsthetically sublime—a fact of which our choice of such terms to describe it as "fine," or "noble," or even "beautiful," is

cations in Philosophy, Vol. 5). The theory I am defending, however, differs substantially from Mr. Prall's, since he discovers value in the feeling relation, which constitutes æsthetic experience prior even to perception, i.e. to any cognitive activity. As I have explained (pp. 141–2 above), I hold in opposition to this that the primary æsthetic experience is not rightly called value experience at all, as no valuing, in the strict sense of the word, i.e. no acknowledgment of a value, is possible prior to judgment. The real experience of *value* occurs when the object of æsthetic experience is acknowledged as good.

Digitized by Google

perhaps sufficient evidence. It is further confirmed by the recognition that we seldom regard our own moral acts *per se* but almost always with reference to the whole series of events in which they form a link. It is only, as a rule, the acts of others that we appreciate in their intrinsic aspect, just because we can more easily assume towards these the disinterested attitude of contemplation.

One further objection may be raised here, though this has already been dealt with by Professor Moore. How, it may be asked, is the moral, as instrumental good, distinguished from the expedient. Now, if by "expedient" is meant the best apparent means to a desirable end, and not as in its popular usage, what promotes a narrow or selfish interest in opposition to a broader good, the answer is that there is *no* distinction except in so far as a particular sentiment has come to attach to certain classes of expedient acts, which there is a strong temptation to omit and the omission of which involves unpleasant consequences for others.[1] To call this sentiment, as Moore does, a *moral* sentiment seems, however, to be a *circulus in definiendo*. If we discount the more insistent emphasis on utility due to the danger that the difficult act will be omitted, and consider the sentiment simply as it is directed towards the act itself, is it once more anything else than æsthetic feeling?

[1] G. E. Moore: *Principia Ethica*, pp. 168–9.

Digitized by Google

The case of religious values hardly calls for a separate analysis, for these differ from the moral only inasmuch as the value of love may play some part in them, whilst the instrumental factor is less prominent here, the attitude being otherwise predominantly æsthetic.[1]

So far, then, as this investigation yields any general conclusion, it is, that the only real *fundamentum divisionis* among value objects is that between objects that are valuable for their own sakes, those that merely participate in the value of the ends they promote and those that have both characters; and, secondly, that those that are valued as ends in themselves are normally such as evoke the contemplative attitude of æsthetic enjoyment, though it is possible to value as intrinsic goods objects that have none of the qualities essential to such enjoyment, or that are not directly *presented*, and cannot therefore be contemplated from without. What we call *moral* value is the value attributed to acts that are useful by reason of the effects they produce, and that we also admire because they are difficult to perform, and so yield the pleasure that is always aroused at the sight of a dangerous obstacle overcome. When we

[1] I mean, of course, that there is no further distinction between *the factors of value* in religion and ethics. This should not be interpreted as an identification of the *domains* of religion and ethics, which I regard as quite distinct.

Digitized by Google

recognize the object's value through the immediate satisfaction it affords us, we call it *æsthetic*. When the object is an object of exchange, which is purely instrumental, we call it an *economic* value, and so on. It must be confessed, however, that this enquiry has not proved a very fruitful one, for it has revealed no further common character among the great variety of objects having value: acts and persons, material things, and the collections and arrangements of things. It is only in respect to their relations to ourselves or to other things that it is possible to classify them at all.

This should not of course be interpreted as a lapse into the doctrine that it is by becoming ends for us that things acquire value, which I should still reject as a *hysteron proteron*. For not every object can become an end, but only those comparatively rare things that we perceive to be of worth. It is their value that constitutes them ends, not the fact that they are our ends that gives them value,[1] though innumerable other objects, almost anything in fact, may occasionally be used as a means to

[1] Cf. Plato: *Euthyphro*, 10: "Socrates: The holy has been acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is holy—not to be holy because it is loved. . . . Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence—the attribute of being loved by the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me *the nature* of piety." (Jowett's Translation, Oxford, 1892.)

Digitized by Google

such ends, so that most things are valued in some relation, though for the most part only derivatively.

If, now, we return to the discussion from which this enquiry was a digression, the only question that remains to be determined is whether æsthetic value is ever realized apart from a consciousness, though the range of this class of values has been so greatly extended that it may be more difficult than it appeared before to find an answer to it. Certainly it could only be treated fully in a detailed discussion of æsthetic problems, which I do not propose to undertake. Moreover, it is very difficult to keep the epistemological and ontological issues distinct here. It is obvious, for example, that beauty is not *exemplified* only in persons, as moral goodness is. The objects of art are, indeed, creations of human minds, but many of these derive their inspiration from a natural beauty that has no such source, whilst, if we discover a similar æsthetic quality in the objects that excite the admiration of the scientist—the neatness and simplicity of a "teleological" adaptation or a mathematical proof—its impersonal character is even more obvious. In such cases, however, the problem assumes a different form. Beauty, it is familiarly objected, is "in the eye of the beholder," or it consists in *expression*, and things are expressive only to minds, which find in them an emotional quality that is an ejection

Digitized by Google

of their own inner experience. Thus the physical object and the æsthetic object are distinct, the latter being the bearer of psychical qualities.

I should like, in closing, to make a few brief suggestions upon this point.

If, as I have maintained, æsthetic experience is not as such an experience of value, but is both logically and temporally prior to this, not every object of æsthetic experience need have beauty, even in the very widest acceptation of that term (i.e. it need not be an object of value), for any experience may be called æsthetic in which I am absorbed in the simple contemplation of the object, both action and explicit judgments about the object being inhibited.[1] If I see a man slip on a piece of orange-peel, and am so arrested by the spectacle that I neither relate it practically to my own activity by a movement to assist the victim nor consider it intellectually in relation to its causes or effects, this is an æsthetic experience, yet I should scarcely describe its object as *beautiful*. It may be objected that it is only when we enjoy the objects we contemplate that the experience is genuinely æsthetic, and that it is just the objects we enjoy in this manner that we *do* call beautiful. Even if we admit the first half of this contention, however—and presumably we should

[1] Cf. Lascelles Abercrombie: *An Essay towards a Theory of Art*, London, 1922, pp. 14 ff., pp. 21–2, and p. 32.

Digitized by Google

not rest long in the contemplation of anything that we did not enjoy—the identification made in the second half seems to be erroneous, for we surely do *not* call all the objects that we enjoy in this way beautiful. I may genuinely enjoy the spectacle of a man slipping on a piece of orange-peel, or a crudely coloured lithograph, or the performance of a jazz band, but I do not consider the first beautiful, and if I applied this adjective to either of the latter, I should certainly be inviting criticism for an error of judgment, for I do not claim to be the measure of all things even in æsthetic matters. The same argument, then, applies here as in all the more general cases we have examined. If it is admitted that only those objects of æsthetic experience are properly called *beautiful* that are not only enjoyed but are judged fit to be enjoyed, this is equivalent to saying that the value is logically prior to the enjoyment, though psychologically the valuing comes after the pleasure. The latter is simply the occasion of the discovery of the value, though as an element in a desirable state of consciousness, it may have a slight additional worth, whilst, as Professor Moore has emphasized, the value of the whole, beauty enjoyed by a conscious being, is undoubtedly greater than that of either the enjoyment or the beauty regarded in isolation. So soon as it is recognized that there is no genuine experience of value until there is an attempt to

Digitized by Google

evaluate,[1] in other words, that in all cases of any complexity it is through the tacit recognition of things as *better* or *worse* that we come to know them as good,[2] it becomes clearer that an object is regarded as beautiful not simply as a source of æsthetic enjoyment, but by reason of some intrinsic quality that it possesses and that is not possessed by other objects, such as a jazz band, which we may enjoy but which we do not consider to be of value.

It will still be objected that this is only an argument against such hedonistic doctrines as that beauty is "objectified pleasure," and that it has no force against some other æsthetic theories, e.g. the theory that beauty consists in expression, for the intrinsic quality referred to may be just the psychical quality that the defenders of this view discover in the æsthetic object. We find things beautiful, they would tell us, in proportion as they are expressive of natural feeling, which is simply another way of saying that conscious subjects find their emotional experiences presented in the object, so that without emotional experients there could be no beauty. Thus to resolve the recurrent epistemological difficulty is only to bring back the ontological one in a more acute form. Whether or not there is

[1] i.e. there is only valuing in Dewey's first sense, in which it is equivalent to liking, and this I have argued is not an experience of value.

[2] See Chapter V, p. 239 above.

Digitized by Google

beauty only *for* a mind that enjoys, it is always a spiritual experience that is expressed; hence it can be realised only *through* a mind. And if this definition really covered all the objects of æsthetic value, the objection would be unanswerable.

Even if it be an adequate account of beauty in the narrower sense, however, it is obvious that it cannot refer to nearly all that we have agreed to include in æsthetic value. It would be too extravagant a claim that the value we ascribe to a body of scientific truth, or to the structure of the solar system, belongs to them solely as expressive of our emotions! But if it applies only to one type of æsthetic object, the value of the other types may be independent of the medium of consciousness—indeed, it is difficult to see how any mental factor could enter into some of them—whilst, as I have already suggested,[1] it is probably a too-exclusive attention to the higher types of beauty, even in the narrow sense, that has caused it to find such wide acceptance.

Now, I am far from claiming to be able to frame a new definition of æsthetic value that shall be broad enough to cover every case that I have included under it. I can at most draw attention to some classes of æsthetic objects to which this one seems not to be applicable. I have already mentioned the circles and curves, the simple colours and tones, that are commonly admitted to be of some

[1] See above, p. 186.

Digitized by Google

æsthetic worth, though it is difficult to see what human emotions they "express." The difficulty of formulating an adequate theory is clearly due to the fact that, if "æsthetic value" is to include everything that is found good for its own sake and can also be contemplatively enjoyed, it will be as hard to define as value itself, for it will embrace objects that resemble each other so slightly that their other common features are far to seek; hence only a description couched in the most general terms will be broad enough to cover them all. The most valuable contributions to this subject have thus been those that have attempted a classification of the principal æsthetic types, of which expression is of course one. The most comprehensive investigation along these lines is probably that of Witasek (though it is likely that even his classification is not exhaustive). I will therefore take this as representative of the broader view of æsthetic value that my theory implies, and will consider for a moment how far such a classification admits any intrinsic value in objects of a non-psychical character.

Witasek distinguishes four species of æsthetic objects, any of which, or any combination of which, may be found in the things to which we ascribe æsthetic value. These are: (1) Simple sense-data, such as colours or sounds—a bright orange or a pure violet, or the single tones of a musical instrument. (2) Form. (3) Conformity to type, or to a "norm."

Digitized by Google

(The beauty of many animals and that which we recognize as specificially "masculine" or "feminine" beauty in human beings would belong to this class. We do not call masculine characters beautiful in a woman or feminine characters in a man.) (4) Expression.[1] He calls these factors "æsthetic elements" because, even though some of them may contain elements of another æsthetic type—e.g. an expressive object may have a beauty of form or colour that is quite independent of what it expresses—their specific quality is destroyed by further analysis. Both the form and the expression of a melody are, for instance, destroyed by its analysis into single tones.

If, now, we avoid the *tour de force* of subsuming the first three of these classes under the fourth (as Croce, Alexander, and a number of other modern

[1] S. Witasek: *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Æsthetik*, pp. 36–58. Witasek adds a fifth class, viz. "objectives," which, he thinks, constitute much of the beauty of poetry and of the representations of historical or allegorical subjects in the plastic arts, where we require to know the meaning in order to appreciate the object. The elements in these that do not belong to any of the last three classes enumerated seem, however, to be non-æsthetic, the response they arouse being what Meinong calls an *Aktgefühl* (e.g. the pleasure of recognition. See p. 76 above). It is true, of course, that we sometimes require knowledge in order to appreciate what is expressed, but this is simply a condition of the enjoyment of one of the other æsthetic elements; it is not itself an æsthetic element. I have therefore taken the liberty of omitting this class from my list.

Digitized by Google

writers have done) and consider each as an independent type, we shall find that these three classes seldom if ever require minds as their media of realization. Neither the beauty of simple sensa nor that of the form of physical objects has any special relation to the psychical.[1] The former is always, and the latter almost always, discovered in the physical alone, whilst it is surely to the conformity to physical rather than mental types that the third category refers. Nor is it a sufficient objection that such conformity is beautiful only so far as it *expresses* certain qualities, such as the masculine qualities of force and vigour, for these are again physical not psychical qualities, and their display is surely of *some* value even though there be no beholder *to* whom they are expressive. Lastly, it is obvious that the properties or relations of order, simplicity, symmetry, system, etc., in which we have discovered intrinsic worth, belong almost exclusively to the second group (for even subsistents have *form*, which may be a logical not a sensuous property), whilst the beauties of external nature normally consist in the first three kinds,[2]

[1] It is true that Witasek himself believes æsthetic value to depend upon a conjunction of subjective and objective conditions (see op. cit., p. 372), and I cannot therefore claim to be following him in the use I have made of his classification. His view appears to rest on the assumption I have consistently denied that value and valuing are correlative terms.

[2] This of course depends upon how far colours and sounds are real properties of natural objects. I would agree with Professor

Digitized by Google

being at best "permanent possibilities" of the fourth, which may supervene if a beholder is present.

If this line of argument carries any weight, we seem justified in concluding that not all objects of æsthetic value, but only one very important group of these, require minds as a condition of their realization.[1] To be mind-dependent in this ontological sense is thus a character of the species, not of the whole genus. And since æsthetic values form, as we have seen, by far the largest group of the simpler intrinsic values,[2] this may perhaps be considered a sufficient vindication of the thesis that value is neither epistemologically nor ontologically dependent upon mind, though some values are, as

Laird that "if the wind really does moan in the wide, uninhabited forests, or sunsets irradiate antarctic wastes, it is hard to deny that beauty, too, may be there," whilst "even if nature herself is not as our senses reveal her, but an imperceptible rhythm of electrons instead, it is not quite evident that this hidden dance and musical motion might not itself have beauty" (*A Study in Moral Theory*, pp. 100–1.)

[1] I have already discussed the theory that the æsthetic qualities traceable in nature and in the realm of truth indicate the presence and agency of a Divine Mind, a form of the Teleological Argument which is founded on the belief that reality is an organic system involving a unifying principle.

[2] It should be clear from the foregoing discussions that the most valuable objects are always organic wholes, some of which contain several factors of value, which may be of different types.

Digitized by Google

a matter of fact, realizable only in conscious beings or through their activities.

4. It has been the primary aim of this essay to dispel some of the clouds that the prevailing *Psychologismus* has cast about the problem of value, obscuring to a great extent its logical and epistemological aspects, and resulting in the self-defeating attempt to deduce value from fact. No method, however ingenious, of discovering the nature of good through the analysis of psychical states or subjective attitudes can ever evade the charge of question-begging, for value is not a psychical element. Nevertheless, it is difficult to prove its epistemological independence by any positive argument, for it is found to be an unanalysable property with few direct implications. Thus it is only possible to establish this by exhibiting the inadequacy of all the alternative views, and the arguments employed in this process of elimination owe most of their force to the discovery that these alternatives—that value consists in feeling or desire for an object, in interest in it, or in a specific determination of the subject-object relation, or that it is *conditioned* by the judgment that the object ought to exist—all presuppose a judgment as to the value of the object, as does the theory that admits its objectivity but believes it to be mediated by feeling, or emotion. That it is a *predicate* or *determination of the object* is then established by showing that other objective accounts of it either again assume this,

Digitized by Google

or are too broad and vague to convey its perfectly clear significance, whilst the few destructive criticisms that have been made of it are seen to be based on a misunderstanding of its real intent.

The objectivity of value does not, however, involve an idealistic ontology, with which indeed it can hardly be reconciled, for an indefinable property is a non-mental subsistent, it is not an existent of the mental type, as most idealists have believed value to be. Their accounts confuse the content of knowledge with the act of knowing, and other forms of reality with existence, and find implications of an ultimate unity and coherence in what is at most an evidence of a partial order, whilst their treatment of reality as the supreme value category appears to rest upon the belief that all relations are of the internal or organic type, hence that things are real, as they are valuable, only as necessary elements in an organic system, an isolated unit being a nonentity. Once it is recognized that some wholes are not of this type, but that their elements may be externally related, it beomes clear that the totality of being is not *necessarily* valuable at all, and as its value cannot be empirically ascertained, it can scarcely constitute the norm of all lesser values.

Nor is it true that intrinsic value, though not necessarily *for* a mind, can be realized only *through* minds—in other words, that nothing can be called good in itself save the acts or qualities of living

Digitized by Google

beings—though it is clear that many of the most familiar value objects do belong to this class, notably moral acts, religious values, knowledge, and the values of human affection and happiness, whilst it seems impossible to include truth as such among the value categories. A brief investigation, however, reveals that many of the things commonly regarded as good in themselves are only of derivative value, most genuinely intrinsic values being æsthetic, though no generalization is possible here, for the values of happiness and affection, and of certain objects, such as fragments of theoretical knowledge, that are judged to be of worth without exciting any emotional response, form notable exceptions. The important question is thus whether æsthetic value can be realized except through persons. It is clear that, in so far as this is itself an embodiment of feeling, it must imply sentient beings whose feelings it expresses. Expression, however, is only one type of æsthetic object, and the other types, which include all form-qualities, thus comprising the intrinsic worth of all subsistents, seem to be quite independent of mind.

We seem justified in concluding, then, that, since "life itself is not the supreme good," things other than conscious existents will often be found to have a value "that requires no living subject for its realization."

FINIS

Digitized by Google

INDEX

Abercrombie, Lascelles, 312 note
Absolute, the, 279
Æsthetic feeling, *see* Feeling, æsthetic
Æsthetic value, *see* Value, æsthetic
"Affective sign," 90 ff.
Affective-volitional theory of value, *see* Value and interest
Aktgefühle, 63, 69 note, 317 note
Alexander, Samuel, 46, 165–89, 317
Analytic tendency of modern thought, 4
Appreciation, *see* Valuing
"Appreciative Description," 61, 92
Aristippus, 147 note
Aristotle, 305
Assumption, 78 ff.
  and feeling, *see* Feeling and assumption

Baldwin, J. M., 16, 18–38, 83, 92
Bartlett, F. C., 62 note, 74 note, 108 ff.
Beauty, 266, 271, 311 ff.
  Alexander's view of, 183–9
  analogy of, with truth, 174 note
  as expression, 184 ff., 311, 314 ff.
  of form, 316 ff.
  of natural objects, 187 ff., 311
  of objectives, 317 note
  of objects conforming to type, 316 ff.
  of sense-data, 187 f., 278, 315 ff.
Belief, and knowledge, *see* Knowledge and belief
Bentham, Jeremy, 229
Better, the fundamental value category, 239
Bosanquet, Bernard, 11 note, 15 note, 19 note, 24 ff., 280 f., 283, 297 note
Broad, C. D., 277 note, 306 note
Brogan, A. P., 239
Butler, Joseph, 229

Character, value of, 307
Cognition, and feeling, *see* Feeling and cognition
Coherence Theory of Truth, *see* Truth, Coherence Theory of
  value as, *see* Value as coherence
Community, as criterion of universality, 24, 28, 35 f.

Digitized by Google

Consciousness, value of states of, *see* Value of states of consciousness
Contemplation, 305
Contemplative liking, 150
Correctness, as criterion of value, 124 ff., 128 note
Creighton, J. E., 19 note
Croce, Benedetto, 184, 235, 317

Desire, and value, *see* Value and desire
not a distinct factor in mental life, 53
priority of feeling to, in valuing, 54 f.
Dewey, John, 43 note, 46, 84 note, 103 ff., 131 note, 140, 148–65, 199 note, 211 note, 241
Divine Mind, a, 258 f., 292 note, 298, 319 note

Economic value, *see* Value, economic
Egoism, Refutation of, 119, 209, 225 ff.
Ehrenfels, C. von, 7 f., 52 ff., 135
Einfühlung, 36, 100 note
Einstein, A., 174 note
Epistemological aspect of value, *see* Value, epistemological aspect of
subjectivism, 119, 128, 164
Error, Truth and, *see* Truth and error
Errors in valuing, *see* Valuing, errors in

Ethics, 215 ff.
Ehrenfels' view of, 7 f.
relation of, to metaphysics, 5 ff.
Ewing, A. C., 263 note
Existence and other modes of being, 73, 154, 215 ff., 243, 245 f., 249 f., 258 ff., 279 ff., 297
and value, *see* Value and existence
Expediency and moral value, 308

Feeling, æsthetic, 63, 65, 74, 77; not value feeling, 72, 141 f., 145, 312
and assumption, 91, 94, 97 f.
and cognition, 28, 37, 92 f., 198 ff.
and value, *see* Value and feeling
Baldwin's logic of, 16 f., 27 ff.
definition of, 57
" depth and breadth " of, 59, 61, 80 note
" form qualities " of, 95 f., 101
logically prior to desire in valuing, 54 f.
Meinong's classes of, 65 ff.
of imagination, 93 ff.
presentational function of, 46, 140, 161, 198–212
qualitative differences in, *see* three dimensional theory of
three dimensional theory of, 57 ff., 63 ff., 67 note
Urban's modes of, 90 ff.

Digitized by Google

Freedom, value of, 232
Freud, Sigmund, 52 note
Fullerton, G. S., 232

Genetic method, 5, 8, 14 ff.
Good, *see* Value
Green, Thomas Hill, 5
Groos, C., 99 note

Happiness, value of, *see* Value of happiness
Harmony, intrinsic value of, 232
Hartmann, E. von, 233
Hedonism, 5, 113, 142, 203 note, 314
Hobhouse, L. T., 232
Hume, 6
Husserl, Edmund, 14
Huxley, T. H., 213
" Hypostatic ethics," 215

Idea of the Good, the, 282 ff.
Idealism, 4, 20, 30, 167, 182, 257–90, 291, 321
  of T. H. Green, 5
Ideas of Plato, 280, 282 ff.
Imagination, feeling of, *see* Feeling of imagination
" Immanental reference," 58, 294
Impersonal value, *see* Value, personal or impersonal
Inclusiveness of interest, as criterion of value, 122 f.
Induction, Methods of, 21
Instrumental value, *see* Value, intrinsic and instrumental
Intensity of interest, as criterion of value, 123 f.
Interest, and value, *see* Value and interest
Intrinsic value, *see* Value, intrinsic

Judgment, as constitutive of value, *see* Value as constituted by judgment
  as presupposition of value, *see* Value, judgment as presupposition of
  hypothetical, 281
  of practice, 149 ff.
  of value, *see* Value, judgment of
  subject-predicate type of, 263, 279 ff.
" Judgment feeling," 75, 79, 98
  and value feeling, 76, 142

Kant, 5, 261, 267, 296, 305
Knowledge and belief, 164
  internality of the relation of, 262 note, 263 note
  value of, *see* Value of knowledge
Külpe, Oswald, 99 note

Laird, John, 212, 241, 256, 274, 293 note, 295 note, 299 f., 306 note, 318 note
Lange, F. A., 250
Laws of thought, Baldwin's genetic derivation of, 23
Life, value of, *see* Value of life

Digitized by Google

Liking, *see* Interest
Lipps, Theodor, 20, 67 note
Locke, John, 249
Logic and Psychology, 12 ff.
  Aristotelian, 19, 263, 281
  Baldwin's Genetic, 18 ff.
  of feeling, Baldwin's, *see* Feeling, Baldwin's logic of
  relation to metaphysics, 5 note
Logical aspect of value, *see* Value, logical aspect of
Love, Perry's definition of, 123
  value of, *see* Value of love

Mach, E., 174 note
Malebranche, Nicolas, 260 note
Meinong, A., 8 note, 9, 20, 45 note, 51 f., 54, 56, 62 ff., 70 ff., 83, 93 ff., 141 f., 161, 194–212, 230, 299, 317 note
Metaphysics, relation of the problem of value to, *see* Value, metaphysical implications of
Michelangelo, 186
Mill, John Stuart, 14 f., 52, 104, 133 note, 228
Moore, G. E., 8 note, 32 note, 45, 114 ff., 127, 143 note, 179, 194, 202 note, 209, 212, 213 note, 225, 232, 236, 240, 258, 261, 263, 276 note, 306 note, 308, 313
Moral value, *see* Value, moral
Münsterberg, Hugo, 266

Natorp, P., 286 note
Naturalism, 8, 32, 114, 131 note, 140, 165, 182, 221 ff., 238
"Naturalistic fallacy," 114 ff., 202 note, 203, 213, 236
Necessity, moral, genetic derivation of, 31 ff.
Negative value, *see* Value, negative
Nominalism, 174 note, 280
Normative sciences, 5 ff., 13 f.

"Objective," value as an, *see* Value as an "objective"
Objective view of value, *see* Value, objective view of
Order, intrinsic value of, 33, 232, 238
Organic wholes, value of, *see* Value of organic wholes

Paulhan, Fr., 90 note
Peace, intrinsic value of, 238
Pepper, Stephen C., 103 note, 104 note, 145 note, 216, 227
Perry, Ralph Barton, 9, 42 note, 104 note, 112–40, 155 note, 159, 222, 230 note
Personal value, *see* Value, personal or impersonal
Perspectives, 171 ff.
Petitio Principii, in genetic derivation of logical universality, 26

Digitized by Google

in subjective views of value, 32 ff., 61 f., 83, 122, 134, 161 ff., 179, 225 ff., 254
Philosophy and science, 3 f.
as criticism, 157
Picard, Maurice, 103 note, 104 note, 107, 145, 213 note
Plato, 280, 282 ff., 310 note
Postulates of value, Urban's, *see* Value, Urban's postulates of
Pragmatism, 175
Prall, D. W., 43 note, 104 note, 106 note, 107, 128 note, 150, 306 note
Preference, ambiguity of the term, 133 f.
as criterion of value, 129 ff.
valuing as, *see* Valuing as preference
Presentation, relation of judgment to, 77 ff.
Presumption, pre-judgmental, 77 ff.
Psychologismus, Chapter I *passim*, 190, 207, 244, 320
Psychology, and logic, *see* Logic and psychology
Comparative, 1
treatment of the problem of value in, *see* Value, psychologists' treatment of

Quality, value as a, *see* Value as a quality
Quasi-affective experiences, Appendix to Chapter II

Rashdall, Hastings, 264 note, 291 note, 306 note
Rational Benevolence, Principle of, 225 ff., 267, 272 note, 296
Reality, as a value category, *see* Value as coincident with reality
spiritual character of, 257 ff.
unity of, 167 ff., 257, 265 ff., 276 ff., 282 ff.
Relational view of value, *see* Value, subjective view of
Relations, internal, 261 ff., 275 ff.
Religious value, *see* Value, religious
Ribot, Th., 27, 198 note
Rickert, H., 230, 250
Riddell, J. G., 291 note
Robinson, D. S., 156 note
Ross, W. D., 264 note, 306 note
Royce, J., 168 note
Russell, Hon. Bertrand, 194, 212, 215 ff., 230, 270, 277 note, 282 note, 289, 301, 306 note
Russell, Leonard, 289 note

Santayana, G., 104 note, 118 note, 215–29, 250, 282 note
Schiller, F. C. S., 12, 16
Secondary qualities, subjectivity of, 200, 318 note
" Sensation feeling," 57 ff., 63, 65, 72, 77
Sheldon, W. H., 42 note, 214

Digitized by Google

Sidgwick, Henry, 225, 229, 272, 298 note, 300
Socrates, 136, 147
Sorley, W. R., 268, 292 note
Space-Time, orderly occupation of, 170 ff.
Spaulding, E. G., 262 note
Spencer, Herbert, 3
Spinoza, 5
Stewart, J. A., 284, 286 note
Stoicism, 307
Störring, G., 58
Subjective view of value, *see* Value, subjective view of

Taylor, A. E., 10, 13
Teleological Argument, 319 note
Theism, 269
Titchener, E. B., 58
" Transgredient reference," 58, 294, 306
Truth, 168 note
  and error, 170 ff.
  Coherence Theory of, 167, 264 note
  value of, *see* Value of truth
  various views of, 171 ff., 299

Universal, value as a, *see* Value as a universal
Universality of moral obligation, 30, 34
Universals, affective, 28 ff., 34 ff.
  concrete, 30, 35, 279 f.
  genetic derivation of, 21 ff.
  qualities as, 156
Urban, Wilbur M., 41 note, 43 note, 47, 57 ff., 75, 77 ff., 90 ff., 214 note, 229–36, 243–52, 294
Utilitarianism, 84 note, 300 f., 306

Vaihinger, H., 289 note
Validity of value, *see* Value, validity of
Valuable, meaning of, 105
Value, actual and potential, 195 ff.
  æsthetic, 174 note, 183–9, 266, 271, 294, 311–19; not coincident with intrinsic value, 302–11; of truth, 300 f.
  ambiguity of the term, 41 note, 99 ff., 152 ff.
  and desire, 46, 52 ff., 80 note, 111, 179 ff., 222
  and existence, 71 ff., 127 f., 154 f., 245, 258 ff., 272
  and feeling, 27–34, Chapter II, 141 f., 198–212, 216 ff., 312; mutual independence of, 91 ff., 100, 144 ff., 303, 313
  and interest, 9, 27, 46, Chapter III, 157 ff., 222
  and values, 154, 231
  as an indefinable predicate, 47, 50, 116, 127, 137, 236 ff., Chapter VI
  as an " objective," 47, 215, 230, 243–52
  as a quality, 153 ff., 230 ff., 244

Digitized by Google

as a relation between objects, 46, 213 f.
as a subject-object determination, 46, Chapter IV
as a total affective state, 57 ff.
as a universal, 154 f., 216 ff., 245 f., 259, 297
as coherence, 166 ff., 288 f.
as coincident with reality, 248 ff., 276, 282 ff.
as constituted by judgment, 148–57
as *that which ought to be*, 201, 216 ff., 230 ff.
classification of theories of, 47 f.
comparatively estimated, 239
economic, 106, 310
epistemological aspect of, 11, 17 f., 193, 207, 290, 311, 314, 319, 320
evolution of the problem of, 4 ff.
intrinsic, 180, 202 note, 231f., 238; and æsthetic, 302–11; and instrumental, 45, 73 note, 83 ff., 106, 126 f., 134 f., 136 f., 142 ff., 208 ff., 218, 240 ff., 246, 266, 275, 300, 302–11, 322
judgment as presupposition of, 68 ff., 108, 129 note
judgment of, 82 f., 140 ff., 149–65, 201, 207, 211 f., 217, 313 f.
logical aspect of, 11, 17 f., 26, 83, 143, 152, 191, 205 note, 320
metaphysical implications of, 4 ff., 156, 193, 235, 244, Chapter VI
moral, 117, 223, 227 f., 267 f., 271 ff., 294; Alexander's view of, 178–83; independent of consciousness, 296 f.; instrumental character of, 275, 305 ff.
negative, not the contradictory of positive, 250 f.
objective view of, 45 f., 166, Chapter V
of happiness, 295, 303 f., 305
of knowledge, 265 f., 269 ff., 295, 298 ff., 303; instrumental character of, 298 note
of life, 202 f., 300, 322
of love, 232, 238, 295, 304
of organic wholes, 233 f., 275, 277 note, 278, 294, 319 note
of states of consciousness, 84 f., 142 ff., 208 f., 264 ff., 290–320, 321
of truth, 167–78, 294, 298 ff.
personal or impersonal, 45 note, 71 note, 195–212
psychologists' treatment of, 7 ff., 50, 113, 165, 190, 201 ff., 237, 244, 256, 320
religious, 295, 297 f., 309
simplicity of, 240, 273 f.
subjective view of, 6, 26, 45 f., Chapters II-III, 159, 166, 195–212, 217 ff.
Urban's postulates of, 246 ff.

Digitized by Google

Value, validity of, 7, 11, 17, 26, 83, 143, 163, 205, 211 f.
Values, classes of, 293 ff.
distinguished from value, *see* Value and values
Valuing, ambiguity of the term, 103 ff., 194
as preference, 108 f., 162
attitudes of, 294
errors in, 204, 243, 255 note, 313
process and content of, 140, 148 ff., 190, 193
two types of, 152, 195, 220 ff.

Ward, James, 57, 93
Will, Collective, 180 f.
Windelband, W., 230, 250
Witasek, Stephan, 69 ff., 72, 94, 97 ff., 141 f., 316 ff.
Worth, *see* Value, intrinsic
Wundt, W., 58, 248

Digitized by Google